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Abstract 
This thesis is about autobiographical and fictional accounts of chronic illness 
professionally published between 1990 and 2012. It begins with a survey of popular 
and critical thinking about illness accounts, in which I show how both the medical 
humanities and literary studies have placed restrictions on what these accounts can 
mean, and thus on the kinds of cultural work they can do: restrictions that frequently 
belie the complexity of the aesthetics and ethics at work in many of the texts 
considered in this thesis. I build on this claim through close reading of a cross-
section of contemporary illness accounts in which I flag up the presence of aesthetic 
elements distinct to the literary—including aspects of imagery, form, symbolic 
structure, address, and so on—, and show how these elements work not just to 
underscore the informative content of these illness accounts, but also to create new 
patterns of meaning, new networks of relation, and new modes of engagement.   
Though this project focuses on the contemporary, Virginia Woolf’s essay On Being 
Ill (1926) acts as its theoretical nucleus. In chapter 2, I show how On Being Ill 
provides a productive framework within which to explore the relationship between 
illness, literary aesthetics, and ethics. I also tease out the themes that are to define the 
chapters that follow, for, as Woolf demonstrates, at stake in the representation of the 
embodied self and the sensations it experiences are issues such as the referentiality 
of language and of fiction; the workings of metaphor and allegory; and the 
possibilities and limitations of the discursive sediment that accrues around words, 
images, and narrative tropes. In chapter 3, I explore this latter issue in a study of the 
construction of the narrative self and of the body in four autoethnographies by 
women academics. In chapter 4, I look at the representational experiments that 
Hilary Mantel and Paul West undertake in their memoirs as they seek to describe the 
physical and psychological effects of illness. Finally, in chapter 5 I consider how two 
South African fictions of illness—J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron (1990) and Marlene 
van Niekerk’s Agaat (2006)—provide a valuable case study for thinking about the 
relationship between illness and allegory in fiction. My conclusion draws these 
strands together, arguing that illness accounts can contribute not just to our 
understanding of the illness experience, but to our thinking about the nature of the 
literary and its participation in the ethical also. 
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 6 
Introduction 
 
Every era casts illness in its own image. Society, like the 
ultimate psychosomatic patient, matches its medical 
afflictions to its psychological crises; when a disease 
touches such a visceral chord, it is often because that 
chord is already resonating. 
Siddhartha Mukherjee (182) 
 
 
In the late twentieth century, there emerged a public culture of illness quite unlike 
any seen before: a culture in which personal experience was thrust to the fore, and 
first-person accounts of living with, through, and beyond illness flourished in a range 
of media, including life writing, fiction, film, theatre, television drama, and blogs. 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the illness account had become well 
established as a genre—particularly in the field of life writing—and has since shown 
no sign of disappearing. Instead, it has continued to flourish, buoyed up by growing 
popular and scholarly interest in the subjective experience of illness, as well as the 
intersection between medicine and the arts and humanities. As Nancy Mairs—herself 
an author of several works on her experience of multiple sclerosis—observes, “we’re 
not talking about a handful of books here. Dozens have poured forth from publishers 
large and small in the United Kingdom as well as the States. My shelves groan under 
their weight” (xi).1  
 
Of course, this culture was not spontaneously generated: accounts of illness and 
treatment have for a long time circulated within social networks, in the form of 
personal correspondence and diaries, some of which have been published 
posthumously or brought to a wider audience through the work of social historians of 
medicine. Well-known examples from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries include Samuel Johnson’s reports of temporary aphasia (and other 
ailments) in his letters and journals,2 and Frances Burney’s account of the 
                                            
1  The deluge of accounts that Mairs describes here is given quantitative impact in the second edition 
of Anne Hunsaker Hawkins’s Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (1999), which records 
that between 1993 and 1997 the number of published autobiographical illness accounts almost 
doubled (159). This figure has continued to increase into the present day, as a 2012 replication of 
Hawkins’s 1997 OCLC World Catalogue search and analysis demonstrates.     
2  See, for example, Critchley (1962).  
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mastectomy she underwent—without anaesthetic—in a letter to her sister Esther.3 A 
more recent illustration of this kind of account can be found in Alice James’s diary, 
which documents her experiences of mental illness and breast cancer in the late 
nineteenth century.4 Sheila Rothman’s 1995 study of tuberculosis narratives in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries charts the beginnings of the transition 
from diaries and personal correspondence to more public accounts, such as those 
published in sanatorium newsletters, while in Illness and Narrative (2011) Ann 
Jurecic identifies the precursors of these accounts in professional medical journals 
and the popular press (Jurecic 5-6). However, though the first half of the twentieth 
century saw the appearance of personal narratives about illness, medicine, and 
healthcare in professional medical journals and the popular press, it was not until the 
second half of the century that first-person illness accounts began to move from the 
private sphere into the public in large numbers: a movement tightly bound up with 
cultural and technological shifts such as the democratization of autobiography, the 
growing influence of so-called “therapy culture,” the mass production of paperbacks, 
and, more recently, the digital revolution.5   
 
What remains surprising is that, while in recent decades a substantial body of 
scholarly work has grown up around the burgeoning genre of published illness 
accounts, the principles and practices of literary studies do not occupy a central role 
in this scholarship.6 While valuable literary readings of life writing and fiction about 
illness do exist,7 in general these readings, and the approaches they represent, remain 
on the periphery of the medical—or “health”—humanities. For, though ostensibly 
cross-disciplinary in ethos and methods, the field is currently dominated by “a very 
limited set of influential critics (and works of critical insight) whose own specialisms 
are not those of the humanities but instead come from the sociological and health 
                                            
3  As high-profile figures, and themselves biographers—Johnson of “the most eminent English poets” 
and Burney of her father—is it likely that they anticipated the publication of their letters and journals, 
including their accounts of illness and treatment. This certainly seems to have crossed Burney’s mind. 
In her study of Burney’s account, Julia Epstein argues that it was “a more studied text than the usual 
casually informative, familiar letter,” though she appears to have had no intention of publishing it 
during her lifetime (137).  
4  Covering the period from 1889 to 1892, James’s diary wasn’t published until 1934, with a 
complete, comprehensively edited version not appearing until 1964. 
5  For more on this, see chapter 1 in Jurecic (2012).  
6  In this sense, the medical humanities approach to life writing and fiction about illness forms a stark 
contrast to that found in literary and cultural studies of disability, a field that emerged from the 
disability rights movement, but which is now well established in its own right.  
7  See, for example, Herndl (1993), DeShazer (2005), Diedrich (2007), and Jurecic (2012).  
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disciplines,” with the result that illness accounts are seen to represent “either ‘data’ 
to be mined for information-giving patterns or ‘life stories’ which require some form 
of generic categorisation or typologies,” as Keir Waddington and Martin Willis 
observe (iv). To this list, we can also add the use of storytelling in therapeutic 
contexts, and the integration of narrative studies and creative writing into medical 
education and professional development, which frame illness accounts in relation to 
ideas of psychological and pedagogical utility.  
 
These interpretive limitations are further compounded by two factors. The first of 
these is the profoundly presentist worldview that currently holds sway in the medical 
humanities – a worldview in which the ascendancy of the biomedical model over the 
course of the twentieth century is seen, through its systematic occlusion of the 
subjective experience of illness in favour of the medical record, to be the major 
causal factor in the emergence of the illness account genre.8 Attempts to categorize 
illness accounts thus tend to focus on their relation to the representational norms of 
modern biomedicine, and specifically on whether they resist or reproduce these 
norms. In doing so, they often overlook the wider contemporary context in which 
illness accounts exist, as well as the influence that longitudinal patterns of writing 
and reading illness exert on these accounts.  
 
The second limiting factor lies in the assumption that narrative representations 
mirror clinical, social, or psychological reality, either mimetically or, in the case of 
unconscious perceptions and responses, symbolically. This assumption precludes the 
possibility that, in adapting experience into narrative, those who account for illness 
might consciously undertake any kind of reflective, interpretive, or representational 
work, and that this work might have meaning and value. As a result, both the burden 
and the power of interpreting and evaluating accounts of illness are placed squarely 
                                            
8  The biomedical model has its origins in the growth of laboratory sciences—such as bacteriology 
and pathological anatomy—during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and represents an 
approach to illness that is “causally specific” and “pathologically based,” in contrast to the “symptom-
oriented” approach that had previously held sway (Bury 2-4). This model came to dominate medical 
thought and practice in the twentieth century, bolstered by a rapid acceleration in medical research 
and technology, and reached a kind of apotheosis in the century’s middle decades. However, in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries this model has been subject to increasing criticism for 
its failure to account for social, psychological, and environmental factors. This logic drives studies 
such as Brody (1987), Kleinman (1988), Frank (1995), and the vast majority of Eric Cassell’s body of 
work, of which The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine (1991) is perhaps best known. 
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in the hands of scholars and practitioners, rather than those of the person with illness: 
an arrangement that is more like than unlike that of modern biomedicine. 
 
In its attention to persistent discursive patterns and commitment to thinking about 
representation as a form of work, the field of literary studies appears to offer a 
powerful antidote to the limitations of the medical humanities in its current 
configuration. And yet, literary scholars have for the most part approached illness 
accounts with a narrow-mindedness similar to that of the medical humanities. This 
narrow-mindedness is bounded on the one side by an unwillingness to explore 
alternatives to the tradition of using and interpreting fictional portrayals of illness 
allegorically—a tradition Susan Sontag calls “metaphoric thinking”—and on the 
other by a reluctance to take life writing about illness seriously as literature: a 
reluctance that underpins a group of critical practices based on a “general distrust of 
affect” and of testimonial writing, and which Ann Jurecic thus describes as 
“suspicious” (13). The coincidence of these suspicious critical practices and the 
growth of the medical humanities has resulted in the inadvertent annexation of non-
fiction illness accounts by the medical humanities, while the unwillingness of 
scholars in literary studies to think outside the parameters of metaphoric thinking 
about illness in fiction not only places unnecessary restrictions on the scope of 
meaning attributed to fictional accounts of illness, but also overlooks those fictions 
that do not fit this interpretive mould. Like the medical humanities, then, literary 
studies also offers a somewhat limited view of the significance of illness accounts 
and the kinds of cultural work they undertake.   
 
Neither of these approaches is wrong, per se. Illness accounts are often valuable 
qualitative sources of information about medical practice and patient experience, 
which can be put to use in pedagogy, professional development, and policy-making.9 
Furthermore, the long tradition of employing illness as a metaphoric device in 
fiction, as well as a means of developing plot and character, constitutes an important 
                                            
9  A recent example of this can be found in the work of Kate Granger, a doctor and cancer patient who 
has documented her illness experience in two self-published books and on a blog. Granger’s 
observations have instigated some significant, practitioner-led changes in healthcare practice. For 
example, following a blog post based on Granger’s observation that many staff failed to introduce 
themselves to her during her time as an in-patient, a voluntary pledge to do so began trending on 
twitter (under #hellomynameis) and on Granger’s blog, and several hospital wards have invested in 
public noticeboards based on the project. For more on this, see <www.drkategranger.wordpress.com>. 
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part of illness’s discursive history in Anglophone Western cultures – a history that 
continues to bear on writing and reading illness in the present day. However, the 
picture of illness accounts that emerges from these approaches is necessarily 
incomplete, with some areas only crudely sketched out, and others left entirely 
blank. Crucially, these lacunae not only point to a lack of meaningful 
interdisciplinary research at the interface of the medical humanities and literary 
studies, but also—and perhaps more importantly—to the intellectual and 
methodological limitations of these fields in their current forms.  
 
What this problematic suggests, I argue, is a pressing need for more thorough 
engagement with the challenges that illness accounts pose to the critical models on 
which these fields depend. This need is at the crux of my thesis, which seeks to 
further understanding of how the principles and practices of literary studies can 
make visible previously overlooked dimensions of the contemporary illness account, 
and how these accounts can in turn yield valuable insights into the nature of the 
literary and its participation in the ethical: an aim driven not just by a commitment to 
the possibilities and limitations of my own field (that of literary studies), but by a 
desire to articulate these possibilities and limitations for a wider cross-disciplinary 
audience, as an important step towards the emergence of the kind of meaningful 
interdisciplinary work that critics such as Waddington and Willis call for. Though 
the scope of such a project is potentially endless, my particular interest lies in a 
cluster of illness accounts published between 1990 and 2012 in which the literary in 
its various forms is not only particularly pronounced, but is staged in ways that strike 
up powerful resonances with notions of identity, accountability, responsiveness, and 
recognition: notions that lie, in the wake of Lévinas and his interpreters, lie at the 
heart of contemporary ethical philosophy.  
 
Consequently, this project takes as its frame of reference a group of book-length, 
published accounts by British, American, and South African10 authors written in 
prose and from a first-person perspective, in which illness not only forms both the 
motive for writing and the central theme, but is entwined with the act of accounting 
                                            
10  Though J. M. Coetzee has lived in Australia since 2003, and became a citizen in 2006, Age of 
Iron—the novel on which I focus in chapter 5—is set in South Africa, and was written when Coetzee 
still lived in the country.  
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for the self before others both real and imagined. Illness accounts of this description 
not only cut across the crude distinction between life writing and fiction, but also 
range over the entire spectrum of published material, from the lowbrow to the 
experimental. The texts on which this thesis focuses constitutes a cross-section of 
these accounts, ranging from autoethnography11 to experimental fiction. By accident, 
rather than design, they also fall under the rubric of chronic illness, primarily, I 
suspect, due to the time frame with which this thesis is concerned—a period in 
which chronic illness emerged as a major global disease burden—but perhaps also 
because of the nature of chronic illness itself.  
 
Defining and Describing the Chronic Illness Experience 
Though few histories of chronic illness exist, it is not, of course, an entirely modern 
phenomenon;12 nor is it the only kind of illness experienced in the present day. 
Nevertheless, chronic illness is an increasingly prominent facet of contemporary life, 
and one that is unlikely to diminish as the population ages and as therapies and 
interventions are developed that allow people with previously untreatable, aggressive 
conditions—such as HIV/AIDS and many cancers—to survive for decades. Plenty of 
evidence exists to suggest that chronic disease is increasing, both in incidence and 
                                            
11  In his contribution to the edited collection Illness in the Academy: A Collection of Pathographies 
by Academics (2007), Christopher R. Smit defines autoethnography as a work in which one “uses the 
same principles of ethnographic writing (i.e., observation, analysis, storytelling, deduction, and 
theoretical exegesis, etc.), but the lens is turned back on the author rather than on another group or 
culture” (272). As such, this mode of writing is marked by “shifts between personal anecdotes and 
reflection, storytelling and analysis,” with the result that “much of the interpretive work is done for 
the reader” (Smit 272; Myers 7).  
12  Echoing influential medical historians such as Roy Porter and Adrian Wilson, Ian Miller writes 
that historians of medicine “have often been too cautious” in their engagement with chronic diseases, 
preferring to focus on more sensational, life-threatening diseases such as smallpox, plague, 
tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS (5). Carsten Timmermann makes a similar argument in his contribution 
to The Oxford Handbook of the History of Medicine (2011), where he critiques the emphasis of social 
and cultural history on epidemic disease before going on to examine the continuities between the 
contemporary chronic illness experience and nineteenth century accounts of consumption. Literary 
studies of illness tend to replicate this restricted gaze, producing monographs on cancer, HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and so on. However, as G. Thomas Couser points out, this is as much to do with the 
material available as it is the limitations of the scholarly gaze, since, he argues, “those illnesses that 
are especially threatening—either because they are common or because they are particularly fraught 
with cultural significance—tend to provoke relatively large numbers of narratives” (8). In more recent 
years, this has been counterbalanced to an extent by the focus of literary and cultural disability studies 
on more chronic conditions and impairments.  
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scope.13 However, the array of statistical information on offer does not provide much 
insight into the lived experience of being chronically ill. What defines chronic illness 
as an ontological state that exceeds a set of physical signs and symptoms, and what 
drives people to write and read about it? In answering these questions, much hinges 
on the distinction between disease, sickness, and illness: the triad of terms used in 
English to describe human ailment in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.14 Though in colloquial use these terms are largely interchangeable, in 
disciplines such as medical sociology, medical anthropology, and philosophy of 
medicine, they represent three distinct ways of thinking about human ailment 
(Hofmann 651). Within this framework, disease refers to “a physiological 
malfunction that results in an actual or potential reduction in physical capacities 
and/or a reduced life expectancy,” while sickness signifies “a social identity” in 
which an individual’s “levels of performance with reference to expected social 
activities…fail to meet social standards” (Twaddle 8, 11). By way of contrast, illness 
is defined as “a subjectively interpreted undesirable state” in which an individual 
perceives their bodily functioning and general competence to be inadequate 
(Twaddle 10).  
 
What happens, though, when we add chronic to these descriptors? As its 
etymology—from Χρόνος, the personification of time in Ancient Greek literature 
and culture—suggests, the term is first and foremost a temporal qualifier: it refers to 
something persistent or recurrent. According to the World Health Organization 
                                            
13  Published in The Lancet in 2012, the Global Burden of Disease, Injuries and Risk Factors Study 
2010 revealed that, for the first time in recorded history, chronic, non-communicable conditions such 
as obesity, cardiovascular disease, chronic pain, disabling injury, and mental illness outweighed acute, 
communicable diseases as the primary cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, with the result 
that, though “men and women worldwide have gained slightly more than ten years of life expectancy 
overall” since 1970, they now “spend more years living with injury and illness” (Lozano et al. 2095; 
“Global”). In the UK chronic conditions currently account for anywhere between forty and seventy 
percent of mortality, depending on age. This disease burden is likely to persist, and potentially 
increase, due to the region’s growing ageing population (Alder et al. passim). Likewise, according to 
the Center for Disease Control (CDC), in the US approximately seventy percent of deaths are from 
chronic disease, with approximately 133 million Americans (or almost one in two adults) living with 
at least one such condition, a quarter of whom experience major limitations in their daily life as a 
result (“Chronic Diseases”). The outlook in many other nations is similar: according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), chronic disease is “by far the leading cause of mortality in the world, 
representing 63% of all deaths” (“Health Topics”). Neither is the disease burden of chronic conditions 
restricted to the developed world: again, according to the WHO, ninety percent of premature deaths 
from chronic disease in 2008 occurred in low- and middle-income countries (“Health Topics”). 
14  While the distinction between “disease” and “illness” has been in use since the 1950s, this triad 
was first introduced in the late 1960s, and has since been subject to both further definition and to 
critique (Hofmann 651). 
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(WHO), then, chronic diseases are medical conditions characterized by their “long 
duration and generally slow progression”, and include heart disease, stroke, cancer, 
chronic respiratory diseases and diabetes (“Chronic Diseases”), whereas chronic 
sickness reflects an ongoing failure to meet social and cultural norms of well-being, 
and manifests in phenomena such as long-term absenteeism. What, however, is 
chronic illness? In spite of the importance of this issue to both medical discussions 
and everyday life in the present day, thinking about chronic illness remains 
“extraordinarily vague” (Ishiwata 56). “Does chronic illness refer only to the 
temporal dimension of illness,” asks philosopher Ryuji Ishiwata, “or is it some 
species of illness, or type of illness or simply the incurability of illness?” (56). Is it—
like chronic disease and most aspects of chronic sickness—an experience that, apart 
from its long duration and slow progression, is in all other aspects identical to that of 
its acute form? Or is it something fundamentally different?  
 
In its acute form, illness is typically described in terms of disruption. According to 
Gay Becker, one of the major sources of this disruption proceeds from the tendency 
of its physical symptoms to throw into disorder the familiar “flow of bodily 
experiences” that characterize our daily lives (81). When these symptoms are 
“transitory and of no great consequence”—a muscle twinge, for example, or a minor 
headache—“one may within minutes return to one’s habitual world” of bodily 
absence, as Drew Leder points out in The Absent Body (1990) (79). However, when 
symptoms endure, a more significant disruption takes place (Leder 79). This 
disruption is characterised by what Leder calls “a heightened thematization of the 
body,” in which its aches and pains, its weaknesses and its internal workings come to 
occupy the forefront of everyday experience — often to the occlusion of all else 
(81).  With acute illnesses lasting for a few days or weeks, this thematization soon 
recedes into the familiar, automatic flow of everyday experience, in which the body 
is, for the most part, an “absent presence” (Leder 13). But, when illness turns out to 
be chronic, persisting for years or even decades, this heightened thematization of the 
body comes to define everyday experience.  
 
In the case of illnesses that are life-threatening, disabling, or otherwise chronic, this 
heightened thematization of the body is joined by a sense of ontological disruption 
and of instability. Arthur Kleinman describes chronic illnesses as subjective states of 
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experience that “tend to oscillate between periods of exacerbation, when symptoms 
worsen, to periods of quiescence, when disability is less disruptive” (7). Crucially, 
Kleinman’s description accommodates states of remission from serious illness, 
including autoimmune conditions and cancer – states that medical sociologist Arthur 
W. Frank, who has himself lived with cardiovascular disease and in remission from 
cancer for over a decade, defines in terms of being “effectively well” without ever 
considering oneself “cured,” an idea that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick echoes in her 
description of remission as “decades and decades of free-fall interpretive panic” 
(Frank 8; Sedgwick “Queer” 13).15 As in Kleinman’s definition of chronic illness, 
then, in Frank’s experience of remission “the foreground and background of sickness 
and health constantly shade into each other” to create an ongoing sense of instability 
(9). Genetic and other forms of predictive and diagnostic testing add a further 
dimension to the illness experience, as Sontag observes when she notes that “with 
the most up-to-date biomedical testing, it is possible to create a new class of lifetime 
pariahs, the future ill” (AIDS 33-34). Consequently, though only some of the 
accounts considered in this thesis attest to the experience of living with conditions 
that fit the biomedical definition of chronic disease, all describe the experience of 
being chronically ill: of living in a state of perpetual uncertainty and disruption, both 
ontological and corporeal.  
 
The experiences of those who spend months, years, even decades in the penumbral 
state of chronic illness are not only disruptive for the individual and their immediate 
network of family and friends, but also trouble the two-outcome paradigm that 
underpins both medical and popular thinking about illness and health in the 
industrialized West: a paradigm in which illness results either in death, or in full 
recovery, and which thus has a narrative trajectory of sorts (Smart and Smart 65). 
More specifically, these experiences also come into conflict—often repeatedly—
with the more detailed storylines that, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, have become entrenched in institutional and popular thinking about 
illness. These storylines have been documented at length by scholars from a range of 
disciplinary backgrounds—including Frank (sociology), Couser and Hawkins 
(literary studies/life writing), and Jackie Stacey (cultural studies)—, whose findings 
                                            
15  See also Frank’s memoir, At the Will of the Body: Reflections on Illness (1991).  
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give a sense of the discursive context of accounting for illness at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. Generally speaking, retrospective illness accounts—ones told 
from a point of substantial recovery—display a drive to absorb and integrate the 
illness experience into a “coherent story of success, progress, and movement” 
(Stacey 8-9). This thrust is most evident in the restitution narrative beloved of 
modern biomedicine, with its “basic storyline” of “yesterday I was healthy, today 
I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy again” (Frank 77). An alternative to the 
restitution trope can be found in the “quest” narrative, a storyline that has proved 
increasingly popular in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Frank uses 
this term to describe a cluster of narrative strands organized around the idea of 
illness as a journey, including the “automythology” narrative, which revolves around 
the adage that ‘what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger’;16 the memoir, or 
“interrupted autobiography,” which combines the illness story with an account of 
other events in the author’s life; and the manifesto, a storyline that tends to drive 
contemporary illness activism (Frank 120). At the other end of the spectrum—and of 
the two-outcome paradigm—lies what Hawkins describes as a “new ars moriendi,” 
or “guidebook to the art of dying” (Reconstructing 92-93). David Servan-Schreiber’s 
Not the Last Goodbye (2011) and Philip Gould’s When I Die: Lessons from the 
Death Zone (2012) are classic examples of this genre, while Ruth Picardie’s Before I 
Say Goodbye (1998) and Christopher Hitchen’s Mortality (2012) offer satirical, but 
no less poignant plays on its conventions.  
 
The lived experience of chronic illness defies these narratives at every turn. With its 
unpredictable cycles of illness and remission, increased susceptibility to secondary 
conditions, and changing treatment protocols, the chronic illness experience clashes 
with ideas of progression and recovery. Conversely, though many people with 
chronic illness are given a long-term prognosis that ultimately leads to death17 
most—if not all—lack any concrete sense of how and when its various stages might 
                                            
16  The quest narrative is for the most part synonymous with the “hero” narrative that Stacey discusses 
at length in her illness account-cum-cultural study Teratologies: A Cultural Study of Cancer (1997), 
while the automythology variant in particular can be aligned with the conversion narrative genre that 
Hawkins uses as her point of departure in Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (1999).  
17  Of the accounts considered in this thesis, some illnesses—like Stacey’s cancer—are accompanied 
by a prognosis that includes the possibility of remission, but also of death. Others—like Mary 
Felstiner’s rheumatoid arthritis—are not in themselves fatal, but predispose one towards a range of 
other medical conditions, including osteoporosis and cardiac disease.  
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unfold, and what the lived experience of this unfolding will feel like, making it 
difficult to reconcile the chronic illness experience with the ars moriendi trope. And 
yet, as the texts considered in this thesis attest, accounting for chronic illness is not 
impossible, by any means: such accounts do exist, and are growing both in quantity 
and diversity.  
Though only a fraction of those who experience illness publish their accounts in 
book or digital form, this practice has grown almost exponentially in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, with the result that the illness memoir is 
now an established life writing form in its own right. And, while they often utilize 
elements of established illness narratives, contemporary accounts of chronic illness 
tend to differ from more conventional illness accounts in a number of ways, leading 
Thomas G. Couser to posit that “prolonged, serious, or chronic illnesses and 
disabilities may ultimately yield more complex and multidimensional narratives than 
acute illnesses” (12). One of the major differences is that while those who survive 
acute illnesses with no lasting effects and no threat of recurrence might be able to 
“partly absorb” the experience to create a recognizable “before and after” effect—a 
common feature of the hero and memoir forms, for example—those with chronic 
illness tend to find themselves engaged in an ongoing struggle both with the specific 
narrative types that have come to dominate the illness experience in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and with narrative as an organizing 
concept for lived experience and subjectivity more generally (Stacey 9). In 
particular, the conventions of narrative—its demands for coherence, consistency, 
causality, closure and so on—prove a major stumbling block in attempts to account 
for the chronic illness experience, and it is in part for this reason that I have chosen 
to refer to the texts considered in this thesis as illness accounts, rather than illness 
narratives.  
 
Literary Aesthetics and the Ethical: Methodological and Theoretical 
Considerations 
In my reading of chronic illness accounts, I cover ground that has already been tilled 
by scholars in a range of disciplines, from sociology to philosophy to literary studies. 
Though my own approach draws on this rich seam of work where appropriate, one 
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study in particular provides the foundation on which it stands: Virginia Woolf’s 
short essay On Being Ill (1926). This piece might at first seem out of place, given the 
period on which this thesis focuses, and the contemporary nature of the theoretical 
framework described thus far. However, in spite of the changes in the landscape of 
illness that have taken place since its publication in 1926, Woolf’s essay remains 
remarkably relevant to the present day, both in its call to attend to the relationship 
between illness and literature, and in the practices of representation and 
interpretation it demonstrates and describes. Alongside the survey of the key critical 
metanarratives that underpin thinking about writing and reading illness at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, my exploration of Woolf’s thinking about illness and 
literature in chapter 2 of this thesis forms the springboard for my close readings of 
contemporary illness accounts in chapters 3 to 5. Before moving onto these chapters, 
however, I want first to conclude this introduction with a brief description of how I 
use the terms ‘aesthetics’ and ‘ethics’ in this thesis, followed by an overview of the 
project as a whole, including its methods, structure, and key themes. 
 
Both historically and in the present day, the meanings of the terms ‘aesthetics’ and 
‘ethics’ in relation to the literary are highly contested, and though my use of these 
terms is developed in greater detail in the chapters that follow, I want at this point 
briefly to lay my cards and allegiances on the table.  In thumbnail, my use of the 
term “aesthetics” in the context of illness accounts is not allied to the notions of 
beauty and truth with which the aesthetic is traditionally associated, but instead 
signifies a dimension of writing and of the printed text that interacts with, but is 
distinct from, the information it contains. This dimension consists in elements of 
representation such as imagery, temporality, address, metaphor, form, symbolic 
structure, style, and so on. Though not necessarily specific to verbal expression nor 
to the text as artefact, these elements take on particular kinds of meaning and power 
within the context of the written work: forms of meaning and power that come to life 
in the encounters that readers have with written works, in ways unique not just to the 
work, nor to the reader, but to each and every act of reading.  
 
In this argument, I am particularly influenced by Attridge’s reappraisal of the 
concepts that underpin our thinking about literature in Singularity. Central to this 
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reappraisal is the suggestion that acts of writing and reading involve an encounter 
with and response to alterity, or otherness. This way of looking at literature and our 
engagement with it is indebted to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, as 
filtered through the work of Attridge, Butler, and Ricoeur, who in turn approach this 
philosophy both through direct reading of Lévinas, and through of the work of his 
interlocutors, including Maurice Blanchot and Jacques Derrida. 
 
For Lévinas, the basic unit of the ethical is a kind of phenomenological, pre-
cognitive—or “face-to-face”—encounter between the self and the other, in which the 
self is compelled to respond to the other by offering up an account of itself. The self 
is thus, in the very act of affirming the other, brought into an awareness not just of 
the particularity of its being as a self—or what Butler describes as “a relational 
being” (Giving 20)—but also of the fact that this particularity necessarily exceeds 
what can be rationally accounted for, let alone evaluated, within traditional 
epistemological and moral frameworks.18 The face-to-face encounter thus unfolds as 
a scene of recognition based on difference – a scene in which intimacy proceeds 
from a shared condition of unfathomability, and familiar epistemological and moral 
frameworks are rendered strange.    
 
Similarity and difference, familiarity and alterity, intimacy and strangeness, 
unfathomability and recognition: Attridge draws on these aspects of the Levinasian 
tradition in his discussions of the way in which we experience literature. In 
Singularity, this discussion begins by looking at how the handling of the aesthetic 
dimensions of writing and of the published text opens up new possibilities of 
meaning, and at how these possibilities are most fully realized in the act of reading – 
features that are central, Attridge argues, to our understanding of how the literary 
differs from other art forms and from other written media, and, crucially, of its 
participation in the realm of the ethical. In this vein, Attridge’s thinking challenges 
                                            
18  For further discussion of this issue, see Lévinas (1961, 1974). In brief, for Lévinas, as for many of 
his interlocutors, ethics involves a phenomenological encounter between the self and the other, 
whereas morality signifies a set of rules that govern social conduct and determine what is ‘good’ or 
‘bad.’ This tension between ethics and morality in relation to accounting for the self and responding 
to the other is of central importance to the work of both Butler and Ricoeur, and forms one of the 
major points of intersection between their ethical philosophies and that of Lévinas.   
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the traditional dualism that divides form from content, arguing instead that one of the 
distinguishing features of the literary is the way in which its deployment of the 
aesthetic dimensions of language and of the printed text not only intensifies and 
extends the themes that authors explicitly set out, but also inaugurates patterns of 
referentiality, symbolicity, metaphoricity, and so on that come together to create 
another kind of content: a content that is distinct—but not necessarily 
disconnected—from the work’s stated themes. This content is realized in the act of 
reading, and thus takes on different emphases and meanings depending on a range of 
factors, including: the reader’s knowledge of the discursive contexts on which a 
work’s aesthetics draws; the attitudes, values, experiences, beliefs, and judgments 
that individual readers bring to the work—attitudes, values, experiences, beliefs, and 
judgments that are not fixed, but which change over time in ways that render each 
subsequent reading of a work unique—and the ways in which a work brings these 
attitudes, values, experiences, beliefs, and judgments forth. Crucially, then, by 
opening up seemingly endless possibilities of meaning, this content complicates, 
challenges, and disrupts the idea that a work can ever be exhaustively and 
objectively known. 
 
At root, then, for Attridge literature’s participation in the realm of the ethical lies in 
the complex engagement between self and other that, in the act of reading, brings 
this content into being. This engagement unfolds as a kind of phenomenological 
face-to-text encounter that closely resembles the face-to-face encounter at the heart 
of Levinasian ethics, and consists in the reader’s apprehension of a work’s 
simultaneous familiarity and alterity: an apprehension that is always already a 
response in which the reader is interpellated—or brought into being—as a self. The 
realization that each reading, whether of the same work or of a different work, will 
therefore present a different combination of familiarity and strangeness—and thus 
interpellate a different self—further extends the connection of the literary to the 
ethical, by fostering a form of recognition based not on comprehension nor 
assimilation nor evaluation, but on an awareness of the instability and inscrutability 
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not just of the other, but also of the self19 – the ethical importance of which is 
explored in greater detail by both Butler, as we will see in chapter 2, and Ricoeur, as 
we will see below.  
 
In focusing my attention on the aesthetic dimensions of contemporary illness 
accounts and their ethical implications, my intention is not to romanticize illness, nor 
to downplay the difficulties faced by those for whom the prospect of accounting for 
illness in any form is inconceivable. Rather, in taking this approach, I seek to show 
what is lost when these dimensions are not taken into consideration. Given the 
emphasis here on subjectivity in the experience of the literary and its participation in 
the realm of the ethical, it could be objected that any attempt to describe the patterns 
of meaning, allusion, symbolism, and so on that come into being through reading 
will tell us more about the reader than about the work itself, and thus be of limited 
value as a foundation on which to begin constructing a new approach to writing and 
reading illness accounts – especially one that aspires to cross disciplinary borders. 
These concerns are valid: though mitigated somewhat by in-depth contextual 
research, multiple re-readings of the accounts concerned, and a sustained 
engagement with other readings of these accounts where possible, what I offer here 
will of course be shaped by the attitudes, values, experiences, beliefs, and judgments 
that I bring to this selection of illness accounts.  
   
Earlier, I suggested that illness accounts possess the potential to reshape our ideas 
about the literary, about its participation in the realm of the ethical, and about the 
ethical itself. Consequently, while the basic framework described above is at the 
crux of this potential, in this thesis I am not fundamentally concerned with whether, 
as a genre, illness accounts display the kinds of aesthetic activity in which Attridge 
sees the essence of the literary and its ethical potential to lie, but with the ways in 
which certain illness accounts explore and extend our thinking about the literary and 
its ethical potential. More specifically, I’m interested in a cluster of illness accounts 
                                            
19  This awareness highlights the inherent slipperiness of the self-other dyad in the Levinasian 
tradition, not only by revealing the fundamental incomprehensibility of the self and the grounds for 
recognition that this—somewhat paradoxically—establishes, but also by blurring the boundaries 
between the multiple significations of “the other,” including, but not limited to, the other as a real or 
imagined individual; the other as a real or imagined collective; and the other not as a human presence 
per se, but a concept, artefact, or mode of articulation.   
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that have emerged over the past two decades in which the aesthetics deployed take 
shape as a self-reflexive staging of the process through which literature participates 
in the ethical, and thus give rise to readings that, though specific to individual 
accounts and to each reading they undergo, ultimately work towards the same ends. 
 
The illness accounts considered here are therefore bound together by their capacity 
to create and sustain literary performances that are not only ethical in their effects, 
but ethical in their content, by which I mean that these accounts not only facilitate 
encounters in which the reader is compelled to respond to the other—and thus to 
interpellate the self—but themselves dramatize these encounters and the complex 
experience of responsibility and interpellation they entail. They do so by 
foregrounding the creative labour involved in responding to others and accounting 
for the self: creative labour necessitated by the tension between the 
phenomenological experience of being and encountering—the basic unit of 
Levinasian ethics—and the discursive norms, or morals, that govern the experience 
of accounting for the self and responding to others.   
 
All accounts of the self, Ricoeur argues, involve creative labour. Though it is “often 
repeated that life has something to do with narrative,” the assimilation of lived 
experience into a life story is far from straightforward, he contends, for the lived 
experience is not, in itself, amenable to the norms of storytelling (“Life” 20).20 
Rather, the transmutation of lived experience into a life story involves a significant 
degree of what Ricoeur calls “emplotment,” a concept he borrows from Aristotle 
(“Life” 21). Emplotment, in Ricoeur’s sense of the term, signifies “an operation,” or 
“integrating process” through which the “heterogeneous elements” of lived 
experience are synthesized into a story which is “unified and complete”: a story 
organized around a logic of concordance, coherence, causality, culmination, and 
closure (“Life” 21-22). For Ricoeur, furthermore, the labour of emplotment is central 
                                            
20  For Ricoeur, the “elusive character of real life” is the product of both the ontological and the 
biological limits of self-knowledge (Oneself 162). Of the latter, he writes: “there is nothing in real life 
that serves as a narrative beginning; memory is lost in the hazes of early childhood; my birth and…the 
act through which I was conceived belong more to the history of others—in this case, to my parents, 
that to me. As for my death, it will finally be recounted only in the stories of those who survive me” 
(Oneself 160).  
 22 
to the ways in which we embellish the “biological phenomenon” of life with 
existential meaning and value, and thus to an ontology that is distinctively human 
(“Life” 28).21  
 
Emplotment is an iterative process, involving an active and ongoing deployment of 
fiction to shape the discordant, heterogeneous, unstable nature of lived experience. 
While Ricoeur’s emphasis on the importance of emplotment within an ethical 
context differs from the argument I develop as this thesis progresses, several of the 
claims he makes here are salient to my project (“Life” 20; Oneself 178). Foremost 
amongst these are his insistence that emplotment is only ethical insofar as we 
remember that the stories it yields consist in “an unstable mixture of fabulation and 
actual experience” – a claim that places intentionality and an awareness of one’s 
audience at the heart of the first-person account (Oneself 162).22 When we lose sight 
of this mixture and its instability, Ricoeur warns, emplotment ceases to operate as an 
ethical process—a pathway to self-understanding—and becomes instead a kind of 
moral prosthesis.23 By fully assimilating lives to stories, and vice versa, good life 
stories—those that are coherent, consistent, and so on—become synonymous with 
good lives (in the moral, rather than ethical, sense of the term), while those which 
fail to conform to these standards of narration are seen to be morally suspect.  
 
In their staging of the creative labour through which the subjective experience of 
                                            
21  In this, Ricoeur aligns himself with a wider philosophical movement, in which selfhood is seen to 
be fundamentally narrative in nature – a movement that has in recent years been subject to a small but 
significant body of criticism. Prominent amongst its critics are Galen Strawson, who vigorously 
deconstructs this thesis in “Against Narrativity” (2004), and Butler, who in Giving is concerned with 
the anti-ethical implications of normalizing narrativity – an approach I discuss in greater detail in 
chapter 1.  
22  Though both are centrally concerned with the intersubjective encounter, and distinguish between 
ethics and morality, Ricoeur’s thinking about these issues differs in significant ways from that of 
Levinas. Whereas Levinas is interested in the phenomenology of this encounter, Ricoeur is more 
teleological in his approach, and values the intersubjective encounter primarily in its relation to the 
Aristotelian concept of eudaemonia, or the “good life”. Ricoeur’s understanding of the “good life” is 
complex, and for the most part tangential to my argument here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
recognise the importance he places on the Socratic maxim that “an unexamined life is not worth 
living,” which places narrative self-understanding at the heart of the good life (“Life” 20; Oneself 
178). For more on this, see the Seventh Study of Oneself (169-202).  
23  I use this not in David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s sense of prosthesis as a narrative process in 
which deviance is resolved—a concept they develop from the work of David Wills—but rather to 
signify the use of the artificial to give a semblance not just of wholeness, but of normativity (Mitchell 
and Snyder 2000; Wills 1995).  
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illness is rendered into an illness account, the works considered in this thesis are 
ethically active in both the Levinasian and the Ricoeurian senses. Rather than simply 
rejecting the prostheses offered by illness’s discursive past and present, and by the 
conventions of autobiography, they instead handle these prostheses—examining and 
describing them, even trying them on—in ways that draw attention to the gap 
between lived experience and life stories, and to role that fiction plays in bridging 
this gap. In doing so, they foster what Ricoeur sees to be an ethical perspective on 
emplotment, and resist its slippage into the realm of normative morality. Further, by 
unharnessing the impulse to engage with and respond to the other from conventional 
modes of writing and reading the self—both in illness and in health—they open up a 
space in which to explore alternative ways of representing the self and interpreting 
otherness.  
 
These properties are by no means limited to accounts of illness: as I have already 
intimated, the aesthetics and ethics at work in the accounts considered here are 
representative of a wider movement to extend and revitalize a set of approaches to 
representing lived experience and the encounter with others that are broadly 
modernist in origin, though of course, as Attridge reminds us, modernism in turn has 
“antecedents and foreshadowings in earlier periods” (Coetzee 4). Neither are they are 
common feature of the contemporary illness account: the works addressed in the 
pages that follow are for the most part outliers in a genre that tends instead to 
conform to the narrative typologies sketched out by Frank, Hawkins, Stacey, and 
others. This is not to say that illness does not play an important role in issues at stake 
in these accounts, however. Illness, and particularly chronic illness, is particularly 
conducive to the problems of self-representation described thus far, for several 
reasons. First amongst these is the fact that illness is typically accompanied by 
demands to account for oneself: demands that are both abstract and concrete in 
origin, and which come from multiple directions, as I discuss in greater detail in 
chapter 2. At the turn of the twenty-first century, furthermore, any attempt to 
respond to these demands is necessarily overdetermined by multiple discourses, 
including those of illness and of autobiography more generally, each of which offers 
the possibility of prosthesis – a possibility that, in its continual disruption and 
inherent instability, the chronic illness experience renders impossible.  
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“Stories about illness,” Stacey claims, “are an intensification of the way in which we 
generally understand our lives through narrative” (8). In their telling, she argues, 
they make “explicit the importance of narratives in the construction of the self in 
contemporary culture” (8). And yet, she argues, illness accounts—and particularly 
chronic illness accounts24—also “put pressure on the structures of conventional 
genres of storytelling,” in ways that open up alternatives to these structures (Stacey 
8-9). In the accounts considered here, this combination of intensification and 
pressurization gives rise to a series of compelling performances that not only 
dramatize the tension between experiencing and accounting for illness, but also enact 
the literary and its participation in the ethical in ways that make the arguments put 
forward by Attridge, Butler, and Ricoeur come alive. This latter quality makes the 
accounts I consider here a particularly productive frame of reference not only for the 
attempt to introduce the principles and practices of contemporary literary studies into 
the medical humanities, in both research-focused and pedagogical environments, but 
also for the encouraging scholars and students in literary studies itself to take illness 
accounts seriously as sophisticated, aesthetically- and ethically-active works.   
 
Thesis Overview  
Because of its focus on literary aesthetics, this thesis is organized according to genre, 
rather than chronology or geography. Beginning with a group of illness accounts 
written by academic women and ending with experimental fictions from South 
Africa, it seeks to demonstrate how illness accounts of different genres put aesthetics 
to work in surprisingly similar ways to those that Woolf describes and deploys in On 
Being Ill. Further, it shows how illness accounts test assumptions about the aesthetic 
sophistication and ethical complexity that different modes of writing make possible, 
and, in doing so, prompts us to revisit our ideas about what constitutes “the literary.” 
My intention here is not so much to challenge the existing hierarchy of literary value, 
but rather to suggest that, in focusing our attention on these texts, we risk both 
underestimating the potential of what have been crudely labeled “middle-” and 
“lowbrow” modes of writing, and unnecessarily restricting the relevance of our 
                                            
24  Stacey’s example here draws on Derek Duncan’s work on autobiographical accounts of 
HIV/AIDS, a condition that has since the late 1980s become increasingly manageable in the long-
term for those with access to treatment and to the personal or state resources necessary to fund it.   
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scholarship. This risk is particularly high when the objects of our scrutiny are illness 
accounts, because so many are produced and consumed within these “popular” 
paradigms of writing and reading.    
 
By the same token, my gaze spans several geographical regions. In covering this 
wide territory, I seek to show how accounts of chronic illness are aesthetically and 
ethically active in ways that not only cross genres, but also borders. Whereas 
Diedrich proposes the existence of “different national arts of being ill” in her 
comparison of American and British cancer narratives (xx), I instead focus on how 
first person illness accounts published between 1990 and 2008 contribute to a 
transnational aesthetic and ethical project. As such, the texts considered here all 
draw on distinct social, political, and cultural histories and identities in important 
ways, but without collapsing entirely into the local. Finally, I have included texts by 
both male and female authors, though the latter significantly outnumber the former – 
a dominance that reflects both the higher burden of chronic disease that women25 
confront and the late twentieth-century feminist politics of writing about embodied 
experience. Thus, the extent to which gender forms a central part of my reading 
varies depending on whether—and in what ways—an account or group of accounts 
themselves engage with gender.  
 
To set the scene for my readings of contemporary illness accounts, my first chapter 
takes shape as a survey of the key critical metanarratives that underpin current 
thinking about writing and reading illness. This survey is organized according to the 
two major areas of scholarship, practice, and pedagogy on which I draw in this 
thesis: the medical humanities, and literary studies.  Using Waddington and Willis’s 
call for the development of “an increasingly sophisticated and inclusive humanities 
approach to narratives of illness” as my point of departure, in this survey I focus 
particularly on the opportunities and challenges that literary studies approaches to 
illness accounts present, and ultimately question whether the present critical crisis in 
the medical humanities can really be resolved through a methodological 
reorientation towards these approaches in their present form (v).  
 
                                            
25 See, for example, Malmusi et al. (2012).  
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My second chapter shows how in On Being Ill Woolf’s consideration of the 
relationship between illness, literature, and ethics takes shape as a powerful creative 
and critical manifesto that not only identifies the major challenges that illness poses 
to representation, but which also explores possible ways of engaging with, and 
potentially overcoming, these challenges. The principles and practices set out in this 
manifesto, I argue, offer a valuable paradigm for thinking about writing and reading 
illness in the present day: a paradigm that has not only been taken up, but revitalized 
and extended by contemporary writers of illness accounts, and which offers an 
alternative to those currently employed in both literary studies and the medical 
humanities. Not only does this paradigm resist the tendencies of mainstream literary 
criticism towards suspicion and instrumentalism, it also offers a convincing counter-
argument to approaches that frame these accounts as being outside the established 
purview of literary studies. As such, On Being Ill provides a rewarding, though 
perhaps unexpected, way into the analyses of contemporary illness accounts enacted 
in chapters 3 to 5 of this thesis.  
 
In chapter 3 I show how, in accounting for illness the feminist academics Jackie 
Stacey, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Mary Felstiner, and Ann Oakley have had to 
find—and occasionally fight—their way through the complex maze of discursive 
politics in which, as people with illness, as academics, and as women 
autobiographers, they find themselves automatically enmeshed. Within this 
framework, these women not only make increasingly bold decisions about the terms 
on which they engage with these genres, but also explore—and, where necessary, 
create—alternatives. Like Woolf in On Being Ill, they do so by combining in their 
writing an explicitly interrogative approach with more subtle and open-ended 
aesthetic strategies that expose the operations of language and representation in 
accounting for the self, thus foregrounding the creative labour involved in this 
process and continuing Woolf’s work at the interface of illness, literature, and ethics 
into the twenty-first century.   
 
My fourth chapter considers the illness accounts of two established writers of literary 
fiction, Hilary Mantel and Paul West. My reading of these accounts focuses on the 
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hypersensual, synaesthetic qualities of Mantel’s and West’s prose, and the 
hallucinatory passages that form a common leitmotif in their writing. Herein, I 
suggest that these elements can be fruitfully read as an exploration of the ways in 
which illness derails, suspends, and disrupts the referentiality of language, as well as 
a series of experiments in the redirection of this referentiality. In doing, I show how 
Mantel’s and West’s accounts of illness attest not just to ontological disruption or to 
a heightened thematization of the body, but also to the ways in which language can 
be stretched to accommodate new ideas, new experiences, and new patterns of 
referentiality, and the implications of this capacity for its participation in the ethical.  
 
In the fifth and final chapter of this thesis, my focus shifts from the referentiality of 
language to the referentiality of fiction. In contrast to chapter 4, in this chapter I look 
not at how illness resists referentiality, but at the ease with which it is assimilated 
into interpretive frameworks based on notions of national allegory, and thus uses as 
its frame of reference two fictional illness accounts set in South Africa during the 
late twentieth century: J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron (1990) and Marlene Van 
Niekerk’s Agaat (2006). My readings of these novels explore the ways in which they 
simultaneously solicit and problematize the allegorical readings to which both illness 
accounts and South African fiction are regularly subjected, and consider the 
implications of this stance towards allegory for the reader’s sense of responsibility 
towards the work in their hands.  
 
This selection is by no means comprehensive, and it is important, I think, to note that 
the accounts considered here are predominantly those of relatively privileged, 
heterosexual, white people – primarily for reasons of availability and of 
methodology.26 Consequently, though I approach these accounts as representatives 
of a distinct genre, with implications for our understanding both of illness accounts 
                                            
26  Though first person, English language illness accounts are just beginning to emerge from 
developing and newly industrialized countries, to my knowledge these tend to be dominated by issues 
specific to the region from which they emerged, and/or to participate in the discursive traditions that 
have grown up around particular conditions, such as HIV/AIDS: considerations that fall outside the 
scope of this project. The emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in post-apartheid South Africa is a 
case in point, around which has arisen a growing body of fiction, life writing, and scholarly work. 
Examples include Phaswane Mpe’s Welcome to Our Hillbrow (2001), Liz McGregor’s Khabzela: The 
Life and Times of a South African (2005), and Ellen Grünkemeier’s Breaking the Silence: South 
African Representations of HIV/AIDS (2013).  
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in general, and of everyday life, I acknowledge the limitations that accompany this 
demographic choice. To reiterate, then, what links the accounts considered here is 
double-edged reading experience they sustain: the way in which they incite, in the 
reader, a sense not only of aesthetic activity, but of an active probing at and beyond 
the epistemological and ontological horizons both of illness and of subjectivity more 
broadly.  
 
The objectives of this thesis, then, are threefold. First, in bringing together a 
comprehensive range of materials related to the practice and theory of writing and 
reading about illness, it not only consolidates an important, yet under-examined, 
strand in the medical humanities, but also showcases the specific contributions that 
literary studies can make to the field, thus providing a crucial stepping stone for 
further research and pedagogy. Second, like many of the texts it considers, this thesis 
seeks to provide a resource for those at the coalface. In its engagement with the 
experience of accounting for chronic illness, it draws attention to the ontological 
issues at stake in illness, and encourages a more open-minded, and potentially even 
counter-discursive, approach to thinking about writing and reading illness accounts. 
In this, it seeks to appeal not only to people living with illness and its aftereffects and 
those who care for and work with them, but also to those who encounter them on 
different terms: those, for example, who have yet to experience their own serious 
illness or that of others, except through reading. Finally, it seeks to demonstrate how 
accounts of chronic illness offer insights that further our understanding of the literary 
and its participation in the ethical.   
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Chapter One 
 
Contested Fields: Writing and Reading Illness  
in the Medical Humanities and Literary Studies 
 
In On Being Ill, Woolf describes illness as an archipelago of “undiscovered 
countries,” while a revised version of the essay likens it to “an unexploited mine”27 – 
analogies that, at the time of writing, would have been intensely evocative (Being 3). 
The phrase “undiscovered countries,” for example, brings to mind the daring 
expeditions undertaken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into harsh 
regions such as the Antarctic, the Himalaya, South America, and the Sahara,28 while  
as Jurecic notes that of “unexploited mines” would have recalled the unexploded 
land mines left over from the recent war (5). It would not be long, however, before 
Woolf’s analogies proved not merely evocative, but prophetic. In the decades that 
followed the essay’s publication, the writing and reading of illness accounts 
underwent a dramatic explosion, firing missives back from the kingdom of the sick 
with increasing regularity.  
 
The illness account genre was further consolidated as the century progressed, when 
from the 1960s on the medical humanities and its related subdisciplines began to 
establish themselves as “academically respectable” fields of study, and, in turn, to 
validate the objects of their study (Greaves and Evans 1). During this time, scholars 
across the arts, humanities, and particularly social sciences have helped to bring 
substantial tracts of the landscape of illness to light, unearthing previously 
overlooked accounts and monitoring the emergence of new ones. And yet, in spite of 
this foundational work, much of its terrain remains critically under-explored, if not 
almost entirely uncharted, for reasons that are both material and methodological, 
while the canonization of cultural artefacts and scholarly approaches within the field 
                                            
27  This version, entitled “Illness: An Unexploited Mine,” was published in the New York magazine 
The Forum in April 1926.  
28  This allusion is reinforced in Woolf’s subsequent comments on how literature shows the mind 
“ignoring the body in the philosopher’s turret; or kicking [it], like an old leather football, across 
leagues of snow and desert in the pursuit of conquest or discovery” (Being 5) 
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has become an increasingly heated topic of debate.  
 
Though not a primary concern of this thesis, one prominent subject of dispute 
centres on the almost exclusively Western worldview of the medical humanities, as 
reflected in both the materials on which it focuses and the cultural values it 
upholds.29 This tension arises not only in non-Western countries, where higher 
education institutions are taking up the discipline at a rapid rate, but in the West 
itself, whose health care workforce and patient populations are increasingly diverse. 
Another major source of controversy is the elisions that accompany what 
Waddington and Willis describes as the current emphasis on “presentist contexts” in 
the medical humanities (as opposed to the history of medicine) (v). By concentrating 
on illness accounts produced after 1950, they argue, we risk overestimating the shifts 
in thinking about writing and reading illness that have taken place over the twentieth 
century, as well as overlooking the many continuities that link contemporary first-
person illness accounts to more long-running debates about representing illness and 
accounting for the embodied self. However, the focus of my critique in this chapter 
is not on cultural bias, nor on the lack of historical perspective, but on the 
assumptions that underpin current thinking about writing illness accounts in both the 
medical humanities and literary studies, and the limitations of the readings that 
result.   
 
According to Waddington and Willis, in its current configuration the “mainstream” 
medical humanities needlessly restricts “what illness narratives might be allowed to 
mean, and even what they might look like” by focusing on only a certain type of 
illness account—“the linear, progressive, story framed with the context of 
biomedicine and the doctor-patient encounter”—and by viewing it only through 
certain interpretive lenses (iv). In his analysis of university-level courses on 
literature and medicine, Arnold Weinstein extends this line of argument. Weinstein 
sees in these courses a tendency to focus exclusively on certain kinds of literary 
materials—primarily realist fictions that take as their subject matter explicitly 
medical contexts and events, and which he thus describes as “docile”—and to avoid 
those that are more “unruly,” such as “experimental, avant-garde, or postmodernist 
                                            
29  Hooker and Noonan provide an interesting discussion of this issue in their article “Medical 
Humanities as Expressive of Western Culture” (2011).  
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texts” (“Unruly” 1). Further, he finds fault not just in this selection of materials, but 
in the methods used to interpret them, arguing that the pedagogical distinction drawn 
in the medical humanities between docile and unruly texts is entirely spurious, for 
literature, he insists, “cannot be cleansed of its ambiguities, its excesses, its meta-
consciousness as a verbal artifact, its incessant trafficking in fantasy, desire, fear, 
folklore, myth, and the like,” no matter how transparent it at first appears (“Unruly” 
2). Weinstein’s critique suggests that the principles and practices of literary studies 
might yield more sophisticated analyses of literature’s engagement with the medical, 
including accounts of illness. And yet, as we have already seen, only a handful of 
scholars in the field of literary studies have produced studies that engage in any 
significant and sustained way with the “unruliness” of literature about illness, while 
the potential of these studies to extend the interdisciplinarity of the medical 
humanities, and particularly the depth and scope of its literary branch, is often 
limited by the historical specificity of their materials, the theoretical complexity of 
their arguments, and the jargon of the discipline.30  
 
Though the development of the “increasingly sophisticated and inclusive humanities 
approach to narratives of illness” that Waddington and Willis call for in their 
assessment of the field is riddled with difficulties, it is not impossible (v). At the 
most basic level, it requires scholars at the intersection of the medical humanities 
and literary studies to work towards the development of new paradigms for thinking 
about writing and reading illness. These paradigms need to be of sufficient 
complexity to do justice to the principles and practices of literary studies, but also to 
be accessible to scholars from other disciplinary backgrounds, and to students in 
both the medical humanities and the literary studies classrooms. In order to do so, 
however, a thorough understanding of the obstacles that have thus far prevented the 
development of such paradigms is necessary. In this chapter, I thus seek to take stock 
of the ways in which illness accounts are typically interpreted in both the medical 
humanities and literary studies, in the form of a schematic survey that builds on 
many of the themes mentioned earlier, including the therapeutic and pedagogic uses 
                                            
30  For example, in a review of Lisa Diedrich’s Treatments: Language, Politics, and the Culture of 
Illness (2007) Kimberly Myers—a professor who teaches humanities at a medical school—writes 
that, in spite of Diedrich’s claims to appeal to a wide audience, the accessibility of her work is limited 
by a “highly intricate” theoretical framework as well as a tendency to be “condescending” toward 
some of the readers it hopes to reach (Rev. 430, 434).  
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of illness accounts in healthcare practice, and the modes of metaphoric thinking, 
suspicious reading, and docile analysis found in literary analyses.  
 
Policy, Pedagogy, Therapy: The Uses of Illness Accounts in the Medical 
Humanities and Healthcare Practice 
Though the approaches at work within the medical humanities range widely, one 
thing most contemporary critics tend to agree on is that illness is, in the words of 
Frank, a “call for stories” (53). In the main, this storytelling impulse is not seen to be 
purely utilitarian, in the sense of the signs and symptoms described to health care 
professionals and the explanations offered to and/or solicited by family members,31 
friends, colleagues, and fellow patients, but also to possess a therapeutic dimension, 
in which storytelling offers a way of making sense of illness’s effects on the past, 
present, and future, and of integrating change into an existing life narrative.32 This 
kind of thinking is reflected in popular attitudes to illness accounts: in a 2011 article 
for The Independent, for example, journalist Arifa Akbar attributes the emergence of 
the published first-person illness account to two factors: “the in-built narrative arc of 
critical illness,” which, she suggests, “predisposes it to storytelling”; and the “need 
to describe and unburden” that people with illness experience (Akbar).  
 
The perceived affinity of illness for storytelling both proceeds from, and seems to be 
corroborated by, the dramatic expansion in the writing and publication of illness 
accounts that took place in the second half of the twentieth century, and which has 
persisted into the opening decades of the twenty-first – an expansion that is 
increasingly reflected in a range of other genres and media, including fiction, 
journalism, essays, art, dance, and film (Jurecic 10).  And yet, in spite of this critical 
consensus, thinking about the writing and reading of these accounts has in recent 
decades become increasingly contested territory. Influenced by the health and social 
                                            
31  As Brian Lobel notes in his description of the “questioning stares” he experienced as a person with 
“the visible outward symptoms” of cancer, the demand to account for illness that others inadvertently 
impose can take both verbal and non-verbal forms (31).  
32  This is one of the major distinctions between the medical humanities and the history of medicine. 
While medical humanists tend to assume that illness is a call for stories, in general, historians of 
medicine don’t. Rather, they see the stories that do arise from illness as historically valuable and 
contingent on a range of social, cultural, political, technological, and economic factors. For historians 
of medicine, then, narrative is not necessarily the “self’s mode of being,” but a useful by-product of 
literate culture.   
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sciences, much early work on illness accounts looks not at published accounts but at 
oral narratives, focusing on those brought into being as part of the research process 
itself, either in the form of interviews, or through the observation of patient 
encounters with health care professionals. This kind of approach continues into the 
present day, and—as Waddington and Willis point out—has come to exert a 
powerful influence over the field.  
 
In the main, studies of this kind tend to focus on the ascendancy of the biomedical 
model and its effects on the experience of illness and the attempt to account for it. 
Medical practitioners such as Howard Brody, Eric Cassell, and Arthur Kleinman, 
along with social scientists such as Arthur Frank and Byron J. Good, frame these 
effects in terms of colonization and disenfranchisement, arguing that as “modernist 
medicine claimed the body of the patient as its territory,” so the record set down in 
specialist medical language by a qualified physician increasingly took precedence 
over the patient’s account (Frank 10). Within this disciplinary framework, illness 
accounts tend to be analyzed according to their tendency to reproduce or resist the 
narrative of restitution associated with the biomedical model, primarily with a view 
towards applying the findings of this analysis in healthcare policy and pedagogy, 
though the therapeutic outcomes of storytelling for people with illness are also taken 
into consideration, primarily by researchers and practitioners in psychology and 
related fields.33  This latter phenomenon takes its cue from the work of Freud, who, 
under the rubric of “abreaction theory” or “the talking cure,” formalized the notion 
that talking about traumatic experiences is therapeutic, and in doing so can be seen to 
have inaugurated the therapy and self-help cultures evident both in contemporary 
Western society and elsewhere.34 Present day practices such as “expressive 
writing”—also described as “the writing cure”—are heavily influenced by this 
dimension of Freud’s work and the various ways in which it has been extended, 
while collections such as Rita Charon and Peter L. Rudnytsky’s Psychoanalysis and 
                                            
33  James W. Pennebaker is one of the leading figures in this field. The influence of his work on 
“expressive writing” can be found in edited collections such as Lepore and Smyth (2002), and also in 
the work of individuals such as Myers (2008), and Nicholls (2009). Another form of expressive 
therapy used in illness is “bibliotherapy,” which Ella Berthoud and Susan Elderkin describe in The 
Novel Cure (2013) as “the prescribing of fiction for life’s ailments” (1). Bibliotherapy has been used 
in a healthcare context for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. For more on the history of this 
practice, see Jack and Ronan (2008).   
34  For more on this, see Furedi (2004) and Illouz (2008). 
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Narrative Medicine (2008) have explored the theoretical and practical intersections 
of the two fields in further detail. The resemblance is not purely conceptual, 
moreover: the instructive aims and stylistic features of Freud’s publications, which 
often incorporate patient case studies and autobiographical elements alongside 
guides to their interpretation, can also be seen to prefigure the presentation of more 
recent pedagogical works such as Charon’s Narrative Medicine and the Illness in the 
Academy anthology.35  
 
Crucially, in the last twenty or so years, medical humanities scholars have begun to 
look beyond the biomedical context and to consider how other social, cultural, and 
political factors might shape the illness experience and the accounts that emerge 
from it, to create a kind of medical history of the present.36 Some such enquiries, like 
Frank's analysis of quest narratives in The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and 
Ethics (1995), are general in scope, while others are specific to certain diseases. One 
of the most relevant findings of such studies to my project here is that realisation that 
even those stories which emerge in resistance to the biomedical model have a 
tendency to become themselves dominant, often in a relatively short space of time, 
and to trigger in turn further narratives of resistance — a process that can be 
accelerated by scholarly attention, and by the entrance of these stories into 
mainstream culture.37 Thus, as more narrative templates have emerged, medical 
humanists have responded by looking beyond the influence of the biomedical model 
to engage with the range of stories about illness and health that circulate in popular 
culture, and position illness accounts in relation to them.38 However, though there is 
much to commend this expanded view of illness accounts, the resulting studies tend 
                                            
35  The link between contemporary illness accounts and Freud is further consolidated by Hawkins’s 
adoption of the term “pathography” from Freud via Joyce Carol Oates. In a 1988 review, Oates used it 
to describe “a new subspecies of the genre [of magisterial biography].” “In the traditional biography,” 
she argues, “the subject is usually substantial enough to support high claims for his or her cultural 
significance.” Pathography, however, “typically focuses upon a far smaller canvas, sets its standards 
much lower” and takes as its distinguishing motifs “dysfunction and disaster, illnesses and pratfalls, 
failed marriages and failed careers, alcoholism and breakdowns and outrageous conduct.” 
36  In this way, this area of medical humanities research has come to overlap with a range of other 
fields of enquiry, including the sociology of the body, narrative and autobiography studies, and 
trauma studies. Indeed, trauma studies and “witnessing literature” form part of Charon’s “Foundations 
in Narrative Medicine” module at Columbia, as the course website attests: 
 <http://ce.columbia.edu/narrative-medicine/courses>.  
37  This can take place in a variety of ways, from films and television dramas that feature illness to 
media coverage of and life writing by high profile celebrities with illness.  
38  Barron Lerner’s studies of celebrity illness (2006) and on breast cancer activism (2001) are good 
examples of this kind of approach.  
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to offer typological overviews such as those found in Frank’s The Wounded 
Storyteller and Hawkins’s Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography (1999), 
rather than in-depth close readings, which perpetuates the restricted view of illness 
accounts described by Waddington and Willis.  
 
This emphasis on the uses of illness accounts in policy development, pedagogical, 
and therapeutic contexts is reflected in a more recently established area of practice 
and enquiry, known as narrative, or narrative-based, medicine — the rubric under 
which many of the literature and medicine courses Weinstein refers to operate. 
Narrative medicine has its origins in the work of doctors like Brody, Kleinman, and 
Cassell, which emphasizes the need for health care professionals to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the ways in which patients account for illness. In the late 
1990s, this scattered movement crystallized into a distinct field—narrative 
medicine—in which emphasis is placed on pedagogical approaches that encourage 
health care professionals to develop “narrative competence”: a quality Rita 
Charon—a practicing physician, professor of clinical medicine, and proponent of the 
narrative medicine approach—describes in terms of the ability “to recognise, absorb, 
interpret, and be moved by […] stories of illness” (Narrative vii). Prominent 
amongst the pedagogical techniques of narrative medicine are close reading of 
illness accounts, and creative writing,39 both of which are intended to equip students 
with the “skills of observation, analysis, empathy, and self-reflection” necessary for 
the kind of narrative competence Charon describes (NYU School of Medicine).40  
 
In recent years, narrative medicine courses have become integrated into medical 
education programmes at many institutions in the United States, and increasingly in 
the United Kingdom and beyond.41 A key consequence of this integration has been 
the establishment of a distinct literary branch of the medical humanities (Jurecic 2). 
                                            
39  Creative writing in particular has gained in popularity following the success of recent forays into 
fiction by medical practitioners, including Abraham Verghese’s novel Cutting for Stone (2009) and 
Louise Aronson’s short story collection A History of the Present Illness (2013). 
40  Narrative medicine has increasingly become integrated with the growing movement in clinical 
practice towards evidence-based medicine. Pioneered by Charon and her colleagues at Columbia 
under the rubric of narrative evidence-based medicine (or NEBM), this approach seeks to 
“recognise[s] the narrative features of all data and the evidentiary status of all clinical text” (Charon 
and Wyer 297). Further discussion of this approach may be found in Charon and Wyer (2008) and 
Meza and Passerman (2011).  
41  For more on this phenomenon, see Early and DeCosta (2009), Hooker and Noonan (2011).  
 36 
However, as Weinstein points out in his critique of literature and medicine courses, 
the contribution this branch makes to the interdisciplinarity of the medical 
humanities is compromised by its preference for “docile” reading, as well as its 
tendency to repackage, rather than resist, the privileged role of the health care 
professional as the final arbiter of an account’s meaning and value. This preference 
manifests in the kind of questions students are encouraged to ask about illness 
narratives. For example, in Kimberly R. Myer’s anthology Illness in the Academy 
(2007)—a text created with the pedagogical uses of illness accounts in mind ⁠42—each 
account is followed by a series of questions intended to support these readers to 
develop “narrative competence.” Though a small proportion of these questions point 
to the aesthetic dimensions of the account concerned—symbolism, narrative 
structure, and so on—in the main they focus on issues of content, in the traditional 
sense of the attitudes, behaviours, opinions, judgments, and values explicitly 
depicted in a work. “How can medical personnel deal with patients who are unable 
or unready to hear bad news about their health?”, they ask; “Why do sufferers write 
personal narratives about depression?”; “What complements to traditional medicine 
does the author offer as valuable?”; and so on (Myers Illness 54, 130, 72).  
 
This overview of the medical humanities gives a sense of the field’s scope: the range 
of methods and applications that researchers and practitioners in the field employ, 
and the ways in which the medical humanities has drawn attention to—and in many 
cases promoted—writing about illness, while also formalizing existing conventions 
for reading illness and establishing new ones. In addition to their shared emphasis on 
the relationship between storytelling and illness, one of the common themes that 
emerges in this overview is the assumption that both the historical conditions that 
allowed for the emergence of the modern illness account, and contemporary thinking 
about the writing and reading of it, are unique to the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, and that illness accounts are thus useful indices of a particular cultural 
moment.  Moreover, where exceptions to this presentist mode of thinking are made, 
they tend to be portrayed as part of an essentialist conception of human nature – a 
case in point being the influence of Joseph Campbell’s concept of monomyth, as set 
                                            
42  The anthology evolved in response to a conversation between Hawkins and Myers about the 
difficulty of teaching book-length accounts in a medical pedagogy context, and the consequent need 
for “a collection of shorter, chapter-length narratives” (Hawkins “Foreword” xi).  
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out in The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949), on Frank’s thinking about the hero 
narrative  (Frank 117-119). In doing so, they frame illness accounts as reflective not 
of a particular cultural moment, but of an ahistorical cultural consciousness. 
 
Instrumental Attitudes, Suspicious Criticism, and Metaphoric Thinking: 
Literary Approaches to Illness 
Alongside the growth in the medical humanities and narrative medicine, in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries accounts of illness in both autobiographical 
and fictional forms have increasingly attracted the attention of scholars in literary 
studies. Generally speaking, the engagement of literary scholars with 
autobiographical writing about illness tends to combine a set of interpretive habits 
and routines similar to those at work in the medical humanities, and particularly its 
social science components. Studies such as Couser's Recovering Bodies: Illness, 
Disability, and Life Writing (1997), Hawkins's Reconstructing Illness, and to a lesser 
extent Mary K. DeShazer’s Fractured Borders: Reading Women’s Cancer Literature 
(2005), take shape as generic surveys, focusing on the comparison of groups of 
accounts rather than in-depth close reading of individual texts, and pairing 
contextual information—such as motivations for writing and the patterns of 
composition and publication—with synopses of their master plots and recurrent 
thematic concerns. These surveys are geared towards documenting the formulas and 
conventions of the genre, marking its boundaries by defining individual texts in 
terms of their relative conformity or resistance to the archetype. As in the social 
sciences, moreover, they tend to take one of two forms: a generalist survey—such as 
Hawkins’ Reconstructing Illness—or a study focusing on a specific illness, like 
DeShazer’s, or Monica B. Pearl’s AIDS Literature and Gay Identity: The Literature 
of Loss (2012). However, some works combine this approach by juxtaposing 
chapters on specific illnesses to create a broader overview, of which Couser's 
Recovering Bodies is a good example.  
 
One thing these studies tend to focus on is the role of more general factors—that is, 
factors that are not directly connected to illness—in the growth of writing about 
illness. Chief amongst these are the democratization of literature—including both 
autobiography and fiction—and the destigmatization of writing about the embodied 
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self, both of which they see as distinctive to the twentieth-century. Thus at the turn 
of the twenty-first century, Gilmore asserts, memoir is no longer the province of 
“elder statesmen reporting on the way their public lives parallel historic events,” as it 
had been in the nineteenth century, but has been taken up by a far wider range of 
people, including those who are until the publication of their memoirs unknown to 
the public but whose experiences are sufficiently “emblematic of a cultural moment” 
or social or political issue to attract readers – a category into which people with 
illness often fall (Limits 1). According to Catherine Belling, moreover, though in the 
early twentieth century “the story of the self was seldom told in public — or at all, 
especially if it involved private bodily suffering,” contemporary cultural discourse is 
saturated with “memoirs and pathographies, […] confession and testimony, truth and 
reconciliation” — a view that echoes Frank’s assertion that, at the turn of the twenty-
first century, stories are “the self’s medium of being” (Belling 57; Frank 53). 
Elizabeth Grosz’s work adds a further dimension to this viewpoint, counterbalancing 
Frank’s thinking about narrative ontology with the statement that in the postmodern 
era, the body is “the very ‘stuff’ of subjectivity” (Grosz ix).43 As a general rule, 
arguments of this type thus seek to explain the growth of life writing about illness in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as the product of shifting discursive and 
other cultural factors, in much the same way that medical humanists pin this growth 
on the emergence of modern biomedicine and its colonization of the illness 
experience.  
 
In Illness as Narrative, Jurecic charts another trend in contemporary responses to life 
writing about illness, which she terms “suspicious criticism.” In this mode of 
engagement, the critic’s interpretive energy is channeled into an exposé of the 
workings of affect and ideology in a cultural artefact or collection of artefacts, and is 
particularly evident in readings of works that deal with suffering of some kind.44 
Lauren Slater, herself a memoirist of mental illness, captures this suspicious critical 
                                            
43  Peter Brooks’s observation that the body has acted as a “key organising element” in Western 
narrative since at least the late eighteenth century provides a compelling counterpoint to the claims 
put forward by Belling and Grosz, among others (47). For Brooks interest in “private life” and 
embodied experience is not a new phenomenon: rather, he argues, art forms such as the novel reveal 
these to have been prime subjects of cultural concern for many centuries, and to have attained 
particular prominence in the nineteenth (29-30, 26).  
44  Jurecic’s study joins more general responses to suspicious criticism by figures such as Bruno 
Latour, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Rita Felski. For more on this, see Jurecic (3-4, 10-17, see also 
chapter 5 passim).  
 39 
attitude well when she suggests that “illness as an artistic or narrative device is 
cheap, easy to sensationalize, obvious in its plot” (166). She writes: 
the illness memoirist need not grapple with the problems of how to render 
those fleeting poignant moments of being, those Woolfian wisps that 
disappear in mid-formation, the quarks of emotion or perception [...] . The 
illness memoirist need not struggle with all the possibilities of point of 
view—first person, close third person, alternate voices—because her tale is 
relentlessly singular. And how much easier to dramatize the syringe or the 
psychosis than it is to conjure up the haunting emptiness of the Don 
DeLillo suburbia or the poverty of Jean Toomer’s inner city. (166)  
Slater’s tongue-in-cheek analysis here implies that underpinning suspicious criticism 
is a widespread belief that illness accounts are not seen to be authentically literary, 
and therefore do not undertake any significant form of cultural work. The effects of 
this approach can be profoundly inhibitory for both established and aspiring life 
writers: a phenomenon the poet and novelist Sarah Manguso gestures to when she 
confesses that she “avoided writing about her disease” for years because “the subject 
seemed garish, obvious, banal, embarrassingly personal” (Couser 7; Manguso, cited 
in Akbar).  
 
Critical attitudes to fictional accounts of illness display somewhat different 
constraints, and tend to position illness as a symbolic device, or as means of plot or 
character development. The most obvious example of these attitudes can be found in 
the inclination to think about illness as a trope that can only ever be metaphorical. 
This kind of “metaphoric thinking” about illness is described most fully in Sontag's 
study Illness as Metaphor (1978), which not only documents the long literary and 
cultural history of this practice, but attests also to its persistence in the twentieth 
century. In this, her gaze sweeps from Shakespeare’s obsession with infections and 
impairments of the body politic to the political rhetoric of the late twentieth century, 
which abounds with metaphors that link corruption, totalitarianism, and the like to 
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cancer.45 Like many of the foundational works in the medical humanities—a field 
that was in its infancy when she wrote Illness as Metaphor—Sontag emphasizes the 
transformative role of the biomedical model, arguing that it not only brought about a 
renaissance in metaphoric thinking about illness in popular and particularly political 
discourse, but also facilitated the development of new stereotypes and symbolic 
associations by taking up new metaphors—such as those based on military culture—
into its own discourse.46  
 
For Sontag, then, metaphoric thinking represents both the use and the interpretation 
of certain illnesses as metaphors in literary, political, and popular discourse, as well 
as the use of metaphors to discuss these illnesses and their treatment. “In an era in 
which medicine’s central premise is that all diseases can be cured,” she argues, those 
which seem “intractable and capricious”—such as cancer, for which she had recently 
completed treatment, and AIDS, which she discusses with great foresight in her 
subsequent study AIDS and Its Metaphors (1988)—have become so “encumbered by 
the trappings of metaphor” that it is virtually impossible to experience them without 
feeling overwhelmed by their associations (Illness 5). In the late twentieth century, 
such illnesses—illnesses that we would now think of as chronic—are shaped by 
particularly powerful fantasies of “inescapable fatality” and “military metaphors of 
aggressive warfare” that leave little room for the deeply personal experience of 
living through the “calamity of disease” (Illness 87, 42) — an experience that, 
though it featured extensively in her journals, Sontag talked remarkably little about 
                                            
45  Metaphoric thinking about illness has its origins in theories of illness that arose prior to the advent 
of the biomedical model. In Illness as Metaphor, Sontag traces metaphoric thinking about 
tuberculosis and cancer back to at least the fourteenth century, but focuses particularly on the way in 
which nineteenth-century “fantasies” about tuberculosis set the stage for the “lurid metaphors” that 
have come to dominate the experience of cancer in the twentieth-century (Illness 9, 14, 5, 4). Studies 
that share Sontag’s focus on public discourse and metaphor but look at earlier periods include Byron 
Lee Grigsby’s Pestilence in Medieval and Early Modern English Literature (2003) and Jennifer C 
Vaught’s Rhetorics of Bodily Disease and Health in Medieval and Early Modern England (2010), 
although an earlier precursor of both can be both in Saul Nathaniel Brody’s monograph The Disease 
of the Soul: Leprosy in Medieval Literature (1974). Similar texts include Sander Gilman’s Disease 
and Representation: Images of Illness from Madness to AIDS (1988) and David Shuttleton’s Smallpox 
and the Literary Imagination 1660-1820 (2007). 
46  Interestingly, in AIDS and its Metaphors, Sontag notes the longevity of this particular metaphor, 
citing John Donne’s description of “illness as an enemy that invades, that lays siege to the body-
fortress” in Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (1627) (AIDS 8). In the present day, this 
phenomenon is evident in the use of rhetoric such as “rogue cells,” metastatic “invasion,” and “the 
war on cancer” in popular and medical discourse (Illness 65-66). For more on this see Martin (1994) 
and Cohen (2009), particularly chapter 4 on “the defensive poetics of modern medicine”. 
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during her lifetime.47 In this sense, Sontag’s critique of metaphoric thinking thus 
resembles the drive of early medical humanists to carve out a space for the 
subjective experience of illness that they saw modern biomedicine to have 
occluded.48  
 
In its groundbreaking critique of metaphoric thinking about illness, as well as its 
relatively accessible style, Illness as Metaphor participates in the heterogeneous 
culture of activism and resistance that emerged during the second half of the 
twentieth century – a culture in which critical and social justice movements focusing 
on gender, disability, sexuality, race, and other forms of marginalization cohere 
around the attempt to challenge both the construction of normalcy as white, male, 
heterosexual, able-bodied, undiseased, cognitively unimpaired, middle class, and so 
on, and the privilege experienced by those who fit one or more of these criteria. In 
these movements, life writing, fiction, and literary and cultural criticism have 
provided productive supplements to social activism and political lobbying, while 
also reflecting the cultural achievements of these latter activities.49 And yet, the 
changes wrought by these publications and the social movements they represent on 
both popular and scholarly thinking about writing and reading illness are not always 
as profound as both their wide readership and their afterlife in pedagogy and 
research might indicate: a phenomenon that is particularly evident in current 
approaches to writing and reading about illness. In spite of the fact that Illness as 
Metaphor has, since its publication, become an iconic text much cited in life writing 
about, and literary and cultural studies of, illness, and has driven substantial changes 
in medical and media practices, metaphoric thinking continues to exert a powerful 
influence over both popular and scholarly readers of fictions of illness.  
 
In the late twentieth century, a substantial body of work in this vein emerged, 
                                            
47 ⁠ In his account of her final illness, Sontag’s son David Rieff comments on this, noting that both 
Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors are not just “anti-autobiographical,” but 
“intentionally so” (28). 
48  In a study based on popular and professional responses to neoplastic, or potentially cancerous, 
disease in North America in the first half of the twentieth century, Barbara Clow challenges Sontag’s 
claims about the social pervasiveness of metaphoric thinking about illness and its negative effects on 
patients (Clow 2001). Nevertheless, its presence in fiction is marked.  
49  Again, like Grosz’s notion of embodied subjectivity, this too evolved out of nineteenth-century 
literary culture, in which the novel often acted as a vehicle for social reform.  For more on this, see, 
for example, Lovesey (2011). 
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focusing on the ways in which the association between illness, the aberrant, and the 
undesirable is inscribed in European and American fiction prior to the twentieth 
century. Lawrence Rothfield’s reading of Mme. de Merteuil's bout with smallpox in 
Laclos’ Les Liaisons Dangereuses (1782) illustrates this practice well. “In 
disfiguring her,” he argues, “the smallpox offers…readers a legible figure of moral, 
social, and narrative closure, a ‘very true’ representation of Merteuil's evil character” 
(3). This reading forms part of Rothfield’s examination of the relationship between 
clinical discourse and realism in the novels of Gustave Flaubert, Honoré de Balzac, 
George Eliot, Emile Zola, and Arthur Conan Doyle in Vital Signs: Medical Realism 
and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (1992). Other examples of this mode of writing and 
reading illness are discussed in Jeffrey Meyers’s study of European and American 
fiction of the late nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries Disease and the Novel, 1880-
1960 (1985), which ranges from the use of epilepsy as a metaphor for “spiritual 
insight” in Dostoevsky’s fiction to that of tuberculosis to represent “the pathological 
state” of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s in A. E. Ellis’s The Rack and Thomas 
Mann’s The Magic Mountain, whose fiction Sontag describes as “a storehouse of 
early-twentieth-century disease myths” (Meyers 8, 105; Sontag AIDS 23). In the 
materials they deal with and the approaches they take, these studies both attest and 
contribute to the long tradition of “metaphoric thinking” in writing and reading 
fictions of illness: a tradition in which illness is seen to serve "a quite restricted 
literary purpose" (Rothfield 3). More recently, the Jamesonian notion that 
postcolonial fiction must always on some level take shape as national allegory has 
led to the extension of this way of thinking, as typified in readings of illness and 
disability as metaphor in novels such as Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children 
(1980), Bapsi Sidhwa’s Cracking India (1992), and Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous 
Conditions (1988) – though such interpretations are often anticipated, and 
problematized, in the texts themselves, as Clare Barker’s study Postcolonial Fiction 
and Disability: Exceptional Children, Metaphor and Materiality (2011) 
demonstrates.50   
 
                                            
50  A similar phenomenon can be traced in works such as Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov 
(1880), which both uses illness as a means of character development—mainly that of Alyosha as a 
kind hero, through his engagement to Lise Khokhlakov, whose illness confines her to a wheelchair, 
and his desire to help the family of Ilyusha Snegiryov—and holds this strategy up to scrutiny through 
the epileptic Pavel Smerdyakov’s exploitation of the association between his illness and prophecy to 
instill anxieties and suspicions amongst the members of the Karamazov family.  
 43 
A similar problematization of the relationship between illness and metaphor can be 
found in contemporary life writing about illness. An example of this 
problematization can be found in Melanie Thernstrom’s The Pain Chronicles (2010), 
a work that blends medical history, cultural criticism, and memoir. An important 
narrative strand in this work revolves around Thernstrom’s attempt to keep a pain 
diary, as advised by her rheumatologist – an activity in which she repeatedly finds 
herself grappling with metaphoric thinking (10). In her reflection on this activity in 
the introduction to The Pain Chronicles, Thernstrom notes how the diary “became a 
place for embroidering my pain with pernicious meaning” and “metaphors that 
obscured my medical situation,” and recalls being “struck” at seeing this same 
tendency in the other pain diaries she read (10). And yet, at the same time, balanced 
against this critique of metaphoric thinking is the suggestion that the kind of 
demythicization of illness that Sontag demands might pose its own set of problems. 
We can see this in Thernstrom’s interview with Dr. Clifford Woolf, a specialist in 
pain medicine:    
    “But pain feels meaningful,” I suggested timidly, like a riddle or a dream.” 
    “That’s crazy,” he said forcefully. “That’s like the myths about TB we 
were talking about. Chronic pain is not some”—he searched for the right 
word—“code. It is a terrible, abnormal sensory experience, pathological 
activity in the nervous system.” 
    Could these science terms, still so foreign in my mouth, become mine? 
Could the demon that clothed itself in my body turn into excitotoxicity and 
overuse atrophy? Cervical spondylosis and spinal stenosis and impingement 
syndrome—if I truly believed that’s what it was and that’s all it was—would 
be far less alarming than a curse, a punishment, a private sorrow, a symptom 
of aloneness, an inexplicable blight, or any of the myriad unhappy ways I 
understood and experienced and expressed my condition. 
   Would it also be less painful? (189) 
Here, the technical language of modern medicine appears to offer a neutral 
alternative to the morally-weighted language of metaphor: a way of undoing the 
destructive psychological effects of the analogies commonly deployed in accounts of 
illness. But, for all its perniciousness, the language of metaphor is familiar to 
Thernstrom, while that of science remains “foreign.” With her final question, 
moreover, she evinces both excitement and uncertainty about language’s ability to 
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modulate physical sensation.  
 
Ultimately, The Pain Chronicles attests to the need not to dispense with metaphoric 
thinking, but to be attendant to its workings and, in doing so, to rework it. This 
attestation manifests in multiple ways, ranging from reported conversations such as 
that above to extracts from Thernstrom’s pain diary. Some sections appear to 
continue the tradition of metaphoric thinking on which Sontag focuses—
Thernstrom’s likening of pain clinics to Dante’s Inferno is an example of this, as is 
her blurring of the boundary between romantic and physical pain—, while others 
seek to highlight, it seems, the contradictions inherent in Sontag’s deployment of 
metaphor in her prose (Thernstrom 10; Romm). Thernstrom achieves this latter 
effect by incorporating frequent echoes of the image with which Illness as Metaphor 
opens, in which Sontag describes illness as “the night-side of life, a more onerous 
citizenship” (3). “Everyone who is born,” she writes, “holds dual citizenship, in the 
kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick,” and, “although we all prefer to 
use only the good passport,” she continues, “sooner or later each of us is obliged, at 
least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place” (3). We see this 
image invoked by Thernstrom in her introduction to The Pain Chronicles, when she 
asserts that “To be in physical pain is to find yourself in a different realm – a state of 
being unlike any other, a magic mountain as far removed from the familiar world as 
a dreamscape” – a reworking that contains within it both an homage to Sontag’s 
critique, and, through reference to one of its targets (Mann’s The Magic Mountain), 
an ironic commentary on the proximity of her writing to that which she sought to 
challenge (Thernstrom 5). In this way, and as Gilmore notes, Thernstrom’s staging 
of her struggle with metaphoric thinking is representative of a growing emphasis in 
contemporary accounts of pain—a genre that overlaps closely with that of the illness 
account—not on the limitations of the “ready-made languages of pain”51 per se, but 
on the many ways in which pain can be characterized: an emphasis that foregrounds 
both the complex relationship that obtains between the experience of pain and its 
expression, and the overdetermination of this relationship by competing discourses 
(Gilmore “Agency” 86).  
 
                                            
51  As will become apparent in chapter 2, Gilmore borrows this phrase from Woolf’s On Being Ill. 
 45 
The final interpretive approach I wish to discuss here can be allied to what Attridge 
calls “literary instrumentalism,” in which both life writing and fiction are treated “as 
a means to a predetermined end” (Singularity 7). At its simplest, this involves 
“coming to the object with the hope or the assumption that it can be instrumental in 
furthering an existing project”—a project that may be “political, moral, historical, 
biographical, psychological, cognitive, or linguistic”—“and responding to it in such 
a way as to test, or even produce, that usefulness” (Singularity 7). Though as a 
critical approach this clearly has its limitations, in relation to illness is has the 
potential at least to resist existing interpretive modes and pursue alternatives, as the 
work of critics such as Lisa Diedrich and DeShazer show. However, the most 
common examples of instrumental attitudes to illness accounts have their origins in 
trauma theory. As a result, while they are not necessarily invested in the idea that 
only certain life stories have meaning and value, these approaches also impose 
restrictions on the ways in which illness accounts signify and the kinds of cultural 
work they might undertake. Crucially, they also risk distorting the field by placing 
emphasis on those works that corroborate existing theories or further existing 
projects, while neglecting those that do not.  
 
One of the central tenets of trauma theory is the notion that trauma is an experience 
to which “language is inadequate” (Gilmore “Agency” 85). Sociological and 
psychological approaches to illness accounts are often underwritten by this view of 
illness: the reparative role of storytelling that Frank describes in The Wounded 
Storyteller, for example, takes as its point of departure the idea that illness instigates 
an experience of “narrative wreckage,” a state of ontological chaos in which an 
individual is loses her “sense of where she is in life and where she may be going”.52 
However, whereas scholars such as Frank focus on the therapeutic role of 
storytelling, in literary studies emphasis tends to be placed on the unnarratability of 
illness as a form of trauma. In such readings, the silences and fractures in a narrative 
                                            
52  Frank adapts this term from Ronald Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, 
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993). Here, Dworkin discusses the role of the individual’s 
‘sense of self’ in determining the relative benefits and drawbacks of prolonging life. Whereas 
Dworkin stresses that, because individuals have “radically different senses of self” that relate to “what 
has been critically important to their own lives”—the different meanings and values they attribute to 
activities such as reading or exercising, for example—the experience of narrative wreckage is always 
highly personal, Frank uses the phrase in a more general sense, based on a more universal 
understanding of selfhood as fundamentally narrative in nature – for “stories,” he maintains, “are the 
self’s medium of being” (Dworkin 211; Frank 53).  
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are interpreted as evidence of the writer’s struggle to meld the compulsion to witness 
trauma with its fundamental unnarratability. A case in point can be found in 
Belling’s argument that the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic not only “overwhelmed 
language” at the time of its occurrence, but has continued to resist “being recalled 
and recounted” in more recent historical fiction,53 while Jason Tougaw’s reading of 
AIDS memoirs focuses on the ways in which the “fragmentation” evident in their 
narratives reflects “the authors’ own ravaged communities and traumatized psyches” 
(Belling 57, 59; Tougaw 167).   
 
These approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive. When taken to the extreme, 
the instrumental attitude to illness accounts taken by scholars influenced by trauma 
theory risks straying into the territory of suspicious criticism, for, in their validation 
of fragmentation and silence as the markers of authentic trauma, they risk implying 
that accounts in which illness is ‘made sense of’ are somehow inauthentic. A 
common variant on this is the belief that “trauma cannot be spoken of or written 
about in any mode other than the literal” and that any attempt to aestheticize, or 
metaphorize, thus “risks negating it” (Gilmore Limits 6). Conversely, in the work of 
Shoshana Felman, metaphoric thinking, instrumentalism, and trauma theory come 
together in her readings of Albert Camus’ The Plague, which she sees as “a 
transparent allegory for the massive death inflicted by the Second World War and for 
the trauma of a Europe ‘quarantined’ by German occupation and desperately 
struggling against the overwhelming deadliness of Nazism” (8). Underlying this 
approach is the suggestion that any attempt to read the novel against allegory—and 
thus to consider its aesthetic dimensions in other terms—constitutes a denial of its 
central purpose as an “an act of bearing witness to the trauma of survival” – a 
suggestion that stands in stark contrast to the criticisms of Camus’ novel put forward 
by several of his contemporaries, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes, 
who argue that “in representing its subject allegorically, [The Plague] fails to 
represent real material history” (Felman 8; Krapp 655).54  
 
 
                                            
53  Interestingly, Belling’s conclusion here is in opposition to the project she initially embarked upon, 
which centred on the “expectation…that historical fiction about the pandemic could somehow 
work…as an antidote to our collective amnesia” about the event (59).  
54 For more on this, see chapter 4 in Felman and Laub (1992) and Krapp (1999).  
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Conclusions 
In their recent call for scholars in the medical humanities to undertake a major 
“rethinking” of their approach to accounts of illness, Waddington and Willis 
emphasize the need to expand the disciplinary horizons of the field in the direction 
of the humanities (iv). For Waddington and Willis, literary studies should be at the 
forefront of this expansion: in addition to a keener sense of historical perspective,  
“traditional literary methods […] of close reading and textual analysis,” they insist, 
will need to occupy an increasingly central position in future illness account research 
if the limitations of existing methodologies are to be overcome (iv). My discussion 
in the first half of this chapter looks at current thinking about writing and reading 
illness accounts in the medical humanities, and in this way builds on Waddington 
and Willis’s critique by exploring in greater depth the assumptions that underpin this 
thinking: assumptions in which the writing of illness accounts is primarily seen as a 
therapeutic process, and the reading of these accounts an important component of 
training healthcare professionals in skills of empathy and cultural sensitivity. In my 
analysis of current thinking about writing and reading illness accounts in literary 
studies, however, I depart from the general thrust of Waddington and Willis’s 
argument to question whether the present critical crisis in the medical humanities can 
really be resolved through a methodological reorientation towards this thinking in its 
present form.  
 
The assumption that literary studies might offer an antidote to the shortcomings of 
the medical humanities is, I argue, as problematic as it is promising, for literary 
studies has its own preconceptions and blind spots when it comes to thinking about 
writing and reading representations of illness. In my survey of literary approaches to 
these representations in the second half of this chapter, I demonstrate how in the 
limits they place upon what illness accounts might mean, and the kinds of cultural 
work they might undertake, these approaches inflict interpretive crimes similar to 
those perpetrated by the medical humanities. Though the studies cited by 
Waddington and Willis as examples of the kind of “sophisticated and inclusive 
humanities approach” that research into illness accounts requires are not of this ilk, 
the faith they place in the ability of literary studies to extricate the medical 
humanities from its current state of crisis should not be left unchecked. Rather, any 
attempt to integrate the principles and practices of literary studies into the medical 
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humanities needs to take cognizance of the convoluted relationship that literary 
studies has had, and continues to have, to representations of illness, and to subject its 
methods to sustained analysis.   
 
Few critical attempts to challenge the limitations of thinking about writing and 
reading illness in literary studies currently exist, and those that do have not had quite 
as profound an effect on scholarship as one might imagine, as my reading of 
Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor suggests. And yet, beyond this narrow strand of critical 
resistance, the limitations of the critical metanarratives that underpin this thinking 
have not gone entirely unnoticed. As I indicate in my reading of Thernstrom’s The 
Pain Chronicles, illness accounts can themselves offer an important check on the 
tendencies of these critical metanarratives to limit what illness accounts can look 
like, and the ways in which they might signify. In the chapters that follow, I look in 
greater detail at how established patterns of writing and reading illness are 
problematized in a range of contemporary illness accounts, using this 
problematization as a point of departure from which to consider both the ways in 
which these accounts make use of the aesthetic elements that define the literary, and 
the implications of this aesthetic activity for our thinking about the nature of the 
literary and its participation in the ethical.  
 
Though not an illness account in the conventional sense of the term, Virginia 
Woolf’s 1926 essay On Being Ill can in many ways be seen to inaugurate this 
tradition of problematization. Herein, Woolf puts forward a compelling account of 
the relationship between illness, literature, and ethics in which the conventions of the 
literary are subject to extensive critique, and the challenges that illness poses to 
writers and readers explored. As such, the essay provides a rewarding, though 
perhaps unexpected, way into the analyses of contemporary illness accounts enacted 
in this thesis, and thus forms the subject of my next chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Undiscovered Countries and Unexploited Mines:  
Woolf on Illness, Literature, and Ethics 
 
Each of the books Woolf wrote around the time [of The Waves (1931)] 
strained across genre, attempted to break through—or disturb—the limits of 
the essay, the novel, the biography, to touch realities denied by accepted 
forms. In all her work there was an astute awareness that apparently literary 
questions – of genre, language, plot – are questions that touch the pith of 
how society constitutes and contains itself”  
Gillian Beer (1996, 77)  
 
Written from Woolf’s sickbed in 1925, On Being Ill is the first published work 
devoted to the relationship between illness and literature. Though its initial 
reception—by T. S. Eliot, in his capacity as commissioning editor for New 
Criterion—was “unenthusiastic,” and though, as Jurecic notes, no evidence exists to 
suggest that Woolf’s argument had any substantial influence on the writers of her 
era,55 recent interest in writing and reading about illness has led to a resurgence in 
the essay’s popularity (Lee “Introduction” xxv; Jurecic 5; Lee “Introduction” xx). 
Reissued twice by the Paris Press in recent years—once in 2002, and again in 
2012—Woolf’s commentary has increasingly featured in both scholarly studies and 
personal accounts of illness (and related conditions, such as pain), ranging from 
Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985) to 
Hilary Mantel’s hospital diary, Ink in the Blood (2010). However, whereas at the 
turn of the twenty-first century critical reappraisals of Woolf’s essays by scholars in 
                                            
55  A reflection of the presentist emphasis of the medical humanities, the relationship between illness 
and literature in the early twentieth century remains under-researched, though this is slowly beginning 
to change. In this vein, Miriam Marty Clark’s work on illness and injury in Hemingway’s early fiction 
(2004) and Jane Fisher’s monograph Envisioning Disease, Gender, and War: Women’s Narratives of 
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic (2012) have been pivotal in opening up the field, while Alice Hall’s 
reading of disability in Faulkner’s fiction has also made a valuable contribution (2011). In the 
opening to Illness as Narrative, Jurecic also notes the presence of illness—and particularly the 1918 
influenza pandemic—in several American novels and novellas published between 1920 and 1945: 
Willa Cather’s One of Ours (1922), Thomas Wolfe’s Look Homeward, Angel (1929), Katherine Anne 
Porter’s Pale Rider, Pale Horse (1939), and Wallace Stegner’s The Big Rock Candy Mountain (1943) 
(Jurecic 1). Moreover, as Clark suggests, William Carlos Williams’s medical narratives, which are 
scattered through his poetry and prose work and which were later published as the edited collection 
Doctor Stories in 1984, can also be seen as a precursor of the surge in autobiographical and creative 
writing by medical practitioners at the turn of the twenty-first century (M. Clark 168).  
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literary and women’s studies seek to reclaim the relevance of these essays to Woolf’s 
artistic project, and to modernism and women’s writing more widely, On Being Ill 
has for the most part continued to be viewed as a text peripheral to these issues – a 
work that reflects, but does not extend, ongoing themes in her non-fiction writing.56 
Moreover, from a medical humanities perspective, the essay is regarded as an early 
but anomalous blip on the radar—a work with no obvious ancestors and no notable 
descendants—and valued primarily as a source of pithy axioms about the ineffability 
of pain, as well as a pseudo-historical proof of the absence of illness from literature 
prior to the emergence of the illness account genre in the mid-twentieth century.57 As 
such, engagements with On Being Ill in both critical and creative works tend to 
favour a literal interpretation of the essay, dissecting out pithy maxims and scraping 
them clean of the “deviations and devagations” that give the work its character, 
before using these more quotable portions as convenient, but largely inadequate, 
proxies for Woolf’s argument as a whole (Lee “Introduction” xxv, xxvii). In this 
chapter, I counter these views by examining how in On Being Ill Woolf interweaves 
illness, literature, and the everyday, and, in doing so, leaves hanging threads that are 
picked up by later generations of ethical philosophers, literary critics, and authors in 
the fields of life writing and experimental fiction. In doing so, I set out my approach 
to contemporary illness accounts, and give a clearer sense of the foundational role 
that On Being Ill—a text that antedates the earliest of these accounts by over six 
decades—plays in it.  
 
 
On Being Ill as Critical and Creative Intervention 
In recent decades, a handful of exceptions to the approaches described above have 
emerged, in which fragments of the critical and creative project that Woolf 
undertakes in On Being Ill are uncovered. Hermione Lee’s discussion of the “satire 
on conformity” that takes shape in the essay’s second half is one such exception, as 
                                            
56  A case in point can be found in Bowlby’s insightful reading of On Being Ill in relation to the wider 
theme of “multiple selves” in Woolf’s writing (259-260).    
57  For an example of this approach, see Jack Coulehan’s annotation of the essay for the Literature, 
Arts, and Medicine Database. Hosted by the New York University School of Medicine, this online 
database provides a dynamic, open-access annotated bibliography of works of interest to medical 
practitioners, students, and scholars in the medical humanities and related disciplines, and can be 
accessed at <http://litmed.med.nyu.edu>.  
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is Rachel Bowlby’s reading of the work as key moment in Woolf’s thinking about 
the multiplicity of selfhood (Lee “Introduction” xxx; Bowlby 259). To this we can 
also add Kimberly Engdahl Coates’s analysis of the essay as an exploration in the 
“organic aesthetic” she sees as central to Anglo-European modernism, and Stella 
Bolaki’s reading of its depiction of “aesthetics as work” (Coates 247; Bolaki 120). In 
this chapter, I bring these fragments together with others uncovered in my own 
readings of On Being Ill, to provide the first sustained exploration of the essay as a 
critical and creative work in its own right. Drawing on Woolf’s non-fiction more 
widely—including other essays from the same period and biographical material such 
as diaries and letters—I show how On Being Ill not only speaks to key debates in 
Woolf’s oeuvre, but ultimately extends these debates in ways that have significant 
implications for writing and reading illness in the present day.  
 
Central to my reading of the essay is an understanding of the relationship between 
the essay’s critical project and Woolf’s own lived experience of illness. As Lee 
points out, illness is “one of the main stories” of Woolf’s life – a story characterized 
by debilitating physical symptoms, including headaches, palpitations, insomnia, and 
faints, “entwined” with periods of mental distress, ranging from severe agitation to 
profound depression (“Introduction” xiv).58 Though the cause of Woolf’s ongoing ill 
health is unknown and, in spite of much retrospective speculation, ultimately 
unknowable, what we can be certain of is that it would, by today’s standards, be 
classed as chronic illness – a category of conditions that not only challenges medical 
epistemology, but which also defies the conventions of narrative at virtually every 
turn. When, in “Professions for Women” (1931) she writes about how her career has 
been driven by the attempt to tell “the truth about my own experiences as a body,” 
then, illness must have been a significant part of this truth, and On Being Ill therefore 
part of her attempt to tell it – an assertion Lee corroborates in her suggestion that 
Woolf saw in the conventions of the essay an opportunity to draw on “personal 
material” without lapsing into “confession” (Woolf “Professions” 241; Lee “Essays” 
                                            
58 According to Thomas Caramagno, Woolf’s account of these symptoms in her diaries and letters has 
led to a posthumous diagnosis of bipolar disorder by multiple psychiatric specialists (Flight 6). 
However, Lee speculates that she might have had some form of long-term “febrile or tubercular 
illness,” while considering the possibility that the treatments she received—which included chloral 
hydrate, veronal, and the highly toxic digitalis—might have been more detrimental than therapeutic 
(“Introduction” xv). 
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104-105). In this combination of critical and creative intervention, On Being Ill 
forms both important precursor to the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century 
illness accounts on which this thesis focuses, and a valuable point of departure for 
the argument I develop in my readings of these accounts.  
 
On Being Ill is a characteristically Woolfian text. Like many other of her essays from 
the period, it strains across genre to create what Hermione Lee calls “a curious, 
original mixture” of “manifesto, literary criticism, feminist argument, meditation on 
life, fiction, biography, history, and autobiography” in which the intellectual, the 
affective, and the aesthetic are inextricably entangled (“Introduction” xxiii). As such, 
any attempt to engage critically with this essay, and to articulate this engagement in 
ways accessible to others, will necessarily involve acts of compartmentalization and 
alignment that go against the grain of Woolf’s writing. With this problematic in 
mind, I have chosen to structure this chapter as a series of readings of the essay, each 
of which builds on the findings of its precursor. I begin by looking at the 
philosophical dimension of Woolf’s essay: how her descriptions of illness gesture to 
its coextensiveness in her thinking with everyday lived experience. I then build on 
this reading through a consideration of the limitations that Woolf sees in existing 
attempts to represent these experiences, with emphasis on her suggestion that illness 
brings these limitations into sharp relief. Finally, I conclude with an examination of 
the alternatives approaches to writing and reading illness that she gestures to in the 
latter half of the essay.   
 
“Astonishing Disorder”: Woolf on Illness and the Everyday 
According to Bowlby, Woolf’s notion of selfhood as an experience marked by 
multiplicity can be seen to reach its apotheosis in On Being Ill (259). Though 
Bowlby’s reading of On Being Ill is restricted to a short passage in which Woolf 
describes how fiction allows one to “live over and over again,” and which is not 
specifically linked to illness, (18-19), in including this essay in her thematic reading, 
Bowlby not only draws attention to an important dimension of On Being Ill, but also 
suggests a degree of overlap between Woolf’s thinking about illness and her take on 
everyday lived experience more widely. In this section, I want to pursue Bowlby’s 
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suggestion by investigating how far this overlap extends, and what implications it 
might have for our understanding of the critical and creative intervention Woolf 
makes in On Being Ill.  
 
Written shortly before On Being Ill, the essays Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown (1924) 
and “Modern Fiction” (1925) provide particular insight into this overlap. Herein, 
Woolf depicts everyday lived experience as a dynamic constellation of affective and 
intellectual impressions. In Mr Bennett, for example, she suggests to her reader that 
In the course of your daily life this past week […] You have overheard scraps 
of talk that filled you with amazement. You have gone to bed at night 
bewildered by the complexity of your feelings. In one day thousands of ideas 
have coursed through your brains; thousands of emotions have met, collided, 
and disappeared in astonishing disorder. (Bennett 23) 
In “Modern Fiction,” on the other hand, she uses the third person to describe the 
“incessant shower” of “myriad impressions” received by “an ordinary mind on an 
ordinary day,” but with similarly evocative results (“Modern” 189). Though 
superficially repetitive, the “myriad impressions” encountered on “an ordinary day” 
fall into new patterns, with new accents, “as they shape themselves into the life of 
Monday or Tuesday,” leaving one with the sense that “Life is not a series of gig 
lamps symmetrically arranged; [but] a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope” 
(“Modern” 212).  For Woolf, then, the phenomenon of daily life unfolds as a series 
of open-ended encounters and experiences, each “stranger” than the last, that leave 
one “bewildered” and “filled…with amazement” and can only be made sense of in 
retrospect, if at all (Bennett 23).  
 
From the very beginning of On Being Ill, Woolf frames illness as an everyday 
experience, rather than an extraordinary event, as the essay’s opening line 
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“Considering how common illness is” indicates (Being 4).59 The striking similarity 
between Woolf’s descriptions of everyday lived experience in these essays and her 
descriptions of illness in On Being Ill are integral to this framing. Woolf’s 
description of sky-gazing while ill is a case in point. “Able, perhaps for the first time 
in years, to look round, to look up,” she writes of how the ill person finds themselves 
witness to an “extraordinary spectacle” (12). Instead of a backdrop for “chimneys 
and churches” or a symbol of the weather, the sky reveals itself to be a site of 
“endless activity,” featuring an “incessant making up of shapes and casting them 
down,” a “buffeting of clouds together, and drawing vast trains of ships and waggons 
[sic] from North to South,” an “incessant ringing up and down of curtains of light 
and shade,” an “interminable experiment with gold shafts and blue shadows, with 
veiling the sun and unveiling it, with making rock ramparts and wafting them away” 
(13). With its shifts in perspective and synaesthetic sense impressions, illness is 
depicted by Woolf as a case of everyday experience in extremis: the dynamic 
constellation of affective and intellectual experiences with which she describes daily 
life in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction” magnified in the swirling cloudscapes and 
moving shadows of On Being Ill. In doing so, moreover, Woolf indicates that On 
Being Ill is as much an essay on being as it is an essay on being ill.  
 
As Bowlby and others have pointed out, both in her essays and her fiction Woolf 
displays an ongoing concern with the nature of selfhood, and particularly the 
discrepancy between the vagaries of lived experience and the monolithism of what 
Sidonie Smith calls “the autobiographical ‘I’” (1). For feminist critics such as Smith 
and Gilmore, this “I” reflects a fundamentally masculinist and “occluding vision” of 
“universal selfhood” which has its origins in “Enlightenment notions of the human 
subject,” and as such acts as a textual manifestation of the ability to “master[] the 
chaos of experience” through “self-narration” (Smith 1-2; Gilmore 83-84). Woolf’s 
descriptions of lived experience in both her essays and fiction provide a striking 
                                            
59  In this, Woolf preempts the work of prominent scholars in literary and cultural disability studies 
such as Davis and Thomson, both of whom argue that, though social and economic inequalities 
significantly shape the lived experience of disability, as a form of social, cultural, and biological 
difference it is “more fluid” than categories such as race, gender, sexuality, and so on (Thomson 14). 
“No whites will become black; few straights will become gay,” Davis writes, “but every normal 
person can become disabled. All it takes is the swerve of a car, the impact of a football tackle, or the 
tick of the clock to make this transformation” (Bending 4). Likewise, every normal person can 
become ill: all it takes is the bite of a mosquito, the ingestion of a pathogen, or the mutation of a gene 
to make this transformation.  
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counterpoint to this “I,” to which On Being Ill is no exception.  
 
And yet, On Being Ill doesn’t simply reiterate the model of subjectivity set out in Mr 
Bennett and “Modern Fiction”: a model that frames the self as multiple, inconsistent, 
and ultimately incomprehensible. Rather, in this essay, Woolf extends this model in 
compelling and significant ways. The satire on conformity that Lee identifies in the 
second half of the essay is central to this extension. This reading takes its cue from 
Woolf’s descriptions of the ill as “outlaws,” and “deserters from the army of the 
upright” (22, 12). These descriptions that are not critical, but celebratory, for as the 
essay progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that Woolf sees in this outlawry both 
a liberation, and a kind of existential awakening. In illness, she suggests, one is freed 
from the “genial pretense,” “the make-believe” of normative social behaviour (12). 
Released from the need “to communicate, to civilise, to share, to cultivate the desert, 
educate the native, to work together by day and by night to sport”—to participate in 
the processes and transactions of normative social, political, and economic life—the 
person with illness is at leisure to examine and reflect on all that “the cautious 
respectability of health conceals” (12, 10). On first reading, this is reminiscent of the 
Romantic notion of the “mad poet,” in which illness engenders “a revolutionary and 
liberating madness” that releases the imagination from the mundane constraints of 
everyday life and inspires creative vision — a pigeonhole into which Woolf herself 
has been posthumously placed by many critics (Burwick 2-3; Caramagno Flight 8).60 
But in On Being Ill, I argue, Woolf is getting at something very different — 
something that coalesces, both in this essay and in Woolf’s critical oeuvre more 
widely, into an exploration of what Michèle Barrett terms the “power of difference” 
(x).  
 
According to Barrett, Woolf’s thinking about the power of difference hinges on the 
alternative perspectives on and insights into the workings of normative society that 
the experiences of those who circulate outside, or on the margins, of this society 
might yield. In much of Woolf’s work, Barrett argues, this power is located in the 
experiences of women, and particularly in their written accounts of these 
experiences, both fictionalized and autobiographical (x). However, at certain 
                                            
60  For more on poetic madness, or furor poeticus, see Burwick (1992) and Whitehead (2010).  
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moments in Woolf’s oeuvre we see this thinking extended to other forms of social, 
historical, and biological difference, including animals—as Flush (1933), her 
biography of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s cocker spaniel, suggests—and people 
with illness.61 In the first instance, the power of difference that illness engenders 
takes shape as a stripping back of illusions of self-knowledge to acknowledge the 
basic condition of being as one of the unknown and unknowable, of incoherence and 
opacity. In fact, Woolf contends, in illness we go beyond basic acknowledgement, to 
embrace this condition: we not only come to realize that the self is “a snowfield 
where even the print of bird’s feet is unknown,” but to accept that we “like it better 
so” (12). This recognition of preference is in many ways the crux of Woolf’s 
argument, for in its aftermath we realize that “always to have sympathy, always to be 
accompanied, always to be understood”—always to be subject to the illusions 
around which the “genial pretense” of normative social behaviour is constructed—
“would be intolerable” (12).  
 
Indeed, for Woolf these illusions are positively dangerous. She writes: 
…weighted as they already are with sorrow, [if people] were to take on them 
that burden too, adding in imagination other pains to their own, buildings 
would cease to rise; roads would peter out into grassy tracks; there would be 
an end of music and of painting; one great sigh alone would rise to Heaven, 
and the only attitudes for men and women would be those of horror and 
despair. (9) 
In illness, Woolf thus suggests, we not only come face to face with the epistemic 
limits of self-knowledge, but find in the recognition of these limits something that 
feels good, in the ethical sense of ontological well-being, rather than moral 
achievement, and which thus in turn offers the possibility of new and exciting forms 
of intersubjective engagement that take these limits as take as their point of 
departure. In this regard, Woolf’s treatise on illness does not advocate a retreat from 
the social, but rather a renegotiation of the terms of recognition and engagement on 
which the social is based.  
                                            
61  We see this in Flush, for example, when Woolf writes of how, as Flush and Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning (then Elizabeth Barrett) “gazed at each other” for the first time, they experienced a mix of 
familiarity and strangeness (26). She writes: “Each felt: Here am I – and then each felt: But how 
different!” (26). Flush’s amazement at, and lack of self-recognition in, his own reflection earlier in the 
work offers an interesting counterpoint to this (24). 
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The discussion of selfhood and intersubjectivity that unfolds in On Being Ill both 
anticipates, and can be further elucidated by, the ethical philosophy Judith Butler 
sets out in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). Here, Butler offers a powerful 
response to Levinasian ethics and its legacies in literary and philosophical 
scholarship. Like Ricoeur, she sees the lived experience of subjectivity as “unstable” 
and “elusive,” characterized by contingency and incoherence, while also stressing 
the importance of distinguishing between lived experience and narrative conventions 
(Ricoeur Oneself 162).62 Nevertheless, her response differs from Ricoeur’s in 
significant ways. Though Ricoeur is wary of the risks inherent in assimilating well-
told life stories to morally good lives, he places emphasis on the role of 
emplotment—or, of narrative synthesis and integration—in understanding the self 
and giving value and meaning to lived experience, and thus sees self-narration to be 
an integral part of the aspiration towards the ethical. In Giving, however, Butler 
takes a harder line, arguing that assimilation and moral evaluation are inseparable 
from the practices involved emplotment. Whereas Ricoeur sees in emplotment a 
tendency to slip from ethics into morality that is entirely avoidable, then, Butler sees 
the antithesis of the ethical.  
 
In opposition to Ricoeur’s emphasis on emplotment, Butler claims that any viable 
attempt at thinking through the relation between the self and the other—at 
recognizing and being recognized, at responding and being responded to—must be 
predicated on this sense of incoherence, of opacity, of necessary failure. For Butler, 
then, as for Woolf, one’s capacity to understand oneself and to recognize others is 
not achieved through thinking in terms of coherence and consistency—the kinds of 
qualities associated with the autobiographical “I”—but through thinking outside 
these terms. In her development of this argument, Butler puts forward two concepts 
that give shape to Woolf’s critique of the “genial pretense” of everyday life and to 
the power of difference that illness engenders, and thus to the alternative practices of 
writing and reading accounts of lived experience—in both fiction and non-fiction 
forms—that emerge in On Being Ill. The first of these is “ethical violence,” which 
                                            
62  In this vein, it is interesting to note that though in Giving Butler covers much of the same terrain as 
Ricoeur does in Oneself, his work is only mentioned once by Butler and even then only as an aside, in 
a footnote focusing on Adriana Cavarero’s more recent study Relating Narratives: Storytelling and 
Selfhood (2000) (Butler 138 n9).   
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Butler describes as the demand “that we manifest and maintain self-identity at all 
times and require that others do the same” – a demand implicit in the equation of 
good life stories to good lives (42).63 The second emerges in resistance to this, in the 
form of Butler’s envisioning of an alternative sense of ethics based on an 
apprehension of the limits of self-knowledge (42-43).  
 
Crucially, while in Giving Butler offers a useful vocabulary for the ideas which 
Woolf grasps towards in On Being Ill, in On Being Ill Woolf explores how ethical 
violence is both perpetrated and perpetuated by the modes and conventions through 
which the literary is defined in early twentieth-century England, while 
simultaneously putting to the test the potential of alternative critical and creative 
practices not merely to resist, but altogether to circumvent this violence, and thus to 
cultivate the kind of alternative ethical sensibility that Butler describes in Giving. We 
see an early version of this argument played out in Mr Bennett and “Modern 
Fiction,” both of which take as their central target the discrepancy between lived 
experience and its representation in literature. In both these essays and others from 
the period Woolf repeatedly depict writers and readers as the gatekeepers of 
literature, in the institutional sense of a particular mode of writing and canon of 
works. In their capacity to safeguard certain habits of production and interpretation, 
she suggests, writers and readers conspire—some intentionally, others 
unwittingly64—in the preservation of literature with a capital ‘L.’  
 
As part of this argument, Woolf takes the previous generation of authors to task for 
allowing their obsessive attention to material detail to take precedence over their 
engagement with everyday lived experience: an argument that positions aesthetics as 
a major force in literature’s participation in the ethical. In the period since 1910, 
Woolf claims, these modes of representation have come to feel increasingly 
disconnected from everyday lived experience, with the result that readers, troubled 
by the “momentary doubt[s]” and “spasm[s] of rebellion” elicited by their encounters 
with these representations, begin not only to question whether “life [is] like this?” 
                                            
63  Some variants on this exist, such as the conversion, or automythology, narrative, in which self-
identity is marked by a discrete moment or period of radical change, to create what Stacey describes 
as a recognizable “before and after” effect (9).  
64  As Lee notes, in many of her essays Woolf articulates a profound “antipathy…to the censorship, 
corruption and hierarchies of the professional literary world,” while also accommodating for the 
subconscious effects of these mores on the common reader (“Essays” 91).  
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but also to ask “Must novels be like this?” (“Modern” 188-189). At times like these, 
she insists, the aesthetic conventions of the literary thus “cease to be a means of 
communication between writer and reader, and become[] instead an obstacle and an 
impediment” (Bennett 21).  
 
“Must Novels Be Like This?”: Woolf on Literature, Ethics, and Aesthetics  
The relationship between literary aesthetics and ethics is therefore one of Woolf’s 
principal concerns at the time of writing On Being Ill. Herein, Woolf uses the 
absence of illness from literature to highlight the roles of writers and readers in 
safeguarding a particular idea of the literary—of what it should look and feel like—
and the ways in which the aesthetic habits and interpretive conventions that 
underwrite this idea of the literary make possible forms of ethical violence. In the 
essay’s opening sentence, Woolf bemoans the absence of illness from literature—a 
term that, for both the author and her contemporaries, encompassed fiction, poetry, 
life writing, and the essay—complaining that, “considering how common illness is,” 
it is “strange indeed that [it] has not taken its place with love and battle and jealousy 
amongst the prime themes of literature” (3-4). This sentence is often taken as a 
pseudo-historical proof of the absence of illness from literature prior to 1926, and 
thus used to reify a scholarly narrative in which the emergence of the illness account 
genre is attributed primarily to the ascendancy of the biomedical model in the mid- 
to late twentieth century, spurred on by changes in thinking about the body and the 
self that occurred during this period. In his annotation of On Being Ill for The 
Literature, Arts, and Medicine Database, Coulehan takes this line of argument, 
concluding that, as a result of this rapid expansion, Woolf’s central premise is “no 
longer true.” What Coulehan fails to attend to, however, is the specificity of Woolf’s 
phrasing: she writes about the absence of illness not from literature, but from its 
“prime themes.”  
 
Though Woolf doesn’t explain exactly what she means by “prime themes,” 
contextual research into the established modes and conventions of writing illness at 
the time in which she wrote On Being Ill gives us a good idea of what these prime 
themes are defined against. While book-length published illness accounts of both 
fiction and non-fiction varieties were rare before the mid-twentieth century, illness 
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certainly wasn’t absent from literature at the time Woolf wrote On Being Ill. Rather, 
illness was a popular trope in the fiction of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, where it was put to a range of different symbolic and metaphoric ends.65 
As a central figure in the London literary scene, and a voracious reader, Woolf 
would doubtless have been familiar with many of these works, and indeed a 
significant number of them can be found in the Woolfs’ library.66 She also seems to 
have been aware of the ways in which illness fuelled a range of non-fiction accounts 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and particularly the ways in 
which these accounts were constrained by competing popular and medical 
discourses, not least from her own experience of chronic mental and physical illness, 
which she documented at length in her diaries and letters.67  
 
When embedded in this historical context, the statement with which Woolf opens On 
Being Ill reveals itself to be not a factual observation, as Coulehan and others would 
have us believe. Instead, it indicates that, for Woolf, the core problem lies not in 
literature’s failure to depict illness, but in the aesthetic strategies and interpretive 
habits traditionally associated with these depictions of illness – strategies and habits 
that revolve around metaphoric thinking and the symbolic inscription of difference 
and which are, therefore, not so different from those at work in the present day. At 
the time in which On Being Ill was written, then, illness was present in literature, but 
not as a prime theme. In the opening pages of the essay, Woolf offers a brief survey 
                                            
65  For further discussions of illness in this body of fiction, see Meyers (1985), Rothfield (1992), and 
Herndl (1993).  
66  The Woolfs’ library contained many of the texts identified by Meyers, Rothfield, and Herndl as 
examples of the presence of illness in literature (King and Miletic-Vejzovic).  
67 For more on Woolf’s documentation of her experience of chronic illness, see chapter 10 in Lee’s 
biography Virginia Woolf (1996). Examples of the kind of non-fiction writing about illness that Woolf 
would have encountered include the letters Woolf’s maternal grandmother Maria Jackson, whom she 
baptised “the invalid of 22 Hyde Park Gate,” sent to Julia Stephen—her daughter and Woolf’s 
mother—in which she recorded every detail of her symptoms and treatments in page upon page of 
“hypochondriac complaints” – letters which Woolf read and attempted to catalogue (Reid 457-460). 
Popular guides to illness, health, and care—the precursors of the “self-health” genre Stacey identifies 
in 1990s Britain—also circulated extensively during this time both in the UK and the US, including 
Florence Nightingale’s bestseller Notes on Nursing (1859) and Catharine Beecher’s Letters to the 
People on Health and Happiness (1855). Indeed, Woolf’s mother herself contributed to this 
movement with the slim guide Notes from Sick Rooms (1883) published shortly after Virginia’s birth, 
and which appears alongside On Being Ill in the most recent Paris Press edition (2012). Another work 
of interest is the Mausoleum Book, written by Woolf’s father Leslie Stephen around 1895. This text 
came into being as a response to the illness and death of Woolf’s mother Julia Stephen and, to a lesser 
extent, that of Leslie’s first wife Minny Thackeray, but leaves out the details of both women’s 
illnesses. Of Minny’s death, Stephen writes “I remember only too clearly the details of what followed; 
but I will not set them down,” while of Julia’s final illness he simply says “I cannot venture to speak 
of the last terrible time” (22, 96).  
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of the three key reasons she sees to keep illness from these prime themes. The first of 
these can broadly be described as the conventions of the form, and particularly the 
ways in which these conventions dictate the subjects that writers choose to focus on: 
conventions that deem the “daily drama of the body” a matter unworthy of 
literature’s attention (5). The second builds on the first by pointing the finger at 
reader expectations regarding thematic content and narrative structure: “the public,” 
Woolf writes, “would say that a novel devoted to influenza lacked plot,” and “would 
complain that there was no love in it” (6). The third and final barrier that keeps 
illness from literature's prime themes can be found in one of the essay's best known 
lines, which describes the “poverty” of the English language and bemoans its lack of 
“words for the shiver or the headache” (6). Though Woolf qualifies this last 
statement by suggesting that illness, and particularly physical pain, is a creative 
catalyst powerful enough to compel the “sufferer…to coin words himself,” she 
stresses that this kind of linguistic innovation will fall on deaf ears. The “brand new 
word[s]” that illness yields will “probably […] be something laughable,” she writes, 
“for who of English birth can take liberties with the language?” (7). Inherent in her 
use of the phrase “take liberties” is a doubleness that apportions blame to both 
writers and readers in equal measure: while writers are reticent to explore the full 
scope of their linguistic creativity, she suggests, readers are unwilling to tolerate the 
results of this exploration. Though illness holds within it the possibility of a “new 
language,” this new language will inevitably be “more primitive, more sensual, more 
obscene” than the English are capable of either creating or receiving. The 
conventions and habits of writing and reading are thus, she suggests, instrumental in 
the short-circuiting of literature’s potential to resist ethical violence through aesthetic 
innovation. 
 
In this critique, the unsuitability of illness as a literary theme rubs up against both the 
dearth of strategies through which it can be represented, and the reticence of readers 
to take seriously attempts to develop such strategies. Illness, Woolf suggests, poses 
challenges to established thinking about narrative structure and the referentiality of 
language of sufficient scope to render it if not unrepresentable, at least 
unrecognizable to her contemporaries as literature proper. In this sense, her argument 
replicates that set out in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction” in such a way as to 
suggest that, for Woolf, the topic of illness and literature might simply provide an 
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opportunity to rehash an old hobbyhorse and thus a way of quickly spinning out a 
publication—and generating income—after a relatively fallow period.68 And yet, 
certain elements of On Being Ill suggest otherwise, indicating instead that On Being 
Ill represents an important extension of the arguments about literature and everyday 
lived experience set out in these earlier essays. Specifically, this extension takes 
shape, I argue, as a development of the suggestion made in Mr Bennett and “Modern 
Fiction” that though everyday lived experience is at root “disconnected and 
incoherent,” unknowable and uncircumscribable, there exists a kind of intellectual 
and affective integrity to lived experience that allows readers to recognize—on a 
subconscious and even visceral level, in the form of “momentary doubt[s]” and 
“spasm[s] of rebellion”—when literature’s attempts to convey it fall short: to 
recognize, therefore, when ethical violence is being perpetrated (“Modern” 212, 188-
189).  
 
And yet, Woolf suggests, these attempts do not always fall short. Rather, literature’s 
ability to capture and convey these common dimensions of human experience makes 
possible forms of identification and engagement in the teeth of radical difference. 
We see Woolf’s commitment to this idea most clearly in her contention that reading 
allows one 
to live over and over again, now as man, now as woman, as sea-captain, or 
court lady, as Emperor or farmer’s wife, in splendid cities and on remote 
moors, at the time of Pericles or Arthur, Charlemagne, or George the Fourth. 
(Being 18)    
By allowing its readers to “live[] out those embryo lives which attend about us,” 
therefore, literature thus offers a powerful antidote to the tyranny of the 
autobiographical “I” and, in doing so, can begin to facilitate forms of intersubjective 
engagement independent of this “I” (19). Neither in On Being Ill nor in other of 
Woolf’s essays is the difference between literature that facilitates this engagement 
and literature that prevents it explicitly delineated, though her critique of illness’s 
absence from literature in the former give an indication that this difference might be 
                                            
68  As Lee notes, for significant portions of her career Woolf made money almost entirely from her 
journalistic work, rather than her fiction (“Essays” 90). However, between the publication of Mrs 
Dalloway and the first series of The Common Reader in early 1925 and that of On Being Ill in April 
1926, Woolf spent months in bed, and was during this time forbidden by her doctor to write (Lee 
“Introduction” xvi-xvii).  
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at least in part to do with representational strategies. Woolf’s explicit self-
presentation in these essays as reader, rather than writer, is instrumental in this 
ambiguity. The specificity of her critique of the literary marketplace means that 
individual authors and works stand in for more detailed descriptions of literary style 
and technique, while the abstract, highly affective language that characterizes her 
personal accounts of reading gives us insight into Woolf’s responses to works, but 
not into the nature of the works themselves.   
 
On Being Ill is replete with literary allusions, and invokes an eclectic range of texts, 
from the highbrow—Shakespeare, Keats, “the Miltons and the Popes,” Shelley, 
Mallarmé, Lamb, and Donne—to the middlebrow and beyond, including newspapers 
such as The Times and The Morning Post, and Augustus Hare’s three-volume work 
of biography, The Story of Two Noble Lives, Being Memorials of Charlotte, 
Countess Canning, and Louisa, Marchioness of Waterford (1893) (7, 16, 21, 23, 14, 
17). In this sense, Lee proposes, the essay is “as much about reading and writing”—
as much about literature, and the ways in which people engage with it—“as it is 
about illness” (“Introduction” xxxi). And yet, on closer scrutiny, Woolf’s emphasis 
on reading, and her reluctance to discuss the act of writing, reveals that the former, 
rather than the latter, dominates her discussions of the literary in this essay.  
 
Rash Reading: Realizing and Responding to the Literary 
In contrast to the analysis of the literary marketplace with which On Being Ill opens, 
the essay draws to a close with an intimate description of reading while ill. This 
description follows in the wake of Woolf’s account of sky-gazing and—by way of a 
brief detour through a garden bedecked with “gladioli; dahlias; lilies” and other 
assorted flowers—also of the satire on conformity described by Lee. A thematic 
continuity of sorts can be traced between this satire and Woolf’s descriptions of 
reading while ill. In illness, she writes, “responsibility [is] shelved and reason [held] 
in the abeyance – for who is going to exact criticism from an invalid or sound sense 
from the bed-ridden?” (20). Released from the obligation to read critically—from 
what Lee describes as “the cultural power structures which get in the way of the 
reader's conversation with the book”—in illness one is free to let “other tastes assert 
themselves”: tastes that are “sudden, fitful, intense” (Lee “Essays” 94; Woolf 20). 
These tastes, Woolf proposes, draw us to poetry, to the work of writers who share 
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with ill people both an awareness of the “mystic quality” of words, their “scent” and 
“flavour,” and the freedom to make use of this quality in their writing – writers who 
bring to life the kind of “primitive…sensual…obscene” dimensions of language that 
Woolf suggests the attempt to account for illness requires (19, 21, 7).  
 
The attraction that poetry holds for the ill is reinforced as the section continues, in 
which she describes how, in illness 
We grasp what is beyond [the] surface meaning [of words], gather instinctively 
this, that, and the other—a sound, a colour, here a stress, there a pause—which 
the poet, knowing words to be meagre in comparison with ideas, has strewn 
about his page to evoke, when collected, a state of mind which neither words 
can express nor the reason explain. (21) 
It is at this point that the central motif of Woolf’s account of reading while ill begins 
to come into focus. This motif is “rashness,” “a propert[y] of illness” that has much 
in common with her descriptions of illness’s liberatory effects earlier in the essay: 
the feeling of being “irresponsible and disinterested,” free from “the stirrings of civic 
ardour” and able to look beyond “dignity and self-possession,” for example (22, 12, 
14, 15). In illness, rashness spreads from one’s engagement with the world to our 
engagement with literature,69 instilling in one not only an affinity for poetry and a 
disinclination for prose, but, crucially, an ability to look beyond the “buzz of 
criticism” and the suspicion that, no matter what “conjectures” one makes while 
reading, “someone has said it before, or said it better” (22-23). As such, in Woolf’s 
thinking rashness can thus be seen to signify an openness to and investment in the 
potentially limitless possibilities of meaning inherent in a work. However, in relation 
to reading, it also signifies a willingness to participate in bringing these meanings to 
life, and thus to create the kind of collaborative content that, in Singularity, Attridge 
sees to emerge in the interactions of readers and works. Like Attridge, then, Woolf 
sees certain kinds of writing—and particularly poetry—to facilitate this kind of 
unmediated engagement with the text – an engagement driven not by “intelligence” 
but by “our senses” (22, 21).  
 
                                            
69 In this regard, Woolf's word choice is particularly apt, with “rashness” denoting an impetuous 
attitude or behaviour while also bearing the homonymic traces of disease – traces that in turn evoke 
the contagious nature of this impetuousness as it spreads from one's view of normative society to 
one's engagement with literature.  
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This viewpoint is reinforced by the contrast Woolf sets up between “rash reading”70 
and what could, by way of contrast, be called ‘cautious’ reading of Shakespeare. 
When “fully conscious and aware” of the canonical status of Shakespeare’s work, 
and the critical legacy that surrounds it, she suggests, the reader is “intimidate[d] and 
bore[d]” (22). By way of contrast,  
Illness, in its kingly sublimity, sweeps all that aside and leaves nothing but 
Shakespeare and oneself. What with his overweening power and our 
overweening arrogance, the barriers go down, the knots run smooth, the brain 
rings and resounds with Lear or Macbeth, and even Coleridge himself squeaks 
like a distant mouse. (23) 
However, though Woolf presents illness as the catalyst for this transition from 
cautious to rash reading, it is clear that she does not see this property to be unique to 
illness. Rather, she not only believes in the possibility of sustaining this propensity 
both for rashness and for rash reading in the transition back to health, but also in the 
possibility of attaining rashness, and of reading rashly, in the absence of illness. In 
fact, she goes even further, insisting not on the possibility of doing so, but of its 
necessity. In this vein, she writes: “It is rashness”—rather than illness—“that we 
need in reading Shakespeare” (22). With its monolithic implications, the task of 
“reading Shakespeare” contrasts dramatically with the fragments of poetry enjoyed 
in illness, and in sheer volume alone represents a readerly undertaking of sufficient 
scale to challenge the memory and stamina of the fittest. This contrast, furthermore, 
is in direct proportion to the effort Woolf sees rash reading to require. Whereas in 
illness, rashness comes naturally, then, in health it requires the reader to undertake a 
form of liberatory labour that, I propose, anticipates Attridge’s description of 
“creative reading” as a form of engagement based on “a suspension of habits” and “a 
willingness to rethink old positions” (Singularity 80).  
 
At this point, Woolf performs one of her characteristic half-turns of the head. “But 
enough of Shakespeare – let us turn to Augustus Hare,” she writes, before launching 
into an account of Two Noble Lives (23). As Lee notes, on first reading this section 
seems “a peculiar coda” to an essay on illness and literature, prompting Woolf’s 
readers to ask “why are we being treated to a potted version of a minor nineteenth-
                                            
70  I take this phrase from Lee’s introduction to the essay (xxxi).  
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century historian’s life of two unknown aristocratic ladies […]?” (“Introduction” 
xxxiii). Indeed, the “rush of scenes and stories” that Woolf recounts here is markedly 
different from the critique with which the essay opens, though to those familiar with 
her wider oeuvre her depiction of Lady Louisa Waterford as oppressed artist 
conforms closely to Woolf’s “quest for female forebears” and for “female inspiration 
within a patriarchal tradition,” as evidenced in later works such as A Room of One’s 
Own, Three Guineas (1938), and her essays on Renaissance literature (Lee 
“Introduction” xxix; Lee “Essays” 93).71 Further, the image with which it closes—of 
Lady Waterford crushing the fabric of a “heavy, mid-Victorian” curtain in her hands 
in silent expression of her “agony” as she watches her husband’s hearse depart—
makes “a startling echo” of the ill person who, earlier in the essay, is depicted in the 
act of crushing pain and sound together to forge a language for illness (Woolf 28; 
Lee “Introduction” xxxiv).  
 
And yet, in relation to the creative and critical intervention Woolf sets out in On 
Being Ill, this account of Hare’s Two Noble Lives is not simply a momentary 
diversion into literary feminism, nor the rhetorical equivalent of a closed cadence. 
Rather, in these final pages Woolf gives a vivacious performance of rash reading in 
action, and, in doing so, adds a further dimension to this practice: a dimension that 
can best be described, I propose, in terms of the Attridge’s notion of creative reading 
as inventive response. According to Attridge, creative reading not only brings new 
content into being, but, in doing so, frequently pushes the reader “to an articulation 
in words” of their engagement with and response to the work in hand (92). It is “as 
if,” he writes, “the work being read demanded a new work in response” (92). With 
this in mind, I argue that, in this final section of On Being Ill, Woolf presents her 
reader with much more than a “potted version” of Hare’s history. Though the 
descriptions and ideas about women and their lives that circulate in Hare’s 
narrative—and in the letters and journal entries that this narrative links together—are 
for the most part reflective of the broader cultural trends that Woolf targets in essays 
such as “Professions for Women” and A Room of One’s Own,72 her reading also 
surpasses the limitations of critical commentary. Rather, in this final section of On 
                                            
71  For more on Woolf’s essays on Renaissance literature, see Dusinberre (1997).  
72  Relevant examples include the Angel in the House trope, and the fraught relationship that women 
historically have had to creativity and artistic production, as typified by Countess Canning’s 
description of her sister’s “painted-glass mania” (Hare I.270).  
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Being Ill Woolf differentiates herself from the figure of the cautious reader sketched 
earlier on—the reader who, intimidated and bored by “all the views of all the 
critics,” is hesitant to voice her opinions out loud, and instead “hazard[s her] 
conjectures privately” and “make[s her] notes in the margin”—by offering up a 
powerfully creative response to Two Noble Lives: a response in which her reading of 
Hare’s work flows over into a writing of the ideas, images, and emotions this text 
imprints upon her, and the wide-ranging associations it calls to mind (Being 22).  
 
Furthermore, as a published work in its own right, Woolf’s account of Two Noble 
Lives invites her readers to engage and respond in various ways both to her creative 
response and to the original text, should they be familiar with it. By posing this 
invitation in the final section of the essay—conventionally, the section in which the 
author’s argument would come to a conclusion—moreover, it is implicitly extended, 
inviting a response not merely to Woolf’s account of Two Noble Lives, but to the 
essay as a whole. In doing so, she couples the notion of reading as subjective 
response to that of reading as recursive, transhistorical conversation73: a notion that 
is enhanced, rather than diminished, by Hare’s original text. Though Two Noble 
Lives is for the most part a curation of the wealth of writing Countess Canning and 
Lady Waterford left behind in the form of letters, journals, and sketch-books, rather 
than a narrative in its own right, this curation reveals as much about Hare’s attitudes, 
values, experiences, beliefs, and judgments as it does about his subjects’, and, as 
such, can be seen as both a creative response to, and an extended conversation with, 
his source material (Hare I.v). In this way, the final passage of On Being Ill thus 
extends Woolf’s thinking about rash reading beyond the idea of an unmediated, 
phenomenological engagement with a work, to include the suggestion that the 
literary both comes to life through, and invites the reader to participate in, creative 
response.  
 
Woolf’s emphasis here on the changeable and highly subjective nature of the literary 
                                            
73  This approach to reading both stems from, and feeds into, an ongoing theme in Woolf’s non-fiction 
writing, which Lee summarizes in the following sequence of statements: 
Books change their readers; they teach you how to read them. But readers also change books. 
[…] Writers must adapt to changing conditions. Books alter as they are re-read [and] are read 
differently by different generations. […] Readers, therefore, need always to be aware of 
themselves not as isolated individuals, but as part of ‘a long succession of readers’ […]. 
(“Essays” 89) 
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as it comes to life in the reader’s encounter with the text builds on the distinction she 
makes earlier in On Being Ill between the feelings of enjoyment and identification 
that certain approaches to the representation of lived experience elicit in the 
individual, and more universal judgments of moral value or literary merit. In light of 
this, both Woolf’s choice of Hare’s Two Noble Lives and the nature of her response 
to this text are central, rather than peripheral, to the argument set out in On Being Ill. 
Hare’s marginal status as a writer—the fact that his work has never been recognized 
by critics to have any real significance or merit, leading Lee to describe it as “trash” 
(“Introduction” xxix)—coupled with Woolf’s avoidance of any evaluative comments 
on the text in her response concord with her distaste for the institutionalization of 
literature, and her criticism of the complicity of writers and readers in the 
conservation of this institution, primarily through a habitual equation of certain 
modes and conventions of writing with the literary.   
 
In this way, Woolf’s response to Two Noble Lives, I argue, leads us back full circle 
to the vision of the literary set out earlier in the essay, as well as in Mr Bennett and 
“Modern Fiction.” Herein, Woolf constructs the literary not as a mode of writing that 
makes use of specific tools and conforms to a set of recognizable conventions, but as 
one that instigates in its readers feelings of recognition and, ultimately, response, 
even in the face of radical difference. Crucially, in Woolf’s view, as in Attridge’s, 
this kind of literariness is not always palpable to every reader of a given text, and 
depends as much—if not more—on the attitude with which the reader approaches a 
text than on the text itself. Further, when present, the feelings of recognition and the 
kinds of response that come to life in the encounter with the literary are not only 
unique to each reader—a feature that, in its reflection of her personal and political 
concerns, Woolf’s account of Two Noble Lives demonstrates—but to each reading.  
 
And yet, as we have seen in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction” as well as in On 
Being Ill, investing all responsibility for the realization of the literary and its ethical 
implications in the reader is for Woolf a temporary solution to the crisis she saw 
facing literature in the early twentieth century: a means of buying time and tolerance 
for writers battling to adjust, and appropriately respond, to the widespread existential 
and cultural changes she sees to have taken place in and around 1910. As such, she 
stresses the importance for writers to avoid complacency at all costs, and to commit 
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fully to the innovation and experimentation necessitated by these changes. Indeed, 
just as in “How Should One Read a Book,” A Room of One’s Own, and On Being Ill 
she warns against the inhibitory effects of the social context of reception on literary 
innovation, her exhortations in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction” that readers 
remember their “duties and responsibilities…as partners in this business of writing 
books” carry with them a simultaneous, though unvoiced, appeal to writers to resist 
these pressures. In On Being Ill, Woolf negotiates this difficult situation in 
interesting ways, exposing both the opportunities and the limitations inherent in her 
vision of a literature capable of accommodating illness amongst its prime themes. 
She does so by interlacing her critique of the relationship between illness and 
literature with what can perhaps be best described as an indirect attempt to enact the 
experience of accounting for—or rather, attempting to account for—illness: an 
experience that, she suggests, involves extensive creative labour. In the final section 
of this chapter, then, I explore the representative strategies that Woolf grasps 
towards in this attempt, and from this add to her theory of rash reading a paradigm 
for writing illness based on the principle of aesthetics as work.  
 
 
Woolf’s Robust Philosophy of Representation: Illness, Autobiography, and 
Aesthetics as Work 
As we have seen, illness is, according to Woolf, one of the most common features of 
lived experience in the early twentieth century, in both the habitual and universal 
senses of the term. Furthermore, in Woolf’s worldview the phenomenon of illness is 
not discrete from that of health, but is instead a kind of everyday experience in 
extremis. For Woolf, then, the kingdom of the sick is ultimately not an 
“undiscovered country” so much as a well-travelled, but woefully under-described, 
hinterland of daily life. As such, she suggests, the representation of illness offers 
challenging, yet fertile terrain in which to undertake the type of innovation and 
experimentation that her vision of the literary necessitates. Though Woolf never 
realized this in her own work by producing a novel “devoted” to illness, over the 
course of her writing career she explored its representation in several fictional works, 
including The Voyage Out (1915), Mrs Dalloway (1927), and The Waves (1931). The 
“overlap” that Lee sees between these various depictions is suggestive of a sustained 
attempt to explore ways of representing illness in prose fiction, though one 
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subsumed under Woolf’s commitment as a writer of fiction to other issues, including 
everyday lived experience more generally, and that of women (albeit of a certain 
demographic) in particular (Lee “Introduction” xiv).  
 
Significantly, while in these novels illness is not a prime theme, in the sense Woolf 
gestures towards in On Being Ill, in her depictions of the illness experience she 
moves away from tradition by combining elements of metaphoric and symbolic 
thinking with a kind of existential realism. Rather, in these texts, Woolf makes use of 
aesthetics—including metaphor and symbolism—to convey the experience of illness 
in much the same way as in her depictions of lived experience more generally, both 
in her essays and her fiction, to create a series of small-scale experiments in treating 
illness as a “prime theme” of literature. In both The Voyage Out (1915) and 
Melymbrosia—an earlier version of the novel reconstructed from Woolf’s 
manuscripts—, for example, we find Woolf describing of her protagonist Rachel 
Vinrace’s daily life in ways evocative of her depictions of everyday lived experience 
in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction.” Replete with synaesthetic sense impressions, 
abstract land- and sky-scapes, and perpetual movement, this mode of description is 
intensified, rather than dispensed with, during Rachel’s fatal illness as her subjective 
perceptions of the world segue into feverish delirium. In killing off her female 
protagonist Woolf can be seen to participate in a wider tradition in women’s writing 
and visual art – a tradition exemplified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in images of dead women, such as Sarah Bernhardt’s self-portrait “Sarah in 
Her Coffin,” and literary deaths, such as that with which Edith Wharton’s House of 
Mirth concludes, and which takes shape in Woolf’s own oeuvre as the act of “killing 
the Angel in the House,” which she describes as “part of the occupation of a woman 
writer” and one of the two “adventures of my professional life” (“Professions” 238, 
241).74 By describing not just Rachel’s death but her experience of illness in detail 
and at length, however, in The Voyage Out Woolf intertwines this with the second of 
                                            
74  Though closely related to depictions of female illness and death in the work of their male 
contemporaries, these artistic and literary stagings of death were radically subversive. As Herndl 
notes, this phenomenon represents not a conformation to a “male-defined genre” by women writers 
and artists so much as a turning of “that genre to their own psychic needs” (137). “If these women 
produced artistic objects to satisfy the demands of patriarchal disciplinary power,” she writes, “then 
those productions could take their places in that power structure,” and enable the fictional 
invalid/dead woman to “shield [her creator] from having to embody cultural norms” (137). For more 
on this, see Herndl (135-140) and Showalter (1985).  
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these adventures: the struggle to “tell[ing] the truth about [her] own experiences as a 
body” (“Professions” 241).75  
 
As has already been discussed, illness is “one of the main stories” of Woolf’s life, 
and her desire to find a language for this story can be traced not just in her fiction, 
but in her diaries and letters. Lee describes the depictions of illness in her diaries as 
“some of the most powerful and accurate pieces of prose she ever wrote,” before 
going on to argue that “to arrive at this language for illness she had to work past a 
whole swathe of prescriptive terms, some of which she never quite shed” (Woolf 
187). Like the “new language” forged from pain and sound in On Being Ill, then, in 
both her fiction and autobiographical writing Woolf attempted to “create an original 
language of her own” distinct from “the competing narratives” of illness that 
circulated in the early twentieth century – a language “which could explain her 
illness to her and give it value” (Lee Woolf 191). However, in spite of the clear 
autobiographical connections between On Being Ill and Woolf’s lifelong struggle to 
articulate her experience of illness, the relevance of this essay, and particularly of its 
aesthetic dimensions, to this struggle has thus far been overlooked.  
 
Though in On Being Ill, as in most of her essays, Woolf's narrative is never explicitly 
autobiographical—as both Bolaki and Lee note, she does not at any point say “I” 
(Bolaki “Lights” 119; Lee “Introduction” xxxiv)—she frequently makes use of the 
first person plural in her descriptions of illness and of reading, thus implicating 
herself in the activities, affective experiences, and opinions she describes. However, 
the most obvious clue to the autobiographical subtext of On Being Ill can be found in 
Woolf’s rash reading of Two Noble Lives. For Lee, this clue, which resides in the 
tableau of Lady Waterford with which the essay ends, is the only dimension of this 
section that makes sense (“Introduction” xxxiv). It does so by presenting “an image 
of fierce courage” that not only links back to the figure of the ill person who, earlier 
in the essay, is described in a similar act of crushing, but is ultimately 
autobiographical in nature, reflecting Woolf’s “heroic powers of endurance and 
courage, her lack of self-pity, and the use she made of her physical and mental 
                                            
75  In this endeavour, Woolf can be seen as an early pioneers of what Bolaki terms the “body Bildung” 
– a narrative in which the female body acts as “a site of experience, knowledge, development, and 
resistance” and “a key player” in “a continuously renewed project of learning and teaching,” and 
which is exemplified, she argues, in the work of Audre Lorde (Bolaki Unsettling 185).  
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suffering […] how she put [these qualities to work], and transformed them into a 
new kind of writing” (“Introduction” xxxiv). To this I would add the many parallels 
between the lives of Lady Waterford and, to a lesser extent, Countess Canning to 
Woolf’s own,76 as well as the implicit connection between Lady Waterford’s 
crushing of the “heavy, mid-Victorian” curtain and Woolf’s call for writers to 
dispense with the tools and strategies of the Victorian realist tradition and its 
preservers in the Edwardian era—such as Bennett, Galsworthy, and Wells—in order 
better to describe the lived experience of the everyday in essays such as Mr Bennett 
and “Modern Fiction.”  
 
This autobiographical dimension to On Being Ill is not, in itself, unusual: as Lee 
notes, Woolf’s essays come together to create “the autobiography of a reader” 
(“Essays” 104). However, in her non-fiction work one can also sense moments in 
which Woolf seeks to articulate her experience as a writer. In On Being Ill, this 
comes to the fore in her description of how, from the recumbent perspective of 
illness, the sky is perceived as if for the first time—revealing itself to be an 
“extraordinary spectacle” of “light and shade,” rather than “a background for man” 
or a symbol of the weather (Being 13). Earlier in this chapter, I pointed to the close 
correspondence between this passage and those in which Woolf seeks to describe the 
everyday lived experience in Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction.” I now want to take 
this further by suggesting that her description of sky-gazing might also be legible as 
a veiled attempt to describe the experience of illness, just as in these earlier essays 
Woolf’s critique of the Edwardian literary tradition partially conceals her attempts to 
find a new language for everyday subjectivity: an idea corroborated by the reference 
to “veiling […] and unveiling” in this section of On Being Ill (13).  
 
                                            
76  These include the sisters’ childlessness, their experiences of chronic illness and long periods spent 
in isolation, and their significant, but largely unrecognized, creative outputs. To this one might also 
add the posthumous curation of their lives and work by Augustus Hare, a phenomenon that could 
plausibly have intersected in Woolf’s mind with her husband Leonard’s role as editor and advocate of 
her work, which he continued after her death. Further, the emphasis Woolf places on the sisters’ 
separation—in which she elides the many trips to Europe that Charlotte made in her role as Lady of 
the Bedchamber to Queen Victoria and focuses solely on her move to India in 1855, which she 
anachronistically synchronizes with Louisa’s move to Ireland in 1842—in her account of Two Noble 
Lives, one might posit, could be seen to reflect Woolf’s preoccupation with the impending departure 
of her close friend and lover Vita Sackville-West to Persia at the time of writing On Being Ill: her 
description of the letters that “begin to cross vast spaces in slow sailing ships” a premonition, perhaps, 
of the years to come (Lee “Introduction” xvii-xviii; Woolf Being 26).  
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This indication that, in On Being Ill, Woolf seeks to explore new ways of accounting 
for illness is almost overshadowed by a quick preview of the satire on conformity 
that Woolf develops in the second half of the essay: a structural arrangement that 
somewhat disrupts the creative momentum achieved in her description of sky-gazing 
(13).77 However, instead of using this contrast to mark the conclusion of one point 
and the introduction of another, however, in this section of On Being Ill Woolf 
jumps the rhetorical gun, to finish on the more sober enjoinder that “one should not 
let this gigantic cinema play perpetually to an empty house” (14). The shift in tone 
here re-establishes the narrative voice with which the essay opens—a voice 
associated with Woolf’s “more theoretical pieces on fiction” (Lee “Essays” 95)—
and is further intensified by the invocation of another of Woolf’s essays of the same 
period and genre, entitled “The Cinema” (also 1926), which shares with On Being Ill 
a concern with the representational possibilities offered by a given medium.78 This 
reference consolidates the link between Woolf’s impressionistic descriptions of lived 
experience—which in this context can be seen to create a montage-like effect—and 
her call for “new forms for our new sensations.” It can also be seen as a hint to the 
reader that, in On Being Ill, Woolf’s agenda goes beyond a critique of the 
relationship between illness and literature to include an attempt—however 
diffident—to bring the gigantic cinema of the illness experience to a wider audience, 
and, by capitalizing on her growing reputation and readership as an essayist during 
the 1920s, to bring an audience to this gigantic cinema.   
 
At the time this must have seemed like an effective strategy, for as Lee points out, in 
the interwar period Woolf was better known as an essayist than a novelist (“Essays” 
91). However, in the aftermath of her death, Woolf’s work as an essayist fell into 
“relative neglect” (Lee “Essays” 89), with the result that in the late 1990s Bowlby 
would write  
                                            
77  Momentarily impersonating the comical outrage of the “middlebrows”—a social group Woolf 
describes as “the busybodies who run from one to the other with their tittle tattle and make all the 
mischief”77—she expresses indignation at the fact that the sky “has been left to work its will year in 
and year out,” with “the waste of Heaven knows how many million horse power of energy” 
(“Middlebrow” 179; Being 14). This seems, she continues, “to call for comment and indeed for 
censure” – “Ought not some one write to The Times?”, for “use should be made of it” (Being 14). 
Woolf’s detour here into pastiche contrasts with the overall style and tone of On Being Ill, introducing 
into the essay elements from a different category of her non-fiction writing: one comprised primarily 
of her reviews of contemporary literature and letters to newspapers, and which tends to be sharper and 
more satirical in tone.  
78  For more on this, see Bowlby (253-254). 
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Virginia Woolf the novelist and Virginia Woolf the essayist are two writers 
who might seem to have very little in common. One is famous, the other is 
not. One is a key figure in the history of modernism, the other was 
principally a journalist, working to commissions for weeklies and other 
periodicals. One wrote for art, the other (much of the time) for money. …One 
has been widely studied, and is the subject of numerous critical works; the 
other is little known, and often considered merely as an adjunct to the first, 
enhancing readers’ understanding of the novels. (220) 
Indeed, Woolf’s essays did not receive widespread critical recognition until the 
1980s,79 though this too was not without its limitations: as Bowlby goes on to note, 
those essays which are widely read tend to reflect the chief division in Woolf 
scholarship and pedagogy between modernist studies and feminist studies, a division 
that leaves On Being Ill out in the cold.   
 
Consequently, On Being Ill has suffered a double neglect: first, at the hands of this 
historical disregard for Woolf’s essays, and particularly their aesthetic strategies; and 
second, during the more recent reconsideration of Woolf as essayist, as a result of 
the apparent disconnect between the essay’s subject matter and Woolf’s oeuvre more 
widely – a disconnect that, as I have shown, does not hold up to scrutiny. In the first 
half of this chapter, I show how On Being Ill not only reflects, but ultimately extends 
on-going themes in her non-fiction writing. Likewise, in this final section, I show 
how the essay builds on Woolf’s attempts at “telling the truth about [her] own 
experiences as a body” in her writing more widely: attempts that Caramagno, among 
others, has characterized in terms of the ‘translation’ and ‘transformation’ of the 
symptoms of bipolar disorder.80 I do so by exploring how the aesthetic strategies 
deployed in On Being Ill go beyond an attempt to translate the experience of illness, 
and of embodied subjectivity more generally, and instead work towards an 
enactment of the experience of accounting for illness—and thus for the embodied 
self—in ways that draw on, but are not limited by, the multiple discourses that 
overdetermine these experiences.   
 
                                            
79  In this respect, the publication in 1986 of the first in a six-volume collection bringing together all 
of her essays, articles, and reviews—a project that was not completed until 2011—was a real 
watershed. 
80  For more on this, see Caramagno (1988).  
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As Bolaki points out in her reading of the essay, in On Being Ill Woolf resists 
“settling on the idea of the ineffability of pain” articulated early on in the essay, and 
instead pursues the notion that, in response to the inadequacies of existing discourses 
of illness, the sufferer is “forced to coin words himself,” and thus to undertake a 
form of strenuous creative labour (Bolaki “Lights” 120; Woolf Being 7). The image 
of linguistic invention that follows epitomizes Woolf’s aesthetic approach in the 
essay: an approach in which, Bolaki argues, the notion of work is central. “Taking 
his pain in one hand,” Woolf writes, “and a lump of pure sound in the other (as 
perhaps the people of Babel did in the beginning),” he “crush[es] them together” 
with such intensity “that a brand new word in the end drops out” (7). This image is 
repeated at the essay’s close, though in this latter case they are the hands not of an ill 
person, but of Lady Waterford as she crushes the fabric of a “heavy, mid-Victorian” 
curtain in her “agony” at the burial of her husband (28).  
 
These images act as a lodestar for Bolaki’s reading of “aesthetics as work” in On 
Being Ill, a concept she adapts from Alan Radley’s Works of Illness: Narrative, 
Picturing and the Social Response to Serious Disease (2009). Though Bolaki doesn't 
give much of a sense of what “aesthetics as work” might entail, with this phrase she 
picks up on something fundamental to the essay, and to its relationship to Woolf's 
oeuvre more widely. From the very beginning, Woolf’s prose quivers with exertion, 
both physical and intellectual. Like many of her essays, the impression of effortless 
rumination it gives belies a razor-sharp analysis, its compact format disguising the 
sheer scope of allusion and reflection it displays. Beneath what Lee describes as “its 
sleight-of-hand and playfulness, and its appearance of having all the ‘space and 
leisure’ in the world for allusion and deviation,” then, we find in On Being Ill a busy 
factory, noisy with the din of intellectual and aesthetic work, crowded with the tools 
and materials of writing (“Introduction” xiv). The image of coining words illustrates 
this well. With words like “forced” and “crush,” the lexical field of this passage 
combines with the central figure of the human body, and particularly the hands on 
which Woolf focuses, to create a sense of intense manual labour. Her parenthetical 
reference to Babel calls to mind not only the making of language, but also the brick 
making and building work involved in the construction of the titular tower, while the 
phrase “a lump of pure sound” evokes the raw materials of industrial processes such 
as smelting, combustion, coking, and mining, the last of which brings to mind the 
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essay’s alternative title “Illness — An Unexploited Mine.”  
 
For Bolaki, the “lasting legacy” of On Being Ill lies in Woolf’s emphasis on “the 
importance of taking seriously the aesthetic dimension and imaginative work 
underlying illness narratives” — a legacy that chimes with Woolf’s revisioning of 
the literary, particularly her call in essays such as Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction” 
for writers to experiment with new modes of representing lived experience, and also 
her descriptions of rash reading and creative response in the second half of On Being 
Ill (“Lights” 120). In this short piece, Bolaki can only gesture towards what, for her, 
are the ethical implications of Woolf’s essay. However, both these gestures and the 
rooting of her reading in Radley’s Works allow for the extrapolation of an argument 
that draws on many of the themes discussed above. For both Radley and Bolaki, the 
aesthetic constitutes an important way of making sense of the illness experience and 
rendering it meaningful, to the person accounting for illness, to others with illness, 
and even to those who have previously had “no access” to this experience (Bolaki 
“Lights” 120). The production of aesthetically-active works, Radley posits, offers 
people with illness the opportunity to “render[ing] life’s conundrums somehow 
graspable” and to “re-creat[e]” their experience for others (36, 41). In this respect, 
their approach is evocative of the relationship Ricoeur sees to obtain between lived 
experience, emplotment, and the ethical, both in the sense of self-understanding and 
of recognizing and responding to others.  
 
In her reading of On Being Ill, Bolaki thus makes an important and long overdue 
case for re-examining the relevance of Woolf’s essay to the present day. However, in 
looking to Radley’s Works, rather than Woolf’s wider oeuvre, as a guiding 
framework in this re-examination, I argue, she ends up missing, by some margin, the 
full significance of the creative intervention staged in this essay in relation to 
contemporary illness accounts. Nevertheless, the contrast between Radley’s analysis 
and Woolf’s deployment of aesthetics in On Being Ill is illuminating, for it draws 
into sharp relief the key difference between this deployment and the kinds of 
translational activity Radley describes. As we have seen, for Woolf the 
representation in literature of the everyday and of illness should, in their ideal forms, 
share a common prime theme, or idea to which the aesthetics they deploy are 
directed. This prime theme consists in the gap between lived experience and 
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representation, and the work involved in bridging it: a gap that illness brings to the 
fore. The aesthetic activity that this prime theme requires is thus not translational, 
but meta-translational: a kind of self-referential foregrounding of this work. 
Crucially, then, though in Works Radley stresses that the question of whether or not 
“stories or paintings made by ill people are ‘art with a capital A’” is, for him, “a 
secondary concern,” the meta-translational ethos that underpins Woolf’s thinking 
about aesthetics as work in On Being Ill resonates with both the idea of the literary 
and its relationship to the ethical put forward in her essays more widely, and 
attempts to describe this relationship in contemporary theory and criticism, as 
exemplified in Attridge’s formulation of this relationship in terms of literature’s 
“staging of the fundamental processes whereby language works upon us and upon 
the world”  (Radley 38; Attridge Singularity 130).    
 
We can see this meta-translational quality of aesthetics as work in Woolf’s use of the 
word “coin” in the image of the ill person described above (Being 7). Here, Woolf 
layers a sense of linguistic invention and creative labour with the physical work of 
minting, a process that involves work both blunt (hammering) and fine (milling, 
inscribing), and which has ancient, artisanal origins as well as associations with the 
modern technology of mass production. The use of the infinitive in this sentence 
keeps “coin” free from inflection, and thus enables it to retain a sense of its 
significance as a noun, or object – a characteristic that is reinforced by the sentence’s 
closing image of the “brand new word” that falls, like a newly minted shilling, from 
the sufferer’s hands. This tactic enables the word to take on multiple symbolic roles, 
ranging from an artefact with intrinsic, historic, and/or aesthetic value—such as 
bullion coins made of precious metal, or the tetradrachms of Alexander the Great— 
to a token of socially and politically constructed value and medium of exchange: a 
multiplicity that plays on the double-sided nature of the coin as artefact. In this way, 
Woolf not only foregrounds the polysemic potential of language and image, but does 
so in ways that feed into and extend her argument about the institutionalization of 
the literary. By embedding this manoeuvre within an image of linguistic innovation 
driven by illness, moreover, she engineers one of many instances in which the 
aesthetics of On Being Ill work to consolidate the connection between illness, 
literature, and the everyday, and thus to complement—and even extend—one of the 
essay’s prime themes. 
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Conclusions 
In her essays, and particularly in On Being Ill, Woolf harnesses the sense of self-
reflexiveness that explicit aesthetic activity creates to the act of accounting for the 
self, using it as a means of performing and problematizing the gap that separates the 
subjective experience of daily life from the narrative conventions—such as 
coherence, consistency, causality, closure and so on—according to which this 
experience is both conveyed to and evaluated by others: a gap that, as we have seen, 
Woolf believes illness to foreground. This gap is explicitly addressed only once in 
On Being Ill, in Woolf’s description of the “embryo lives which attend about us in 
early youth” are “suppressed” by the autobiographical ‘I’ (19). And yet, at the same 
time, her handling of aesthetics in the essay repeatedly reinforce and extend this 
idea, not just in her omission of the ‘I,’ but also in the work’s oscillation between 
omniscient narration and the first person plural, and in the moments of blended 
consciousness and embodiment between author and reader that this latter mode 
creates.  The range of roles that Woolf plays in this essay—ordinary reader, novelist, 
critic-scholar, person with illness—and the heterogeneous cast of characters with 
which her prose is populated, including dentists, philosophers, lion tamers, 
schoolgirls, organ grinders, and explorers, also contribute to this effect.81  
 
As a prelude to the chapters that follow, however, I want to bring this reading of On 
Being Ill to a close by looking briefly at the directions in which Woolf develops the 
principle of aesthetics as work. Like Woolf’s fiction and non-fiction oeuvre more 
widely, On Being Ill is replete with vast, abstract land- and sky-scapes such as those 
found in the essay’s middle section: vistas that are distinctly post-impressionistic in 
their deployment of colour and shape. Comparative reading of these passages in On 
Being Ill alongside Woolf’s descriptions of lived experience in essays like Mr 
Bennett and “Modern Fiction,” as well as similar moments in her fiction, might thus 
lead one to the conclusion that, when Woolf talks about the need for writers to create 
for their readers a “common meeting-place,” she has in mind something along the 
                                            
81  This element in turn sheds further light on Woolf’s interest in Hare’s Two Noble Lives, which, as a 
predominantly epistolary text enveloped by an overarching omniscient historical narrative that spans 
over a century, can be seen to foreground the process of emplotment through which life stories are 
given coherence, causality, and so on. Moreover, Hare’s inclusion of letters written by himself in the 
third volume exaggerate this aspect of the work further.  
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lines of these panoramic vistas, and the rejection of mimesis that they represent. In 
this regard, On Being Ill not only constitutes an important extension of Woolf’s 
critique of mimesis as set out in essays like Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction,” but 
can also be seen to epitomize her individual take on the principles and practices of 
modernism, and thus to illuminate further the ways in which these practices are 
extended and revitalized in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries by the 
writers considered in this thesis.  
 
To this, Woolf’s essay “The Cinema” (1926)—a work directly contemporaneous to 
On Being Ill—is a particularly valuable resource, as her reference to illness as “this 
gigantic cinema” indicates (Being 14). Woolf’s exploration here of the potential of 
the cinematic medium “for evoking the pathos of time having past, or the complexity 
of modern experience” not only takes her discussions of artistic innovation in Mr 
Bennett and “Modern Fiction” in new directions, but, in doing so, encapsulates that 
which makes the literary inimical to aesthetic formalism as theorized and practiced 
by her contemporaries: the dependence of its aesthetic strategies on words (Bowlby 
253). In contrast to those images that are “cast in bronze or traced by pencil,” she 
writes, “the images of a poet […] are compact of a thousand suggestions of which 
the visual is only the most obvious or uppermost” (“Cinema” 170). For Woolf, this is 
both an opportunity and an obstacle: words are polysemous, capable of signifying in 
multiple directions, and acting on multiple sensory levels, at the same time. And yet, 
she reminds us, there are also areas of lived experience that are inaccessible to 
words: areas that cinema, she posits, might be able to tap into (“Cinema” 170). Both 
in her descriptions of illness and of everyday lived experience, and in her rash 
reading of Hare’s Two Noble Lives, Woolf can be seen to explore different 
approaches to the matching of words to lived experience, or to what we might call 
the referentiality of language—and particularly to the forging of a “new language” 
for illness—with specific emphasis on those associated with post-impressionism and 
formalism: associations significant in their relationship to ideas of mimesis and of 
the separation of the aesthetic from other realms of experience.  
 
In the chapters that follow, I show how the critical and creative manifesto that Woolf 
sets out in On Being Ill is taken up in a group of illness accounts written at the turn 
of the twenty-first century. I doing so, I do not mean to suggest that any causal 
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connection exists between Woolf’s essay and these contemporary accounts: though 
some of the texts considered in this thesis explicitly engage with On Being Ill, they 
tend to do so in ways that perpetuate the essay’s distorted afterlife by borrowing a 
sentence or two on the ineffability of pain and the absence of illness from literature 
to support or contradict their own observations. And yet, in their engagements with 
the critical issues and creative practices set out in On Being Ill, these accounts testify 
to the substantial, but as yet unrecognized, afterlife of Woolf’s thinking about illness, 
literature, and the everyday in contemporary literature – an afterlife very different 
from that which can be constructed from the essay’s various citations in critical and 
autobiographical writing about illness from the late twentieth- and early twenty-first 
centuries. Further, these accounts demonstrate how the principles and practices set 
out in On Being Ill can be seen to offer a valuable paradigm for thinking about 
writing and reading illness in the present day: a paradigm that not only offers an 
alternative to those currently employed in both literary studies and the medical 
humanities, but which, in doing so, might constitute a valuable point of departure 
from which to begin working towards the kind of “sophisticated and inclusive 
humanities approach” to illness accounts that Waddington and Willis advocate for.  
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Chapter Three 
 
On Being Ill, Academic, and Female 
Contemporary Autoethnographies of Illness  
 
 
“Neither the woman experiencing an illness nor the author writing a story 
about a woman’s illness is free of the ways that illness has been represented 
before, but neither one is entirely constrained either.”  
       Diane Price Herndl (12) 
 
During an abortive foray into alternative medicine, Jackie Stacey discovers that, as 
an “academic lesbian,” her experience of illness is from the outset overdetermined 
by multiple discourses of gender, sexuality, and illness (Teratologies 39). In a 
remarkable display of insensitivity, the Reiki practitioner she consults shortly after 
emergency surgery for a ruptured endodermal sinus tumour—a rare, and highly 
malignant, cancer originating in the germ (sperm or egg) cell—and in the hope of 
avoiding chemotherapy, comments on how her profession as an academic and her 
homosexuality might have disrupted the balance of masculinity and femininity in her 
life, and directs her to the work of Louise Hay, a self-health guru who “believes that 
illnesses are a result of emotional distress” (4, 30, 38-39). She recalls how, “fresh 
from the alienating experience of conventional medicine,” she had expected 
“something better from its alternative counterparts,” but was left feeling “equally 
patronis[ed] and insult[ed]” (38). “Not only had this Reiki healer introduced new 
orthodoxies,” Stacey writes: “she had also reinforced certain very traditional ideas 
about essences, about woman and nature, and about sexuality and reproduction,” and 
deployed these ideas in ways that seemed both illogical and opportunistic, “an over-
blatant clutching at straws” (38).  
 
In Teratologies (1997), the work that emerged out of Stacey’s cancer experience, the 
discursive overdetermination of illness and particularly cancer forms a prominent 
theme. Beginning at a strictly somatic level with the contested aetiology of her 
illness, the sensation of being repeatedly “rewritten” rapidly comes to pervade 
Stacey’s lived experience, as the “new narratives” imposed on her body “rescript the 
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story of [her] life with ruthless editorial authority” (4). This overdetermination is 
facilitated, Stacey suggests, by the disruptive effects of illness on her sense of self, 
which quickly come to resemble the state Frank calls “narrative wreckage” (Frank 
53-56).  
 
For Frank, narrative wreckage demands repair. Illness happens, he writes, “in a life 
that already has a story, and this story goes on, changed by illness, but also affecting 
how the illness story is formed” (54). However, for Stacey, the relationship between 
illness, narrative, and life is not so straightforward. The disruption caused by 
Stacey’s unexpected cancer diagnosis forces her into an awareness of “the extent to 
which all kinds of narratives had quietly structured [her] imagination previously, 
almost without [her] knowledge”: narratives that were not only prospective, but 
retrospective (6). On the one hand, she writes of how, before the diagnosis, she “had 
harboured the hackneyed (though barely articulated) fantasy that [she] would live 
until [her] early eighties and would die suddenly, but peacefully, in [her] armchair,” 
and of cancer’s sudden compression of this distant future “into the most frightening 
of time scales” (5). On the other, she notes that, “in the light of diagnosis, the recent 
past” demanded reexamination “for clues of this newly revealed deception” (5). As 
such, for Stacey the disruptive effects of illness throw into sharp relief the gap 
between lived experience and narrative, by fostering a sudden and overwhelming 
awareness of the life narrative that one has subconsciously set in place – or, rather, 
the life narrative to which one has subconsciously subscribed, for as Stacey points 
out life narratives, like illness narratives, tend to conform to certain cultural 
templates.  
 
In addition to foregrounding the gap between lived experience and narrative, in 
Teratologies Stacey describes how illness creates an ontological vacuum to which 
other narratives crowd to fill. Indeed, though from the outset she is resistant to the 
narratives with which the contemporary cancer experience is colonized, and conveys 
this resistance in Teratologies, her account also attests to their power and their allure. 
Stacey’s acknowledgement that her turn to analysis and scholarly discourse is in part 
a coping mechanism—a way of making the illness experience “more familiar and 
more manageable”—is one such example: an example that accords with Frank’s 
thinking about the kind of repair work that narrative undertakes in the aftermath of 
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illness (3). Her integration of this analytic mode with autobiography is another. This 
integration is not only representative of her “educational histor[y] and race and class 
backgrounds,” her identity as a member of a generation of highly politicized, 
“participatory patients,” and her academic profession (3).82 It also reflects the 
influence of feminist scholarship on women’s life writing about illness, and vice 
versa, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in response to the 
exclusions and assumptions inherent in the body politics of second wave feminism.   
 
Stacey is sympathetic to those who turn to narrative for palliation,83 and 
acknowledges that her account of cancer “follows one of the typical trajectories” of 
illness narratives in its dramatization of “crisis, rescue, and recovery” and strong 
push towards closure. Her project in Teratologies, however, is not to valorize 
narrative, but to expose its artifice. Though narrative offers “the promise of 
delivering the truth about the illness,” she argues, in reality it tends instead to “cover 
up the absences, the amnesia and the gaps in the story” and “iron out the competing 
accounts, the multiple meanings, the lack of meaning” that characterize the illness 
experience (14). In this respect, it is reflective of a deep-seated cultural preference 
for thinking about “lives as coherent stories of success, progress and movement,” 
stories in which “loss and failure have their place but only as part of a broader 
picture of ascendance” (9).  
 
In Teratologies, then, Stacey’s analysis is underwritten by a distinctly Woolfian 
hypothesis on the coextensiveness of illness with everyday lived experience. We see 
this overlap most clearly in her assertion that:  
Stories about illness are an intensification of the way in which we generally 
understand our lives through narrative. The experience of cancer may bring 
these narrative processes into particularly sharp focus, but in many ways it 
only makes explicit the importance of narratives in the construction of the self 
in contemporary culture. (8-9)  
Additionally, the suggestion here that narrative is one of the key terms that illness 
and everyday lived experience share brings to mind Butler’s critique of narrative 
                                            
82  For more on the politicization of patienthood, see chapters 1 and 2 in Diedrich (2007).  
83  “It is impossible,” she writes, “to have cancer and not be seduced by the power of [the] cultural 
narratives” that surround it (13).  
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identity. And indeed, though Teratologies unfolds as an anatomization of the specific 
narratives, myths, and metaphors of cancer and of illness more generally that 
circulate in Western culture in the late twentieth century, these narratives, myths, and 
metaphors also act as a stalking horse from behind which Stacey takes on the 
postmodern assumption that narrative is, to borrow Frank’s phrase, the self’s 
medium of being: a project that closely aligns Teratologies with the ethical 
philosophy sketched out in Giving.  
 
From the synopsis I have given thus far, Stacey’s interrogation of this assumption, 
and of the specific ways in which it impinges on the illness experience, appears to 
take place in what would traditionally be described as the content of her writing—the 
events, behaviours, and experiences it describes, and the opinions, attitudes and 
judgments it explicitly voices—and in this way to conform to a mode of writing that 
combines academic analysis with testimonial evidence. As such, Teratologies 
ostensibly takes shape as a work of autoethnography – a genre in which the 
principles of ethnography are applied to the author and the culture within which they 
live, and which is thus self-reflexive in essence. Like the illness account, the 
autoethnography is an almost exclusively modern phenomenon whose origins can be 
traced back to the 1920s, and indeed a significant history of overlap obtains between 
the two genres.84 In its autoethnographic approach to illness, Teratologies is thus 
representative of a wider trend: a trend that has its origins in works such as Audre 
Lorde’s The Cancer Journals (1980) and Robert Murphy’s The Body Silent (1987), 
but which gains particular prominence at the turn of the twenty-first century, when 
autoethnography increasingly becomes the genre of choice for women academics, as 
exemplified in works such as Zillah Eisenstein’s Manmade Breast Cancers (2001), 
Susan Greenhalgh’s Under the Medical Gaze: Facts and Fictions of Chronic Pain 
(2001), Kathlyn Conway’s Illness and the Limits of Expression (2007), Havi Carel’s 
Illness: The Cry of the Flesh (2008), Barbara Ehrenreich’s Smile or Die: How 
Positive Thinking Fooled America and the World  (2009), and Susan Gubar’s 
Memoir of a Debulked Woman: Enduring Ovarian Cancer (2012).  
 
                                            
84  A comprehensive discussion of the history of the autoethnography can be found in L. Anderson 
(2006). For more on the manifesto narrative, see chapter 6 in Frank. 
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In these accounts, as in Teratologies, the overdetermination of the illness experience 
by discourses of gender, sexuality, and illness is described and analyzed, in keeping 
with the conventions of the autoethnography genre. Typically, moreover, in these 
accounts this blend of description and analysis is spliced to a politics of resistance 
and a call for social action: a trajectory that broadly conforms to Frank’s “manifesto” 
narrative, but which, in the context of late twentieth-century women’s writing, is also 
evocative of “the feminist Bildungsroman,” a narrative that charts “the changing 
self-consciousness of women accompanying their gradual entry into the public 
domain” (Felski Beyond 133). This resistance is typically directed against the 
discourse or set of discourses that the author has found particularly overbearing 
during their experience of illness. Works such as Lorde’s The Cancer Journals and 
Eisenstein’s Manmade Breast Cancers, for example, challenge the cultural 
preference for reconstruction or prosthesis in the aftermath of mastectomy, though 
Eisenstein takes a more flexible stance on the issue than Lorde,85 while in Smile or 
Die Ehrenreich targets the hyperfemininization and sentimentalization of breast 
cancer. In doing so, these accounts undertake important cultural, social, and political 
work, as DeShazer shows in Fractured Borders, and act as valuable resources not 
just for health care professionals and educators, scholars in the medical humanities, 
and the friends, colleagues, and families of women with illness, but for society at 
large.  
 
Teratologies differs from this genre of feminist illness autoethnography in two key 
ways. The first proceeds from Stacey’s positioning of her critique of the discourses 
that define British cancer cultures of the 1990s in relation to a more widespread 
tendency to assimilate lives to stories, and vice versa: a positioning that gives 
Teratologies a more general ethical scope than many other such autoethnographies. 
The second lies in the work’s striking literariness, and of the ways in which this 
literariness is repeatedly foregrounded. Teratologies is from the outset not only a 
richly aesthetic work, but one in which the relationship between the aesthetic 
dimensions of Stacey’s writing and its conceptual content is of central importance. 
 
                                            
85  This process is often recursive: in her 2002 essay “Reconstructing the Posthuman Feminist Body 
Twenty Years After Audre Lorde’s Cancer Journals,” Diane Price Herndl recounts her departure 
from an antireconstructionist stance influenced by Lorde, and develops a counter-argument in favour 
of prosthesis that draws on posthumanism.  
 86 
Surprisingly, the literariness of Teratologies has received little critical attention. 
Instead, responses to the work exemplify the tendency amongst both medical 
humanists and literary scholars to read autobiographical illness autoethnographies 
for content, and to consider their formal features as symptoms of cultural preference 
rather than authorial intention. DeShazer’s reading of Teratologies is a case in point. 
For DeShazer, Stacey is considered first and foremost a “postmodern feminist 
theorist,” and her illness account interpreted accordingly as a work of cultural 
analysis, rather than an autobiographical account – a framing that is most evident in 
her citation of it alongside other more conventionally academic works to support 
readings of more conventionally ‘literary’ texts, such as prose fiction (Gini 
Aldaheff’s Diary of a Djinn), life writing (Justine Picardie’s Before I Say Goodbye), 
and the poetry of Adrienne Rich (24, 231, 29). Further, when DeShazer 
acknowledges the autobiographical element of Stacey’s text, she does so primarily in 
citations that frame this element as a source of sociological insight into the 
experience of illness, and a form of historical testimony representative of the 
treatment of “thousands of other women in the United States and Great Britain from 
the 1940s to the 1980s” (41, 79, 27). A similar tunnel vision is evident in Radley’s 
reading of Teratologies, and particularly the comparisons he draws between Stacey’s 
account and the photography of Jo Spence.86 Though both make extensive use of 
Teratologies in their studies of illness accounts, therefore, at no point do Radley or 
DeShazer consider the text as a literary work in its own right: a work in which style 
and form function not merely as rhetorical strategies, but as meaningful aesthetic 
deployments in which not only are the affective and perceptive dimensions of the 
illness experience enacted, but the observations and arguments they engender 
reinscribed and often extended.  
 
In this chapter, I offer an alternative to these readings by showing how Stacey’s 
deployment of aesthetics extends the observations, experiences, and critical 
interventions set out in Teratologies in compelling and meaningful ways. In doing 
so, moreover, I use Teratologies as my point of entry into a small but significant—
and thus far overlooked—cluster of illness accounts by feminist academics in which 
                                            
86 See, for example, Radley (106-107). Franziska Gygax replicates this approach as well in her 
reading of Teratologies alongside illness accounts by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Jill Bolte Taylor: 
for more on this, see Gygax (2009). 
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the conventions of the autoethnography—and those of the genres with which it 
frequently overlaps, such as the manifesto and feminist Bildungsroman—provide a 
framework within which a politics of resistance is spliced to more wide-ranging 
ethical enquiry and a sophisticated and meaningful deployment of language and of 
the aesthetic possibilities of the published text, to create accounts that are at once 
robustly analytic and distinctly literary. Alongside Teratologies, my readings in this 
chapter will look at three other feminist autoethnographies of illness from the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: Mary Felstiner’s Out of Joint: A Private 
and Public Story of Arthritis (2005) and Ann Oakley’s Fracture: Adventures of a 
Broken Body (2007), both of which are book-length, and one shorter essay from Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s collection Tendencies (1994), entitled “White Glasses” 
(1991), though I will also draw on Sedgwick’s discussion of breast cancer in her 
later essay “Queer and Now” (1993), from the same collection.  
 
Ontological Cracks and Uncanny Effects: Illness Autoethnographies  
and the Literary 
“White Glasses” is both the earliest and—at 15 pages—the shortest of these 
accounts. Though later published—first in the Yale Journal of Criticism (1992) and 
later in the essay collection Tendencies (1993)—“White Glasses” was first delivered 
as a conference presentation, and was originally conceived as an obituary for 
Sedgwick’s close friend, the poet Michael Lynch, whose death from HIV/AIDS 
appeared imminent.87 By the time of the conference, however, Lynch’s health had 
improved—though he was in fact to die exactly two months after Sedgwick’s 
presentation, and thus before the work’s publication—while Sedgwick had been 
diagnosed with the breast cancer that would eventually kill her. An open-ended, 
highly performative text that draws on feminism, queer theory, and HIV/AIDS 
activism, in both its urgency and its compactness “White Glasses” represents the 
sharp end of the texts considered in this chapter.  
 
In contrast, at the soft end we find Felstiner’s Out of Joint, a work published over 
twenty years after “White Glasses.” Out of Joint takes shape as a retrospective 
account of almost four decades spent living with rheumatoid arthritis (RA), which 
                                            
87  For the purposes of this thesis, I will henceforth refer to “White Glasses” as an essay, rather than a 
presentation.  
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Felstiner developed in her late twenties, after the birth of her first child and towards 
the completion of her doctorate in history. Though not “a standard autobiography,” 
in its largely chronological structure and consistent narrative voice, Felstiner’s 
illness account bears the closest resemblance to conventional memoir of the accounts 
considered here—a feature that reflects her work as a historian and biographer, best 
known for her work on the German Jewish artist Charlotte Salomon—while also 
incorporating elements of key illness tropes such as the automythology and the 
manifesto, as I will discuss in more detail below (ix). Oakley’s Fracture recounts an 
orthopaedic injury that occurred in her late fifties and its disabling aftermath, 
including a diagnosis of osteoarthritis and a drawn-out lawsuit.  In contrast to Out of 
Joint, Fracture alternates between autobiography and analysis in ways similar to 
Teratologies: a feature that represents both a break from, and a continuation of 
Oakley’s existing archive of writing about illness and about health care. This archive 
covers her personal experiences of illness—“including a misdiagnosed and nearly 
fatal ectopic pregnancy, cancer, and a herniated lumbar disc”—as well as those of 
others, in the form of interviewees, and ranges across multiple decades and multiple 
formats, to include the “part autobiography, part sociology, part true romance, 
‘memoir, polemic and fictional/fictionalized account of a clandestine love affair’” 
Taking It Like a Woman (1984); the collaborative study-cum-guide Miscarriage 
(also 1984); Telling the Truth About Jerusalem (1986), a collection of essays and 
poems; and Essays on Women, Medicine and Health (1993) (Oakley “Re: Fracture”; 
Taking xvi).  
 
Like Stacey in Teratologies, in their accounts Felstiner, Sedgwick, and Oakley attest 
to the experience of narrative wreckage. Though Oakley begins with the optimistic 
intention of treating her accident as “only a minor interruption in the ordinary flow 
of [her] life,” one that “will run its own course and then move on, leaving [her] 
intact,” she soon comes to realize “that [her] spirit as well as [her] arm is broken” (3, 
13, 14). In a similar vein, Felstiner describes how RA “took hold of [her],” and, 
virtually overnight, her life “got thrown out of joint” (xi). This sense of wreckage is 
both particularly prominent and particularly poignant in Sedgwick’s “White 
Glasses,” when she recalls how four months prior to its presentation, she thought that 
Lynch was dying and that she was healthy. She writes:  
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Unreflecting, I formed my identity as the prospective writer of this piece 
around the obituary presumption that my own frame for speaking, the margin 
of my survival [of Lynch] and exemption [from illness], was the clearest 
thing in the world. In fact, it was totally opaque: Michael didn’t die; I wasn’t 
healthy […] I got everything wrong. (255) 
 
Further, like Stacey, these authors use their personal experience as a point of 
departure from which to describe and interrogate the discursive overdetermination of 
illness, gender, and sexuality in the mid- to late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. In doing so, they pick up on many common themes, including the 
alienating rhetoric of conventional medicine and metaphoric thinking. In Fracture, 
for example, Oakley comments on “the sanitising and obscurantist medical 
language,” and of how “the conundrum of illness and the self produces metaphors” 
(4, 132). Likewise, in her readings of “sixties research on pain” and the “health 
books” of the 1990s, Felstiner encounters—and feels similarly angered by—versions 
of the psychosomatic model of illness that Stacey encounters in her Reiki session: a 
model in which Felstiner’s gender and Jewish ethnicity mark her out as particularly 
prone not just to illness, but to an “exaggerated expression of pain” also (Felstiner 
130-132). In “White Glasses,” moreover, Sedgwick critiques the gender-essentialism 
and heternormativity of breast cancer culture in her account of being told by a social 
worker at a “hospital-organized breast cancer support group” that “with proper 
toning exercise, makeup, wigs, and a well-fitting prosthesis, we could feel just as 
feminine as we ever had and no one (i.e., no man) need ever know that anything had 
happened” (262). “Gender,” she writes, “is so strongly, so multiply valenced in the 
experience of breast cancer today […] that […] even while [breast cancer] is 
supposed to pose unique challenges to one’s sense of ‘femininity,’ [it] nonetheless 
plunges one into an experience of almost archetypal Femaleness”: a phenomenon 
that is comically dramatized in “White Glasses” when she recalls that her first 
reaction to diagnosis was “Shit, now I guess I really must be a woman” (“Queer” 13; 
“White Glasses” 262).  
 
For all of these women, the combination of narrative wreckage and discursive 
overdetermination is a driving force in their illness accounts, and positions their 
writing at the junction of illness and the everyday, insofar as these conditions are 
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experienced by academic women who identify as feminist, queer, or both. This 
impetus is explicitly signalled in their writing, in statements such as Stacey’s on 
stories about illness being “an intensification” of the more general ways in which we 
“understand our lives through narrative” (Stacey 8). In each, however, we find a 
distinct variation, or angle, on this common impetus. In “White Glasses,” for 
example, Sedgwick focuses on the “ontological cracks” of which illness has made 
her hyperaware, and also on the entrenched stereotypes of gender and sexuality it 
brings into stark focus—themes she shares with Stacey—, whereas in Fracture 
Oakley is concerned the with “the universal, intensely perilous status of […] bodies” 
more broadly (Sedgwick 257; Oakley vi). Though written retrospectively, Out of 
Joint charts the shifts in Felstiner’s view on and response to her illness 
chronologically, resulting in a work whose emphasis on the limitations of the 
women’s health movement and the role of disability activism, though signalled in the 
work’s preface, only fully develops in part four of this five-part account. Within this 
framework, or set of frameworks, each author takes on smaller, more specific case 
studies. In Teratologies and Fracture, for example, these case studies are organized 
around specific discourses and concepts, while in “White Glasses” and Out of Joint 
these include political issues, such as illness activism and access to healthcare.  
 
And yet, in spite of this variance, what really binds these works together as a distinct 
group of illness accounts, I argue, are the ways in which their deployment of 
aesthetics feeds back into issues of identification as bodies and as selves that are 
particularly prominent in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries. This 
dimension has been almost entirely overlooked in critical responses to these works: I 
say almost, because, in her recent article on chronic pain accounts and 
posthumanism Leigh Gilmore touches on issues of relevance here in relation to 
Fracture and Out of Joint, though she does not put forward any close readings of 
these particular works.88 This is an unfortunate blind spot in critical responses to 
these works, both in literary studies and in other disciplines, because, like Stacey, 
Felstiner, Sedgwick, and Oakley all foreground the aesthetic dimensions of their 
                                            
88  In her reading of Out of Joint, for example, Rosalía Baena traces an “affirmative model of 
disability” in Felstiner’s account of “the process that took [her] from tragedy and catastrophe to a 
positive identity as a disabled woman” (128). Baena’s approach to Out of Joint is instrumental in the 
extreme, and argues that Felstiner’s background as an academic justifies a reading in which her 
narrative is seen to “self-consciously embody […] theoretical and critical studies concerning 
disability and illness” (128).  
 91 
writing. We see this, for example, in Felstiner’s account, the ‘literariness’ of which is 
signalled from the very beginning in her choice of title, which in the work’s epigraph 
is attributed to both the Bible and to Hamlet, and also in the poetic line arrangement 
of the work’s contents page: an arrangement that consists of blocks of chapter titles 
alternately aligned to either side of the page centre, and which recalls the articulation 
of the skeleton, and particularly of the spine, on which her narrative is focused. We 
see this too in Fracture, in Oakley’s repeated references to semiotics. She describes 
her sling as an “emblem of disability,” and her scars as “the stigmata of loss,” while 
at the same time reading symbolic meaning into both her injury and her post-injury 
behaviour: of how the right hand—the hand left with permanent nerve damage after 
her accident—stands in certain traditions “for the self” and for “self-identity,” and 
how her destruction of a set of bathroom scales in a fit of frustration might be driven 
by its symbolic connection to the body  (14, 25, 51). “Is there a symbolism in this,” 
she asks, “destroying an instrument that measures the body most exactly, because 
it’s exactly the body that has failed?” (14). Perhaps the best example of this 
foregrounding of the aesthetic, however, can be found in “White Glasses,” the title 
of which acts as a synecdoche for the author (Sedgwick) and her subject (Lynch), 
both of whom wear white glasses. This material correspondence in turn gestures 
towards both another bodily commonality, and to a difference: their terminal 
illnesses, and their genders. Though this difference in gender is largely meaningless 
to Sedgwick and Lynch, it inflects the symbolic orientation of their white glasses in 
radically different ways. Sedgwick writes: 
One thing I learned from this is that the white of the glasses means 
differently for a woman, for a man. The white of the glasses is two things, 
after all. White is a color—it is a pastel. White the pastel sinks banally and 
invisibly into the camouflage of femininity, on a woman, a white woman. In 
a place where it doesn’t belong, on Michael, that same pastel remains a 
flaming signifier. (255)                                                                    
She goes on to note that, though “in many cultures white is the color of mourning,”  
On women of all colors white refers, again banally, to virginity […] and the 
flirtations of the veil—to the ways in which our gender tries to construct us 
heterosexually as absence and as the dissimulating denial of it, and tries also 
to inscribe in us, as a standard of our own and other people’s value, the zero-
degree no-color of (not the skin of Europeans themselves but) the abstractive 
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ideology of European domination. (255) 
Though “the ruly ordinariness” of “a white woman wearing white” makes this 
“corrosive aggression” invisible, she argues, “the series of uncanny effects” that take 
shape around these white glasses bring to the fore questions of signification and 
identification in which gender, race, and sexuality are both instrumental and at stake 
(255).  
 
In this chapter, I examine how the arguments, experiences, and analyses that 
Felstiner, Oakley, Sedgwick, and Stacey directly describe in their illness accounts 
are not only reflected in their handling of language and of published text, but 
extended in ways that are politically and ethically significant. My readings of these 
works focus on two aesthetic strategies in particular: strategies that are not only 
evocative of the kind of self-reflexiveness and interference that characterize Woolf’s 
deployment of aesthetics in On Being Ill, but which also draw in productive ways on 
feminist philosophy and performance art of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries. For both of these strategies, the notion of discursive play acts as a centre 
of gravity: of a simultaneous evocation and deconstruction of recognizable 
discourses, particularly of illness but also of gender and sexuality. The first strategy I 
look at uses a process of bricolage to push against the parameters of the 
autoethnography genre, and in this way to effect a form of transgenericism. This 
transgenericism, I argue, enables the authors considered in this chapter to explore 
both the ontological cracks that, though not unique to illness, become increasingly 
prominent to those experiencing it and the multiple discourses that seek to plug these 
cracks. The second strategy I examine plays on the kinds of “uncanny effects” that 
Sedgwick observes in her description of the white glasses, and consists in these 
authors’ construction of both the textual and the photographic body as a volatile, 
floating signifier.  
 
Bricolage, Transgenericism, and the Subject in Motion 
In all of these accounts, the illness experience is described in terms of narrative 
wreckage. According to Frank’s schema of illness, the overwhelming sense of chaos 
that accompanies this wreckage is impossible to tell except in retrospect (97). “Lived 
chaos,” he writes, “makes reflection, and consequently storytelling, impossible” 
(98). As such, he proposes, though chaos stories can be retrospectively reflected on 
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and integrated into a more coherent illness narrative, they cannot exist in isolation: 
like radioactive waste, they are destined to decay unless contained within a 
stabilizing matrix. On the one hand, in their pairing of autobiography with critical 
analysis, their integration of illness into ongoing research projects, and their 
development of a clear narrative trajectory—a trajectory Stacey summarizes well 
when she describes Teratologies in terms of a movement “from the personal to the 
political, from the individual account to the social and cultural implications” (25)—
Felstiner, Oakley, Sedgwick, and Stacey can arguably be seen to create for their 
illness accounts a stabilizing superstructure of this sort, and thus to contain the chaos 
of narrative wreckage. On the other, these authors clearly state that, rather than 
attempting to repair this wreckage through subscribing to any one of the potential 
storylines they encounter, they instead seek to approach it as a vantage point from 
which to survey the vast range of discourses with which illness, and particularly 
female illness, is overdetermined. This contradiction is captured in Sedgwick’s 
observation that, though disorienting, the experience of illness—first Lynch’s, and 
then her own—raises issues consistent with her life project and her life story, such 
that her response to cancer involves a “turning […] back toward a confrontation with 
the theoretical models that have helped [her] make sense of the world so far,” and a 
“hurling [of her] energies outward to inhabit the very farthest of the loose ends 
where representation, identity, gender, sexuality, and the body can’t be made to line 
up neatly together” (“Queer” 13).89  
 
At a textual level, this discursive survey manifests in these writers’ invocation and 
combination of characteristic elements of these discourses in dynamic and often 
chaotic ways, to create an effect that not only draws on the concept of bricolage, but 
puts its indeterminacy and ambiguity to work in ways that foreground the 
constructedness of these discourses while also interfering with the stability of the 
autoethnographic accounts they offer. With its origins in the work of Claude Lévi-
Strauss, for contemporary social scientists the term “bricolage” signifies an 
interdisciplinary methodology capable of accommodating multiple perspectives: an 
                                            
89  However, while this provides a continuity of sorts, it is not without risk. As Oakley notes, 
“academia traditionally regards personal narratives with deep distrust”: a distrust that “is very bound 
up with the whole issue of gender politics, and the continued location of academia in the politics of 
patriarchy”, and which is exemplified by the refusal of her institution “to recognise Fracture as a work 
of scholarship” (“Re: Fracture”). 
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approach that at root seeks to conduct research and to produce knowledge that not 
only accounts for “the complexity and heterogeneity of human experience” but to do 
so without asserting claims of objectivity (Kincheloe 680-681). As such, bricolage 
has found a welcome home in feminist enquiry, with figures such as the philosopher 
Margrit Shildrick not only identifying their methods as “that of the bricoleur,” but 
proposing that “a properly based enterprise in women’s studies demands no less” 
(Leaky 5). In their illness accounts, Felstiner, Sedgwick, Stacey, and Oakley can be 
seen to put this principle of bricolage into practice through their deployment of 
aesthetics. They do so through a series of referential gestures in which multiple and 
competing discourses of illness, gender, and sexuality are put into circulation: 
gestures that add to the overall sense of illness’s overdetermination.   
  
In many ways, Sedgwick can be seen as a forerunner of the kind of epistemological 
and methodological bricolage on which I base my readings of these illness accounts. 
A poet, performer, and queer studies pioneer, she describes her life as “fiercely 
transitive, shaped by a thirst for knowledges and identifications that might cross the 
barriers of what seemed my identity” (253). The multiplicity of knowledges and 
identifications that Sedgwick signals here pervade the essay’s content. We see this 
multiplicity, for example, in the way Sedgwick frames her life’s work in terms of a 
desire “to make decisive interventions on two scenes of identity that were supposed 
not to have to do with each other: the scene of feminism […] and the scene of gay 
men’s bonding, community, thought, and politics,” and in her references to the work 
of fellow queer theorists—such as Judith Butler and Michael Moon—on 
identification and masks, a feature that links closely to my discussion of bodies in 
performance in the next section of this chapter (253-254, 257-258). We see this 
multiplicity also in the range of materials and modes on which she draws, which 
encompasses reported speech; textual citation, both from academic works and from 
other materials, such as letters and poems; and sections of anecdote, auto/biography, 
and autoanalysis; and in the varying impulses and roles the work narrates and 
performs. 
 
A conference paper that breaks with the conventions of its form, “White Glasses” is, 
like the Names Project AIDS memorial quilt panels it briefly describes, a work 
fundamentally driven by “the obituary imperative” (265). At the time of delivery, 
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however, it also constituted both a public and a private “act of homage to a living 
friend,” the latter dimension of which is apparent both in the intimacy with which 
Sedgwick describes moments from her friendship with Lynch, and in the paper’s 
closing section, which reprises an earlier conversation between them about the 
recording of her presentation before concluding with a few sentences directly 
addressed to Lynch (254, 266). Moreover, as the transcript of a recorded 
performance that survives not only the object of its homage but the person who pays 
it, the print version of “White Glasses” also acts to memorialize Sedgwick and her 
idiosyncratic style of analysis, in which heavyweight theory is given affective 
texture and sensory depth through interspersion with anecdote, confession, poetry, 
and other wide-ranging fragments. Finally, in its incorporation of accounts of 
Sedgwick’s illness experience, her relationship with Lynch, and their role in a 
defining period of queer studies and of queer experience, it also constitutes an 
important contribution to the historical archive.  
 
These different facets of “White Glasses” create a strong sense of transitivity, of 
multivalency, and of border-crossing: a sense that is reflected in the make-up of the 
essay and in its position as the final essay in a collection that ranges widely across 
genre, combining “poetry, wit, polemic, and dazzling scholarship with memorial and 
autobiography,”90 as well as in the opening pages of each piece in the collection, 
which in their typographical arrangement—a column that slants from right to left as 
it descends the page—gesture to the techniques of concrete poetry and to ideas of 
deviation as well as, perhaps, the politics of the left, which Sedgwick invokes in her 
critique of the lack of healthcare subsidy. The essay itself begins with an extract 
from the poem “Tobacco”: a poem not by Sedgwick but by Lynch, from his 
collection These Waves of Dying Friends (1989). Like “White Glasses,” These 
Waves of Dying Friends is driven by “the obituary imperative” that not only 
encompasses the author’s friends, but is self-reflexive: Lynch tested HIV-positive in 
November 1985, in the midst of a period in which huge numbers of his friends were 
dead or dying from AIDS (Silversides 109-110). By the time that Sedgwick 
presented “White Glasses,” however, she too was one of Lynch’s “dying friends,” 
while Lynch himself was dying. This inclusion, and their mutual identification as 
                                            
90  This quotation is taken from the back cover of the 1994 paperback edition of Tendencies.   
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people with terminal illness, is reinforced by the self-portrait that lies at the centre of 
the extract, in which Lynch imagines himself through the eyes of a passing stranger 
as “a close-cropped man/ with briefcase, white rolled/ shorts, white glasses”: a vision 
that acts as a prelude to the opening lines of Sedgwick’s essay, in which she recalls 
meeting Lynch for the first time in early 1986 and the impression his white glasses 
made on her, but also to her later description of the “uncanny effects” that 
differentiate her wearing of white glasses from his (252). Further, as she moves into 
the essay proper, Sedgwick combines anecdote and analysis, reported speech and 
academic citation, and shifts between internal monologue, private conversation, and 
public presentation in a seemingly organic manner: a strategy that, in its transgeneric 
tendencies, puts pressure on the autoethnography form and the hybrid self it 
constructs.  
 
Though thus far I have used the term ‘autoethnography’ to describe the interweaving 
of autobiography and analysis in these texts, on closer scrutiny it becomes apparent 
that these texts are only hybrid in this very basic sense, and that within this two-part 
mixture they display a more complex and wide-ranging transgenericism. Stacey 
draws her readers’ attention to this transgenericism early on in Teratologies, when 
she describes the autobiographical component of her account in terms of a series of 
fragments that are “difficult to label” (24). Do these “modes of personal writing […] 
draw on autobiography, memoir, confession, or testimony?”, she asks (24). 
However, though at moments such as this the transgenericism of Teratologies is 
explicitly foregrounded, it also forms an important part of the work’s aesthetic 
dimension, primarily through the staging of what Stacey calls “a series of ‘textual 
rhetorics of the self’” (24). These textual rhetorics take multiple forms, ranging from 
the use of “different modes or ‘registers’ of writing,” including the “personal, 
political and theoretical,” to substantial typographic shifts and other dramatic effects, 
such as the reconstruction of the Reiki consultation as a one-sided “commentary,” 
rather than a dialogue, in which the practitioner’s words are italicized, and Stacey’s 
responses represented by blank space: a technique that prompts the reader to quite 
literally read between the lines (24, 37-38). Further, though occasionally discrete in 
presentation—the textbook format at the beginning of chapter 2 of Teratologies, for 
example—these forms are more often interwoven in complex and inventive ways, to 
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create a sense not of code-switching, but of discursive play and of the subject in 
motion.   
 
We see similar forms of discursive play in Fracture and Out of Joint. Though in 
Fracture Oakley emphasizes the dual nature of her account, describing herself a 
“moonlighter” with “a second career as a medical patient,” both her methodological 
approach to the analytic portion of the work and her autobiographical narrative draw 
on elements of bricolage in ways similar to Teratologies and “White Glasses” (26). 
Fracture, she writes, “combines my personal story with those of others, and with 
history, anthropology, neurology, and the sociology of the body, health, and illness” 
(v). Within this interdisciplinary framework, Oakley embeds a small selection of 
photographs, all of which serve to illustrate her injury and its physical aftereffects, as 
well as a range of different textual materials, including a fictionalized version of the 
online blurb for the hotel at which her accident occurs and extracts from her medical 
notes.   
 
In contrast to the conspicuous transgenericism of Sedgwick, Stacey, and Oakley’s 
accounts, Felstiner’s Out of Joint appears relatively conventional, both in its 
narrative style and in its deployment of aesthetics. When considered as a whole, this 
account takes shape as a kind of manifesto, as well as a source of solidarity and a 
guide for those with RA. With Out of Joint, Felstiner seeks to create the book that, in 
the early days of her RA, she “wanted to find in the worst way” (92). She hopes her 
account might help other people to “view illness in fresh ways” and perhaps even to 
learn from the coping strategies she has developed over the decades (xv). But most 
of all, she is driven by the need in “public space” for a “full personal disclosure 
about the disease”: a disclosure she approaches by “tracing a private timeline and 
splicing it into a public one”  (xii, xiii). And yet, within the framework of the 
manifesto, Felstiner brings a wide range of discourses of illness into play, in ways 
that reflect her changing attitude to and feelings about her illness. One of the ways in 
which Felstiner achieves this involves an extension of the splicing work on which 
her manifesto is based, in which she articulates elements of recognizable illness 
discourses to her autobiographical narrative as she finds “new way[s] to identify 
[her]self with [her] malady” (169). In the work’s preface, for example, we find 
fragments of the therapeutic narrative that underpins the practice of expressive 
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writing in Felstiner’s description of her account as an attempt “to heal by delving 
into history” and of how “expanding the scope of [her] disease is how history 
healing works,” whereas in the account itself the notion that illness, like trauma, is 
ineffable surfaces often (xiii, 189). Her “second discovery about illness,” she writes, 
is that “language isn’t up to it,” an articulation she later links to Woolf and to Scarry 
but also to her work with Holocaust survivors (24, 53, 108). We also find in Out of 
Joint a fraught relationship with the automythology, which oscillates between 
acceptance and rejection. Moreover, though as a chronic, degenerative condition RA 
is fundamentally incompatible with narratives of physical restitution, in Out of Joint 
Felstiner inverts this narrative through a range of metaphoric figures, some 
inventive, some more predictable. She describes “backstrok[ing] painfully up and 
down the pool, with no inkling how [she’ll] get to go forward again,” and writes of 
how “[her] joints match [her] neighbourhood, gilded but gone fragile”: a reference 
both to the treatment of RA with gold compounds, and to the osteoporosis that is 
both a direct result of the disease and a corollorary of its treatment protocol (32, 31). 
Indeed, the concept of metaphoric thinking arises often in Felstiner’s account, and 
though it is clear that her feelings towards it are ambiguous, her stance is not 
Sontagian: she acknowledges that “some people try for relief by wedging a metaphor 
into illness” (133).  
 
The overall effect of this narrative splicing in Out of Joint is not of a careful 
orchestration of various discourses of illness, but of an organic experience in which 
she attempts to recreate in retrospect a historical sense of the different discourses of 
illness she has encountered, and at times subscribed to or resisted, during her 
experience of RA, as she “fold[s] the whole story [of her illness] into its times” 
(198). In this, the sense of discursive play at work in Out of Joint mirrors her 
juxtaposition of different textual materials, most of which are autobiographical, and 
are positioned in her account in roughly chronological order. Like the works already 
described, in Out of Joint these include diary entries and medical records, and, in 
keeping with Felstiner’s experiments in narrative splicing, reflect her changing 
attitude to and feelings about her illness. However, by acting as discrete snapshots of 
Felstiner, taken from specific angles and at specific times, they effectively capture 
the ways in which illness defines her at key moments in her life, and thus convey its 
effects on her sense of self.  
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Bodies in Performance: Literature and the Politics of Embodiment 
Rebecca Schneider’s study of feminist performance art begins with a description of 
the feminist art collective The Guerrilla Girls, who “appear in public wearing gorilla 
masks […] [to] keep their identities secret” (1). These masks, Schneider observes, 
not only “render anonymity,” but “make explicit a social contract which has 
historically marked women and people of color as less evolved, more ‘primitive,’ 
than the implicitly higher primate, white Man” (1). “Alluding to primitivity,” she 
writes,  
the gorilla masks appear to quote the racist primitivism at the heart of 
colonialism as well as the mimesis of all things ‘primitive’ at the base of 
modern art. The conflation of the ‘primitive’ mask with the masked identities 
of the female artists suggests a complex interrelatedness between codings of 
race and gender, especially vis-à-vis the politics of representation and artistic 
authority. (1-2) 
In such performances, Schneider argues, these women seek “to expose not an 
originary, true, or redemptive body,” but rather to draw attention to “the sedimented 
layers of signification” that “surround their bodies,” and thus to the body’s function 
as “a site of social markings, physical parts, and gestural signatures of gender, race, 
class, age, sexuality” (2).  
 
Schneider’s concept of bodies in performance provides a useful lens through which 
to examine the representation of bodies in these illness accounts, particularly when 
considered alongside Shildrick’s notion of the leaky body, which corresponds 
closely to the politics of signification that underpin the performances Schneider 
describes. This concept builds on Shildrick’s theorization of the body as at root “an 
always insecure and inconsistent artefact” overwritten by “a plethora of competing 
discourses,” whose semblance of “material fixity” proceeds from the relative 
dominance certain discourses achieve over others through processes of 
“normalisation and reiteration”: processes in which, as Davis and Thomson point out 
in their work on the cultural construction of disability, literature is both complicit 
and a powerful site of resistance (Shildrick Leaky 13). In this section, I look at how 
Felstiner, Sedgwick, Stacey, and Oakley deploy aesthetics in ways consistent with 
Schneider’s description of the body in performance, and in this way recast the leaky 
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body as a tool of resistance both to the discourses that seek to determine it, and to the 
notion of any originary, true, or redemptive body.  
 
In all of these accounts, the body acts as a call for stories: its failings initiate and 
shape autoethnographic acts. Indeed, bodies are not just at the very centre of these 
texts—as they are to all accounts of illness that include physical symptoms and 
interventions—but, in the case of Fracture and Out of Joint, on their covers too. The 
editions cited in this thesis both bear images of their author’s affected body parts, 
though it is worth mentioning that, in Out of Joint, this is counterbalanced by a 
photograph of Felstiner on the back. The cover of Out of Joint bears a photograph of 
hands distorted by RA, whereas Fracture reproduces an X-ray image of Oakley’s 
shattered humerus and elbow: a monochrome study that is at once shockingly 
material in its depiction of the solid framework that gives the body its structure, and 
strangely abstract, a series of coarse grey brushstrokes on black canvas. This 
abstraction is taken further by Stacey in the paperback edition of Teratologies, which 
takes as its cover an abstract image entitled Beework by Canadian artist Aganetha 
Dyck. The accompanying blurb links this image to the workings of cancer, while 
also evoking feminine stereotypes in ways evocative of the instability and 
overdetermination that for Shildrick characterize the body: 
The beework is about cells. Fragile cells filled with sensuous, mysterious 
substances. Programmed cells, determined cells. Cells which are shaped, 
reshaped, filled, drained, cleansed, painted, prodded, invaded and monitored. 
Powerful and sexual they are filled with nurture, need and desire. 
 
Between the covers, this body-centricity is signalled in both the visual and verbal 
dimensions. In the preface to Fracture, for example, Oakley describes the text as 
“the story of an accident that happened to my body”: an accident that developed into 
“a kind of research project” centred on “the universal, intensely perilous status of our 
bodies” as entities that are both biologically and culturally determined (iv-v). 
Likewise, Out of Joint begins with Felstiner “casing [her] joints,”  “spot-check[ing] 
[her] ankles” and “flex[ing] her fingers”: an image that soon becomes a recurrent 
motif in the text, and which Felstiner often splices to the act of writing in phrases 
such as “cracking a life history joint by joint” (xi, 110). The myth of origins that 
Stacey constructs for Teratologies takes this even further, depicting the story of her 
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cancer in terms reminiscent of an accidental pregnancy, to create a macabre play on 
the nature of her tumour and its silent gestation, “the repeated biomedical inisistence 
[sic] that [she] might be pregnant despite [her] certainty to the contrary,” and the 
metaphoric links between cancer and pregnancy, which she unpicks in chapter 3 (39, 
89-96). On one level, as first person accounts that take women’s bodies as their 
frame of concern, these works can be seen to participate in more widespread acts of 
resistance undertaken by their generation(s) of feminists. For instance, they could be 
aligned with what Felski describes as “the narrative of female self-discovery,” in 
which the female body is claimed as a legitimate source and subject of 
autobiographical writing in resistance to the institutionalized preference of this 
“Western, male-dominated tradition” for “unique, unitary” self “unencumbered” by 
embodiment – a project that reaches back to Woolf’s desire to tell the truth about her 
experiences as a body (Felski Beyond 122; DeShazer 217; Smith 4). Moreover, in 
foregrounding the vulnerability of the body, its illnesses and—in the case of 
Felstiner and Oakley—its ageing, these works challenge the normative impulse of 
which second wave feminism is often accused: its occlusion of those bodies and 
selves that are not white, heterosexual, healthy, and upper-middle-class. Indeed, this 
agenda is clearly signalled by Felstiner in Out of Joint. Recounting her involvement 
in a women’s group and her first encounter with Our Bodies, Ourselves in the late 
1970s, she recalls her private dismay at realising that, according to this “brave new 
source,” women “have hot flashes and sexually transmitted diseases and cervical 
cancer—but never joints” (29). Where RA is concerned, she concludes, “feminism 
leaves an attention deficit as deep as the public one” (104). 
 
However, in doing so, these women encounter a double-bind: since the bodies they 
seek to claim as a legitimate source and subject of autobiography are ill, in writing 
about them they risk reinscribing the very stereotypes they seek to resist, including 
the sexual politics of embodiment—in which women are “associated, indeed 
virtually identified, with the body” while men are “associated and virtually identified 
with the mind”—, and what Ehrenreich and English describe as the sexual politics of 
sickness, in which women are seen not only as sick, but as “potentially sickening to 
men” (Spelman 126-127; Ehrenreich and English 9). Oakley neatly sums this 
dilemma up in a chapter entitled “Our Bodies, Ourselves”—a reference to the same 
handbook that so disappointed and alienated Felstiner—when she writes that women 
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“historically have been seen as more about bodies than minds and personal 
identities,” resulting in an academic feminism “wary of the body, especially the 
sexual body, wanting to avoid the oppressive patriarchal mistake of identifying 
women too narrowly with their bodies” (23-24).  
 
For Sedgwick, this double-bind offers an opportunity for an “adventure in applied 
deconstruction”: an adventure from which “White Glasses” and parts of “Queer and 
Now” emerge, and which can be traced in her performance of the body in the former 
essay (“Queer” 12). Towards the end of “White Glasses,” Sedgwick describes to her 
audience how in the aftermath of her cancer diagnosis “the initiations of surgery, of 
chemotherapy, of hormone therapy” render her body the perfect mise-en-scène for a 
performance that crosses boundaries of gender, sexuality, religion, class, ethnicity, 
and, ultimately, of the human (263). With a generous dose of humour, she observes 
that  
just getting dressed in the morning means deciding how many breasts I will be 
able to recognize myself if I am wearing (a voice in me keeps whispering, 
three); the apparition of my own slightly fuzzy head, facing me in the mirror 
after my shower like my own handsome and bald father, demands that I decide 
if I would feel last alienated or most adventurous or comforted today as Gloria 
Swanson or Jambi,91 as a head-covered Hasidic housewife, as an Afro wannabe 
in a probably unraveling head rag, as a drag queen who never quite figured out 
how to do wigs, as a large bald baby or Buddha or wise extraterrestrial, or as—
my current choice—the befezzed disciple of my new gay fashion gurus, Akbar 
and Jeff. (263) 
In this passage Sedgwick stages a masquerade in which her bald head acts as a blank 
canvas, though as Shildrick reminds us, “the neutral, biological body is in itself an 
effect of language” (Leaky 14): a performance that brings to mind Butler’s comment 
in Gender Trouble that “laughter in the face of serious categories is indispensable for 
feminism” (xxviii). This masquerade, I argue, sets out in miniature the ways in 
which bodies perform in these texts: the ways in which they come to act as floating 
signifiers, and to represent entities that are not undisciplined so much as 
undisciplinable.   
                                            
91  Jambi the Genie is a character from the children’s TV show Pee-wee’s Playhouse, who wears a red 
turban, blue or green face make-up, and red lipstick, and lives in a jewelled box.  
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While at the time “White Glasses” was first delivered, Sedgwick’s physical presence 
in the room would have, one imagines, mirrored the latter image of “the befezzed 
disciple,” in the hardback edition of Tendencies the textual body that she creates here 
is implicitly compared and/or contrasted not with Sedgwick’s ill, befezzed, part-
organic, part-prosthetic body, but with the intact and apparently healthy body that 
appears as part of a triptych of photos of Sedgwick and Lynch—both wearing their 
white glasses—alongside the work’s dedication (viii). Though the overall effect is 
one of stark contrast, the multiplicity of Sedgwick’s textual bodies in performance 
roughly replicates the three almost-identical but subtly different photographic 
versions of Sedgwick, while the photographs’ composition—in which Sedgwick and 
Lynch stand side by side behind Emily Dickinson’s tombstone, their arms around 
one another and heads touching—is also suggestive of a conjoined physical identity, 
a grotesque two-headed, stone-bodied hermaphrodite that captures perfectly 
Sedgwick’s “fiercely transitive” identity (viii, 253).  
 
Sedgwick’s juxtaposition of text and image anticipates the photographic 
paranarratives in Felstiner’s, Oakley’s, and Stacey’s accounts: paranarratives that 
both reflect and complicate their juxtaposition of analysis and autobiography, and in 
which their bodies perform. This effect is particularly pronounced in Teratologies, 
where Stacey’s use of photographic paranarrative extends the textual rhetorics of the 
self staged in her transgeneric narrative. Crucially, in Stacey’s hand, this 
paranarrative gestures towards several distinct discourses of the body, without giving 
any one precedence over the other. It begins with a sequence of medical photographs 
and histological sections from a 1989 Atlas of Germ Cell Tumours—the latter of 
which, as a magnified image of cells, recalls the Aganetha Dyck image on the book’s 
cover—before moving on to consider the materials with which Stacey’s home 
discipline (media and cultural studies) typically works, such as pedagogical 
materials, promotional pamphlets, and visual art (35, 90, 92,109, 145, 167, 168, 170-
171, 205, 206, 208). Amongst this, she includes two personal photographs, a device 
one might expect to find in a more conventional autobiography or memoir (138, 
139). The first of this pair of “holiday snaps” shows Stacey looking “healthy [and] 
tanned” two months before her diagnosis, while in the second, taken shortly after 
completing chemotherapy, she looks “strange” and “puffy” (137, 139). When 
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considered as part of the work’s visual paranarrative, the inclusion of these personal 
photographs serves to foreground the transgeneric nature of Stacey’s account. This is 
not, however, the limit of their significance. Instead, as Stacey acknowledges, in 
their evocation of various, competing cultural forms and interpretations, they signify 
in ways that go beyond self-conscious commentary on the work itself. This pairing is 
reminiscent, she notes, of “the ‘before-and-after’ genre” associated with 
representations of the female face and body, in which a “dowdy, plain face (and 
sometimes figure)” is transformed into a “strikingly glamorous one that would not be 
passed by without notice” (139) — making this a device that, given Stacey’s 
sexuality and intentionally queer appearance is not only ironic, but parodic. This, in 
turn, complicates the second image even further. As Stacey notes in her commentary 
on the photographs, while in relation to cancer her hair loss is simultaneously a 
“striking announcement” of disease and a meaningless symbol that “tells us nothing” 
about its stage or likely outcome—“sometimes the baldness signifies recovery, 
sometimes imminent death,” she notes—her sexuality and political identity project 
additional potential meanings onto the smooth white surface of her scalp (139). 
Regarding herself through the eyes of another, she asks: “Have I been ill or is this a 
radical fashion gesture or even a political statement?” (137).   
 
This pair of photographs also gestures to another version of the “before-and-after” 
narrative, cited earlier in Teratologies as “life before and after illness” (9). In 
particular, this pairing complicates the “before-and-after” narrative, challenging our 
thinking about health and illness, and particularly about what these states should look 
like. In this sense, they create a “disorientating effect,” which Stacey summarizes as 
follows: “in the first, I look healthy, but have cancer; in the second, I look ill, but do 
not have cancer” (139). Further, as Stacey notes, in the first she felt well—“casual, 
relaxed, contented”—whereas in the second she felt ill, her body “devastated” from 
the “onslaught” of chemotherapy (137, 189). When embedded in this context, 
therefore, this pair of photographs comes to signify “a radical disjuncture,” “a gaping 
discrepancy,” an “uncanny mismatch” between representation and reality that throws 
familiar ontological and epistemological frameworks—including narrativity—into 
disarray (140). When seen from this angle, she writes, these photographs and the 
memories that accompany them “resist[s] the story that ensued”: the story of life 
before and after illness (141). For Stacey, then, there is “no sequence and no 
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continuity” in the juxtaposition of these two photographs: the story they should 
represent “makes no sense” (141). As such, it challenges “the notion that the outside, 
observable body reliably represents an inner being”: a notion that, Gilmore notes, is 
central to the tenets of humanism, and which thus comes into alignment with the 
textual rhetorics of the self that Stacey stages in Teratologies (“Agency” 90).  
 
Both Felstiner and Oakley make use of photographic paranarratives in ways similar 
to Sedgwick and Stacey in their accounts, though these paranarratives are not central 
to the ways in which bodies perform in these texts. As discussed above, both 
accounts feature images of body parts on their covers: body parts that bear little 
obvious relation to gender or sexuality, but which are not entirely neutral either. 
With their slender fingers and manicured nails, the hands on Out of Joint are 
recognizably feminine, while also evocative of traditional female roles such as 
caring and nurturing. Likewise, the slight, translucent bones in Oakley’s x-ray evoke 
the fragile frame stereotypically equated with the female body, and, to the trained 
eye, demonstrate the low density associated with osteopenia and osteoporosis — 
conditions that, as Oakley argues in chapter 7 of Fracture, are synonymous with the 
ageing female body, despite shaky medical evidence to support this association.    
 
However, in these works the phenomenon of bodies in performance is most 
pronounced in their use of figurative language, which they employ in ways that 
highlight modes of metaphoric thinking about illness and about gender in a range of 
different discourses, from the medical to that of academic feminism. In Fracture and 
in Out of Joint especially, the kind of recursive, volatile, multidirectional 
relationship between signifier and signified that we see in Sedgwick’s white glasses 
comes to the fore: a relationship in which the body, rather than the glasses, becomes 
a floating signifier, continually bent and stretched to suit different discursive 
conventions, and from which no dominant themes emerge.   
 
The images of disjointed limbs that dominate the covers of both these accounts are 
symbolic of the dissociation that Felstiner and Oakley feel towards their bodies: a 
dissociation caused by illness, in Felstiner’s case, and in Oakley’s by an accident, 
though it continues well into the aftermath. In both accounts, this dissociation is 
articulated and subjected to analysis. In Out of Joint, Felstiner describes her first 
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flare of RA as a discovery made not by her, but by “the person under [her] skin,” 
while in Fracture Oakley regards her injured arm with “detached interest,” and 
perceives her hand as “a turtle, a claw-shaped aquatic animal that has nothing to do 
with me” (Felstiner 4; Oakley 20, 27). Though this latter phrase presages a well-
informed account of misoplegia—the technical term for feelings of antipathy 
towards and alienation from a paralyzed limb—and neural damage, it is in itself 
indicative of the bodily performance that takes place in Fracture: a performance in 
which Oakley transmogrifies her arm into a startling array of objects, ranging from 
the domestic to the mechanical. It is “a bag full of loose old bones, like chicken 
drumsticks or a medical student’s toys,” and appears in x-ray as “a shining metallic 
motorway” from which “screws jut out […] in a series of dead end streets” (3,11). 
Unbandaged, she regards her wound like “an oddly dressed stranger on a bus,” and 
likens it to “a thickly encrusted modern oil painting of a bent zip fastener”: an image 
in which the realm of art meets the world of domestic technology (12-13). In Out of 
Joint, this performance is even more dynamic and wide-ranging, with Felstiner 
depicting her body as an ever-changing conglomerate of matter both organic and 
inert. Her toes resemble “a piano with the keys sprung,” pointing “five to starboard, 
five to port” (140, 30). Beneath her “pumpkin head” and “moonface,” her wrists are 
“starched” and her feet “hold the ground like pickets,” while her limbs are 
“cemented” by the “dinosaur disease” (88, 3, 139, 57, 114). She is “a woman of parts 
who stores her scraps inside a pantry of skin” (133).  
 
Conclusions:  
In “Queer and Now,” Sedgwick writes of how illness, though “draining and scary,” 
has ultimately proven “just sheerly interesting with respect to exactly the issues of 
gender, sexuality, and identity formation that were already on my docket” (12). For 
Sedgwick, this interestingness reflects, rather than introduces, a life in which 
personal experience and cultural critique are deeply intertwined. Both “Queer and 
Now” and particularly “White Glasses” attest to this intertwining, and thus to the 
ways in which Sedgwick not only lives with and through illness, but begins to think 
with and through it too. For Sedgwick, illness prompts both a “turning […] back 
toward a confrontation with the theoretical models that have helped [her] make sense 
of the world so far,” and an “adventure in applied deconstruction” (“Queer” 12). It 
also gives rise to moments of creative exploration at the interface of experience and 
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representation, particularly in relation to embodiment, as my reading of “White 
Glasses” shows. In its integration of autobiography and analysis and its testing of the 
limits of signification, Sedgwick’s essay is representative of the illness 
autoethnographies considered in this chapter, while in its theoretical gestures it 
offers a framework within which the significance of these aesthetic interventions can 
be apprehended as acts both critical and creative.  
 
These illness accounts play on the potential of the literary to sustain forms of self-
reflexiveness and to interference in the structures of discourse.  In this chapter, I 
have considered two of the strategies through which they do so. Through combining 
disparate forms and styles to create a kind of transgeneric bricolage, these texts 
engage in a dynamic process of discursive play that challenges the preeminence of 
any one mode of self-narration. In this way, they disrupt the continuity between the 
autobiographical “I” and the self in ways that challenge the consistent and coherent 
conceptualization of narrative identity Butler decries in Giving, but without making 
recourse to its postmodern equivalent, a hybrid identity that can be comprehensively 
deconstructed into its constituent parts. Likewise, through a recursive emptying out 
and refilling of a key symbolic substrate in the representation of illness, gender, and 
sexuality—the body—they further compound this sense of disruption. In doing so, I 
argue, they both tell and untell stories about illness, in ways that convey a sense of 
the discursive overdetermination of this experience while remaining defiantly 
outside of its sway. This testing of the relationship between signifier and signified, 
and of the capacity of various aesthetic approaches to disrupt the rigidity of meaning 
that cultural discourses impose upon this relationship is not only crucial to our 
understanding of aesthetics as a mode of resistance in these autoethnographies, but 
provides an important point of departure for my next chapter, which looks at the 
illness memoirs of Hilary Mantel and Paul West. Better known as authors of literary 
fiction, in their memoirs Mantel and West build on the acts of resistance to 
discursive overdetermination outlined in this chapter, by how language itself can be 
stretched to accommodate new ideas, new experiences, and new patterns of 
referentiality, and the implications of this capacity for its participation in the ethical. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Devil’s Dictionary: 
Illness and Language in the Literary Memoir 
 
“How can I write this, I wonder? I am a woman with a delicate mouth; I say 
nothing gross. I can write it, it seems: perhaps because I can pretend it is 
somebody else, bleeding on the table.” 
     Hilary Mantel (Giving up the Ghost 189-190) 
 
Shortly after undergoing major surgery to repair some of the damage wrought by 
decades of severe endometriosis, and while still in hospital recovering, the novelist 
Hilary Mantel reads On Being Ill, it seems for the first time. In her hospital diary, Ink 
in the Blood (2010)—a work largely written, like Woolf’s essay, from her sickbed—
she records her response. Describing it as “schoolgirl piffle […] like one of those 
compositions by young ladies mocked in Tom Sawyer,” she proceeds to dismiss 
Woolf’s essay on grounds both personal and intellectual. Mantel’s criticism of On 
Being Ill centres on Woolf’s comments on the poverty of language in the face of 
illness, the lack of anything “ready-made” with which to render it intelligible: a 
claim that Mantel “can’t understand.” To counter Woolf’s claim, in the passage that 
follows she invokes “the whole vocabulary of singing aches, of spasms, of strictures 
and cramps; the gouging pain, the drilling pain, the pricking and pinching, the 
throbbing, burning, stinging, smarting, flaying.” These are “all good words,” she 
argues, “all old words.” “There is even,” she adds, “a scale you can use to refine it.” 
“No one’s pain is so special that the devil’s dictionary of anguish has not anticipated 
it,” she concludes, though she consents that Woolf, with her “genteel” suffering and 
“decorous illnesses,” her “melancholia” and her “ladylike” tears might not have been 
speaking from direct experience.  
 
Mantel’s claims about the expressibility of illness and pain take their authority not 
only from her lived experience of chronic illness, but also from her authorship of two 
autobiographical accounts on the subject—Giving up the Ghost (2003) and Ink in the 
Blood—, and by the sheer size and continued growth of the genre in which these 
accounts participate. However, though in her dismissal of On Being Ill she claims to 
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draw on “old words,” her list of examples is decidedly modern, as exemplified in her 
reference to the numerical rating scale that has, since the 1990s, been promoted as a 
recommended pain measure in Western clinical settings92: an atmosphere Mantel 
recreates in this passage with a cameo appearance from “the doctor,” who asks “on a 
scale of 1 to 10, how much this hurts” before disappearing offstage. On a subtler 
level, this allusion to modern medical culture is underscored by the list of “good 
words” she cites. Though these words are indeed “old,” all but two have been 
appropriated by modern biomedical culture as part of the McGill Pain Questionnaire, 
a scale that organizes sensory and affective descriptors for pain according to 
intensity, and which entered Western medical practice in the mid-1970s: around the 
time that Mantel first began to consult doctors about her symptoms (Noble et al. 15, 
17). Even her references to “the devil’s dictionary” and to “the torture chamber,” 
though redolent of the Middle Ages, confound instead the notion of an old language 
for pain and of the stability of language: the former invoking the satirical reference 
book of the same name compiled by Ambrose Bierce and published in the early 
twentieth century, and the latter Elaine Scarry’s influential work, The Body in Pain: 
The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), which takes the torture room as its 
first scene of enquiry.  
 
Implicit in Mantel’s grouping of these words as a “whole vocabulary” for pain, then, 
is not a call for people with illness to return to an old, enduring language, but an 
embrace of what Gilmore calls “the clinical rhetoric of pain”: “a product of the 
institution of [modern] medicine, which includes the language in which professionals 
are trained to diagnose and treat symptoms and in which they communicate to 
hospital personnel and people in their care alike” (Gilmore “Agency” 85). As such, 
Mantel’s response to On Being Ill echoes Coulehan’s claim that, because of the 
“great deal” of writing about illness now in publication, Woolf’s central premise “is 
no longer true” the argument that, because of biomedical advances in the 
understanding of pain, Woolf’s claims about the lack of a “ready made” language for 
this experience are no longer relevant (Coulehan). In doing so, moreover, Mantel 
appears not only to reinforce the presentist critical metanarrative that underpins both 
scholarship and popular thinking about the expression of illness, but also, as Gilmore 
                                            
92  For more on this, see Noble et al. (2005).  
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points out, to “write[…] against the notion in trauma theory that language is 
inadequate to pain” (“Agency” 89). The rhetoric of pain Mantel defends here is at 
root a dialect of “the sanitising and obscurantist medical language” that the authors 
considered in chapter 3 experience as alienating and patronizing: a language that, 
Gilmore asserts, “often exerts a disorienting effect on people who find themselves 
translated into it” (Oakley Fracture 4; Gilmore “Agency” 85). In her response to 
Woolf, Mantel thus appears to go against the grain not only of trauma theory, but of 
contemporary writing about illness and pain as well.  
 
And yet, as Bolaki observes, Mantel’s defense of medical language in this section of 
Ink in the Blood is “striking,” given that earlier in her diary, and also in Giving Up 
the Ghost, she proves herself “a strong critic of the ‘short exclamatory hospital talk’ 
with its ‘swift acronyms’ and of the belief that everything can be measured 
scientifically” (Bolaki “Lights” 117; Mantel Ink cited in Bolaki). Equally striking, 
Bolaki proposes, is the contradiction between Mantel’s endorsement of the clinical 
rhetoric of pain in response to Woolf and the atmosphere of powerless and alienation 
that pervades her illness memoirs. Crucially, rather than distancing Mantel’s writing 
about illness from On Being Ill, for Bolaki the contradiction between her response to 
this essay and her deployment of aesthetics in Giving Up the Ghost and Ink in the 
Blood instead highlights the ways in which these texts continue the aesthetic project 
that Woolf sets out: a project Bolaki defines in terms of invention and 
experimentation at the interface of language and experience (“Lights” 115).  
 
In this chapter, I take this argument further by examining how in the memoirs of two 
contemporary authors the experience of illness galvanizes a series of explorations in 
the matching of words to lived experience, with particular emphasis on the scope and 
limits of language’s ability to evoke a range of non-, or pre-, verbal phenomena, 
from sensations of discomfort and pain to the appearance of a wound or the noises of 
medical machinery. Alongside Giving Up the Ghost and Ink in the Blood, I consider 
how these explorations play out in the illness memoirs of Paul West, who like 
Mantel is better known as an author of fiction.  With these memoirs Mantel and 
West join a burgeoning group of established authors for whom illness—experienced 
either on a first-hand basis or as an intimate witness to its effects on a friend, partner, 
or family member—presents “an occasion for an experiment in life writing” (Couser 
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7). To Couser’s original list of William Styron, John Updike, Joseph Heller, Audre 
Lorde, Reynolds Price, Richard Selzer, Paul West, Paul Monette, we can now add 
many others, including Joan Didion, Siri Hustvedt, John Bayley, Sarah Manguso, Jo 
Shapcott, Alan Shapiro, Susan Schultz, and Adrienne Rich. However, in relation to 
the project undertaken in this thesis, two features in particular cause Mantel’s and 
West’s accounts to stand out from this crowd. The first of these is the nature of their 
explorations, which oscillate between attempts at mimetic representation and a form 
of abstract, expressionistic evocation reminiscent of Woolf’s descriptions of illness 
and of everyday lived experience more widely both in On Being Ill and in essays 
such as Mr Bennett and “Modern Fiction.” The second is the common trajectory of 
Mantel’s and West’s illnesses—a trajectory defined by long periods of chronic ill-
health punctuated by periods of crisis—and the serial nature of their memoirs. As 
accounts of illness experiences that have unfolded over decades, and in tandem with 
their authors’ careers as writers of fiction, these works reveal an ongoing, 
evolutionary approach to the portrayal of illness that has much to tell us about 
literary aesthetics and their engagement with ethics.  
 
The Limits of Language: Illness and Referentiality  
Born in Derbyshire in 1930, Paul West emigrated to the United States as a young 
adult, where he went on to build a successful career as an author of literary fiction 
and memoir and a professor of creative writing. From the very beginning, West’s life 
has been punctuated by illness, ranging from childhood hives to the debilitating 
migraines of his adolescence and adulthood, on which he has published short 
accounts in a range of periodicals. However, it was not until experiencing a transient 
ischaemic attack (TIA), or mild stroke, in his early fifties that West began to 
contemplate writing about illness. Admitted to hospital for the first time in his life, 
West recounts how, “lying there with nothing to do except to dream of survival,” he  
“dreamed of, and listed, the books [he] would write if [he] got the chance” (Stroke 
37, 40). Prolific to a fault, he does indeed survive to write again: publishing well 
over twenty works of long fiction, non-fiction, short stories, and poetry in the years 
following the TIA, including an illness account entitled A Stroke of Genius: Illness 
and Self-Discovery in 1995, over ten years after the incident. A Stroke of Genius is 
broadly structured around the TIA and its aftermath, including the permanent 
paralysis of West’s left arm and hand, the fitting of a pacemaker, and a subsequent 
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diagnosis of diabetes. Part memoir and part polemic against the institution of modern 
medicine, this text is, as West acknowledges, a testament to his work as “a 
passionate hobbyist of my own illness” (137). However, almost a decade later, in 
2003, illness was to take over West’s life once more, when on the day before his 
discharge from hospital following treatment for a kidney infection, he suffered a 
massive stroke. The stroke resulted in a short period of global aphasia—a 
disturbance in the comprehension and formulation of language—during which his 
speech consisted only of a single syllable, followed by more permanent state of 
moderate receptive and extensive expressive aphasia. West’s experience of aphasia 
forms the subject of his second illness memoir, The Shadow Factory (2008).   
 
Like West, Mantel was born in Derbyshire, though somewhat later in 1952, and like 
West, her life was from a young age shaped by illness, including “growing pains,” 
mysterious fevers, and “raging headaches,” to the point that the family doctor takes 
to calling her “Little Miss Neverwell” (Ghost 82, 87). Her first account of illness, 
Giving up the Ghost, begins as a memoir in which illness features, before shifting 
just over halfway through into a full-blown illness account as chronic pain and 
debilitating medical interventions increasingly encroach upon her everyday life, 
forcing her to give up work and the hope of having children. In contrast, Ink in the 
Blood, her second account of illness, is a compact diary that records the weeks 
Mantel spent in hospital following major surgery in the summer of 2010, and was 
first published in the London Review of Books in November of that year.  
 
In many ways, West’s and Mantel’s illness accounts conform to the characteristic 
features of the illness account genre. Both protest against the prejudices and 
impositions of modern medical culture, and describe feelings of narrative disruption 
and of a heightened thematization of the body. Mantel observes that “everything 
about me—my physiology, my psychology—feels constantly under assault,” and 
recounts how illness has “torn up” the “roots of [her] personality” while long-term 
steroid use has caused her body to become “grotesque” and “perpetually strange” 
(Ghost 222, 54). In a similar vein, West recounts feeling “dispossessed” of his body 
by “wires, oscilloscopes, tubing, and big drafts of chemicals,” an unwelcome “guest 
in the throne room of juices and sludges” (Stroke 35, 36). As migraineurs, moreover, 
they also experience a heightened thematization of perception: of its vagaries and its 
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deceptions. As Mantel notes in Ink in the Blood, “given my record with the 
vaporous, I am not as surprised as some would be, when in the hospital I blink and 
life flits sideways,” while West describes his “sense of being out of control, while 
being also undistortedly aware of the fact from moment to moment” (Stroke 5).  
 
Furthermore, like many of the illness accounts described in this thesis, these authors 
also confess to a desire for narrative coherence and integration, though they 
ultimately fail to achieve this. Mantel writes of her repeated attempts “to rearrange 
[her] life so that illness was only a feature of it, and not the whole, but illness insists 
on its pre-eminence”: a theme that recurs in these texts not only in relation to illness, 
but in relation to the autobiographical act more generally. In Giving up the Ghost, for 
example, she claims that she writes “in order to take charge of the story of [her] 
childhood and [her] childlessness; and in order to locate [her]self,” an act that is not 
finite but recursive (222). She confesses:  
I have been so mauled by medical procedures, so sabotaged and made over, so 
thin and so fat, that sometimes I feel that each morning it is necessary to write 
myself into being – even if the writing is aimless doodling that no one will ever 
read, or a diary that no one can see till I’m dead. (222) 
“When you have committed enough words to paper,” she continues, “you feel you 
have a spine stiff enough to stand up in the wind. But when you stop writing you 
find that’s all you are, a spine, a row of rattling vertebrae, dried out like an old quill 
pen” (222-223).  
 
In A Stroke of Genius, the desire to give narrative shape to illness forms an even 
more prominent theme. When contemplating living in close proximity to death, he 
marvels at how he keeps managing “to come to the end of another chapter,” while in 
his more optimistic moments, he ties his illness to the master-narratives of Western 
epistemology, which he describes as “a very American faith […] in progress and 
remedy, tacked on to a medieval sense…that a symmetry oversees us and provides a 
corrective for every ill” (92, 58). And yet, like Mantel, West’s engagement with the 
techniques of conventional storytelling in A Stroke of Genius is conspicuously 
uneasy. Indeed, this uneasiness is such a definitive feature of the memoir that it 
forms the focus of its opening paragraph, which is worth quoting in full: 
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The rueful jubilation in what follows honors a trajectory, perhaps a crash 
dive, certainly a chronic illness whose phases have always puzzled me and 
some of my doctors. The weird constellation of my symptoms has something 
to it of infernal wizardry, and I still lack the synoptic holist of a doctor who 
can put it all together, dominating by naming it. Surely, I ruminate, so many 
things gone wrong over a long time do not necessarily belong together; they 
just overlap, far from being siblings. I wonder, though, if there are not 
invisible linkages, like those Vietnam bridges built under water. My artist’s 
sense of symmetry craves relatedness and clear lines of causation, from hives 
and flesh tags to migraine and stroke, and thence to diabetes. (1) 
 
This tension between symmetry and chaos is to characterize West’s memoir. The 
disagreement between his affinity for “relatedness and clear lines of causation,” and 
his experience of chronic illness as a mode of being that defies these structures, 
centres on narrative – its strengths and its frailties. Long after leaving hospital, he 
continues to circle around the TIA, without ever getting close enough to hone in on 
it. Like his doctors, he puzzles fruitlessly over its aetiology; like the archetypal 
chronic patient, he speculates obsessively over its possible semantic and syntactic 
relationship to the rest of his life narrative: 
 While I was still in hospital, and long after I left, a seminar met weekly to 
figure out what was wrong with me: neurology or cardiology? [...] The 
debate went on, unresolved now as then, but at least abandoned. Yet the 
worry lingered in my head. Why did that anemic, hive-afflicted boy who 
blinked nonstop become the patient he became? Again and again, I the 
medical voyeur, like the person with a toothache jabbing tongue into the 
agonizing cavity, thought back to the night before my stroke and scoured its 
every cleft, fondled its fiber, wondering not only what had caused it, but what 
it had really been like. (58-59) 
West’s resolution anxiety peppers his memoir. Chapter 2 begins with a section 
entitled “The shapelessness of things to come”, and closes with the reflection that 
“My nonanalyzing mind was not yet ready to link up the things that seemed wrong 
with me and attempt a hypothesis” (11, 24). In spite of the promise this last phrase 
holds of narrative synthesis, West never gets further than tentatively identifying “the 
last cause in the indecipherable chain” (34).  
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Consequently, in these illness accounts, narrative does not deliver the kinds of 
reparative effects that Frank describes, but is instead a source of anxiety and unease.  
Instead, it seems, in the face of illness’s disruptive effects, these authors look to 
literature as their principal means of recourse, in ways reminiscent of the “eclectic 
web of […] literary allusions” that Woolf spins in On Being Ill (Bolaki “Lights” 
116).  This appeal to the literary is particularly prominent in A Stroke of Genius, as 
West observes in a brief third person reflection on the migraines that plagued his 
adolescence, describing himself as “a youth [who…] began to dote on works of art 
because his body kept failing him” (115). According to Danielle Ofri, this recourse 
to the arts, and particularly literature, as a mode of expressing illness is a vivid 
illustration of “how writers…use their poetic coping skills in the face of bodily 
revolt” – a statement made in direct reference to A Stroke of Genius (304). To 
elaborate on Ofri’s observation, in A Stroke of Genius West uses literature in two key 
ways. The first of these is as a sort of shorthand – a way of lending emotional depth 
and texture to his narrative. The second is as a mode of translation, in which the 
alignment of West’s private experience with iconic figures and events in the literary 
canon achieves a sort of empathetic generalization (albeit one limited to a certain 
generation of canonically-minded “Western intellectuals”) (Stroke 63). When faced 
with the prospect of a pacemaker, for example, he describes how he  
became, in a flash, as obsessed as John Milton became with Pelops, 
dismembered and offered as a mince to the gods, but restored by Hermes 
except for the piece of shoulder already devoured by Demeter, which had to 
be replaced by a chunk of ivory. (65) 
Though less prominent, these techniques are present too in Giving Up the Ghost, 
which draws not just on canonical literature but on a heady mix of Proust, St 
Augustine, Shakespeare, Emily Prager, Margaret Atwood, George Orwell, and Ivy 
Compton-Burnett, as well as folk songs, nursery rhymes, hymns, popular music, and 
contemporary poetry.  
 
However, in these illness accounts, the appeal to the literary overlies, and to an 
extent obscures, Mantel’s and West’s struggles not to narrativize their experience of 
illness, but rather to articulate it at all: a struggle that reflects a more fundamental 
concern in their writing with the referentiality of language, and particularly the 
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difference between its mimetic, documentary capacities and its evocative, affective, 
atmospheric potential. For Mantel and West, this concern is of course central to their 
work as writers of fiction, and is intricately enmeshed with notions of perception. 
Nevertheless, for both the referentiality of language is brought into particular 
prominence by illness, in a variety of ways, and reaches a critical point in their 
experiences of various forms of speech disturbance and aphasia, in which language 
is severed from both the interior world of thought and the exterior, material world. 
For Mantel, this is a corollary of hypothyroidism, which causes her to feel “that 
some rustling, suspicious activity” that she “couldn’t put a name to” was taking 
place “at the left side of [her] head” and “muddle[s]” her speech, resulting in her 
calling “a clock’s hands its fingers, and a chair’s arms its sleeves” (Ghost 184). 
While aphasia forms the focus on West’s second illness account, The Shadow 
Factory, he experiences this for the first time as a temporary consequence of the TIA 
he describes in A Stroke of Genius, in which he recalls feeling “amazed” that he 
“could still think while being unable to speak,” and subsequently of “talk[ing] for the 
sheer joy of speech regained” (Stroke 31, 33). 
 
Though these experiences of aphasia derail the normal referentiality of language 
entirely, it is clear from Mantel’s and West’s accounts that illness has troubled this 
referentiality from the very beginning. Their accounts are replete with the notion of 
that which is nameless and unwritable, but which exists nonetheless: of the inability 
of language to describe things deeply felt and newly seen. Both seek out solutions to 
this crisis, with little success. While, as we have seen, the literary offers some ready 
analogues, if little more, the language of medicine proves not only inadequate, but 
prohibited: when West attempts to join in the “arcana” of his doctors, he is met with 
disbelief and disapproval (Stroke 42-43). This problematic drives both authors to 
embark on the kind of creative labour that Woolf describes in On Being Ill when she 
imagines the “sufferer […] taking his pain in one hand, and a lump of pure sound in 
the other” so as “to coin” the right words himself (Being 7). As such, Mantel’s and 
West’s memoirs can be seen as an evolving series of attempts to seek out, and then, 
devise a representational mode fit for illness: attempts fraught with dissatisfaction 
and dead ends, but important nonetheless.  
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Sotuqnangu and the Circus Strongman: Literature and the Invention of a 
Language for Illness 
In these attempts, Mantel’s and West’s shared identity as migraineurs plays a key 
role. We see this in the passage that leads into Mantel’s description of her first 
migraine, which she experienced at the age of seven: 
Sometimes you come to a thing you can’t write. You’ve written everything you 
can think of, to stop the story getting here. You know that, technically, your 
prose isn’t up to it. You say then, very well: at least I know my limitations. 
(Ghost 106) 
But Mantel doesn’t stop there, leaving silence to speak for trauma. Instead, she goes 
on, pushing herself beyond her limitations in an attempt to forge a language in which 
migraine can be described. She writes:  
I can’t see anything, not exactly see: except the faintest movement, a ripple, a 
disturbance of the air. I can sense a spiral, a lazy buzzing swirl, like flies; but it 
is not flies. There is nothing to see. There is nothing to smell. There is nothing 
to hear. But its motion, its insolent shift, makes my stomach heave. I can sense 
– at the periphery, the limit of all my senses – the dimensions of the creature. 
[…] I am looking at a space occupied by nothing. It has no edges, no mass, no 
dimension, no shape except the formless. (Ghost 106) 
Marked by a rhetoric of absence and amorphousness, her description here evokes a 
kind of representational black hole that strains not just at the limits of Mantel’s 
senses, but at the limits of her ability as a writer.  
 
Somewhat ironically, this early encounter with formlessness is a formative moment 
both in her personal life—which is from this point on to be defined not just by 
migraine but by illness and debilitation more widely—and in her professional, or 
writerly, life. It “sets up a sick resonance within [her] bones and in all the cavities of 
[her] body” (Ghost 107): a resonance that, like pain, occludes all else. This 
resonance drives Mantel to seek out a language through which it can be discharged. 
As her migraines had become increasingly enmeshed within a wider lattice of 
symptoms that her doctors describe as “idiopathic”—a term she wryly defines as 
“disease about which we doctors have no bloody idea”—this search for a language 
through which to articulate migraine becomes a more general search for a language 
to describe illness, and, contra her critique of Woolf, meets its first dead end in the 
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rhetoric of modern biomedicine (177, 189). However, the influence of these early 
migraine experiences on the languages that Mantel experiments with in her memoirs 
remains key. For, in revealing one’s experience of reality to be not only subjective, 
but wholly volatile, migraine rules out entirely the possibility of mimetic 
representation.  
 
We see a similar phenomenon unfold in West’s writing about illness, which begins 
not with A Stroke of Genius but with an earlier essay in which he “enacts the 
phenomena of migraine,” and which forms an appendix to this later, book-length 
work (4). Though a “prelude to other illnesses,” West explains this “relegat[ion]” of 
the essay as a decision based on its prose style which, “costive and dense,” would 
“slow the reader to a crawl” (5). As such, when West notes in the “overture” to A 
Stroke of Genius, that migraine is “the backdrop to all that happens” in this work, 
then, he speaks not merely of the events it relates, but of the aesthetics it deploys in 
his attempt to create a language capable of conveying “how the migraines felt, what 
they were” (4).   
 
What these experiences of migraine do suggest is the possible existence of common 
objects that might make possible forms of analogic, rather than mimetic, 
representation. The search for such objects, I argue, is central to the languages that 
Mantel and West develop in their recursive attempts to describe illness. As I take this 
argument forward, I want to pass briefly through a work mentioned above: Elaine 
Scarry’s The Body in Pain. Herein, Scarry takes Woolf’s comments in On Being Ill 
on the lack of a “ready-made language” for illness as the point of departure for an 
extended exploration of pain’s resistance to objectification, and to the processes 
through which this resistance can be overcome. Early on in this study, Scarry 
provides a brief survey of the various groups of people engaged in “the attempt to 
invent linguistic structures that will reach and accommodate” pain, within which she 
includes writers and artists (6, 10). “Alarmed and dismayed by his or her own failure 
of language,” she writes, “the person in pain might find it reassuring to learn that 
even the artist—whose lifework and everyday habit are to refine and extend the 
reflexes of speech—ordinarily falls silent before pain” (10). The “isolated instances” 
in which they do not, however, provide “reassurance” in the form of “fictional 
analogues […] that can be borrowed when the real-life crisis of silence comes” (10). 
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Scarry’s comments here are reminiscent of Ofri’s discussion of “how writers…use 
their poetic coping skills in the face of bodily revolt”: a mechanism I have traced in 
Mantel’s and West’s use of literary allusion in their illness accounts, and which 
reveals more about the work of others than it does about their own. What am I 
interested in instead is how Mantel and West take up the idea of the analogue in their 
own attempts to objectify not just pain, but the multidimensional experience of 
illness more widely, and, in doing so, offer insights into the ways in which literature 
works.   
 
The influence of migraine on Mantel’s and West’s writing is most profound in their 
initial accounts of illness, which take as a central analogue for illness ideas of 
hallucination, synaesthesia, and of mythological or supernatural beings. For West, 
Hopi mythology, and the figure of Sotuqnangu—“the god of the heavens”—form a 
central trope in A Stroke of Genius, and, though in his descriptions of migraine he 
repeatedly references the visual, the images he creates call on multiple senses, not 
just one (19). We see this in the aural and kinesthetic dimension of phrases such as 
the  “blinding saw wheels and coruscating fortification spectra” and “the flying flies 
of Tucson, the pulsing red-bull’s eyes that not even Sotuqnangu could intimidate or 
quell” (28, 31). In Giving up the Ghost, Mantel uses a similarly synaesthetic 
technique, describing “hallucinations of taste” and odours “so thick you felt you 
could graze [them] with your knuckles” (129). Most prominent in this account, 
however, is the recurrent motif of ghosts: a motif that acts as an analogue for the 
ontological disruptions and physical changes caused by her illness. She writes of 
“glimps[ing] the ghosts of other lives you might have led” and of “houses haunted 
by the person you might have been,” as well as of the “ghost baby” and “ghost 
children” of which endometriosis has robbed her (20, 158, 224). Crucially, 
moreover, she speaks of how, in the act of writing, “the ghosts of [her] own sense 
impressions […] re-emerge […] and shiver between the lines” (23).  
 
In the opening scene of Ink in the Blood, the motif of the ghost is replaced by that of 
the surrealist hallucination, as Mantel “come[s] out of the bathroom and spot[s] a 
circus strongman squatting on [her] bed.” This hallucination inaugurates the analogic 
mode adopted in Mantel’s hospital diary, which is marked by surreal metaphors that 
draw on the botanical, the bestial, and the bibliographic. She admires the “spiral 
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binding” of her abdominal wound, likening it to a “manuscript,” and then later 
comments on how she looks “like a watermelon with a great slice hacked out,” while 
the machine used to drain it “snorts like an elderly pug.”  As Bolaki points out, the 
circus strongman, whose image is also emblazoned on the cover of Ink, recalls “the 
dentist-visit hallucination” in the first sentence of On Being Ill (Bolaki “Lights” 
116). Even more than this, it brings to mind the “lion tamer” described later in the 
essay,” and indeed not just the lion tamer, but the motley crew of stock characters 
that litter its pages. From this comparative perspective, the synaesthetic 
hallucinations and ghostly figures that haunt A Stroke of Genius and Giving up the 
Ghost come into alignment with Woolf’s descriptions of sky-gazing in On Being Ill, 
and also with the impressionistic portraits of everyday life she paints in Mr Bennett 
and “Modern Fiction.” I say this not to force a direct connection between the two 
works, but rather to suggest that, in their experiments in accounting for illness, 
Mantel and West explore similar avenues of representation to Woolf: a coincidence, 
perhaps, but one that suggests that illness poses specific, rather than general, 
challenges to the normal referentiality of language.  
 
These challenges come to the fore in The Shadow Factory, West’s second illness 
account and a work he describes as “the first aphasic memoir” (1). Here, the 
referentiality of language is almost completely suspended by aphasia, a condition 
that West continues to experience today, and yet the text that emerges from this 
experience is profoundly literary. The following passage illustrates this well: 
The bright wind of morning returned Dr. Sanjeev Vohra from below in a flash. 
For a patient who waited impatiently, for as much as an hour or two while the 
circuitry of Earth made a burrowing sound, I wanted not at all for time. “There 
is no pain so there is no poison.” I felt privileged to assist in his mystery, 
although the experience seemed much as before. He who was monarch of all 
he surveyed was the archduke and master of us all. First, he showed me a 
sonogram with a brown, centrally located ball that in some ways might have 
been a fragment of Mars but plainly was not, as an excited brain raced on to 
prove. I was myself caught between affection for Mars and his balanced 
presentation. (15) 
With some effort, West’s account of a bedside visit paid by his doctor can be 
extracted from this passage. However, the bizarre idioms with which this account of 
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events is ornamented create an effect in which familiar structures of language, and 
particularly of referentiality, repeatedly collapse into “fragments”—not just of 
words, but of images, sounds, and other sensations—whose significance is insistent 
yet impenetrable. 
 
Towards the end of The Shadow Factory, West describes aphasia as an experience in 
which one 
savor[s] this small consort of [correctly remembered] words in full view of the 
vast sea of language out there among the charcoal seas, knowing you will be 
defeated in all probability by any schoolboy’s notion of completeness. Still, it 
bears thinking about: the gigantic caravan of all the words in the world versus 
the few one has of one’s own – and some of them mispronounced as well. 
(130) 
He then goes on to propose that “there is room […] for all sorts of language. Not 
only for the thousands of versions of English, but also for the literate formations of 
people who have been persuaded they are not speaking English at all – and are 
therefore silenced” (130). This proposal harks back to a moment in A Stroke of 
Genius, in which West complains about what “some of these recently graduated 
sawboneses said about my incapacity to describe my symptoms,” insisting instead 
that “[his] version of [his] symptoms was not simple enough for them to understand, 
[not] couched in words well within their spectrum of anticipation” (43). What West 
points to here, I suggest, is the difference between a mimetic understanding of 
language’s referentiality, and a wider, more abstract sense of its expressive potential.  
 
Conclusions 
In her reading of Ink in the Blood, Gilmore suggests that we see Mantel’s illness 
account in terms of a critique of humanism, at the heart of which lies a disturbance 
of the notion “that the outside, observable body reliably represents an inner being” 
(“Agency” 90).  In this chapter, my comparative reading of Ink in the Blood 
alongside Mantel’s earlier illness memoir, Giving Up the Ghost, extends this notion 
of disturbance beyond the body to address conventional thinking about the 
referentiality of language and the viability of mimetic representation.  Both in Giving 
Up the Ghost and Ink in the Blood, Mantel explores the limits this way of thinking 
imposes on the attempt to account for illness, and conducts a series of experiments in 
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which she attempts to redirect this referentiality, and thus open up new modes of 
expression.  
 
The nature of these experiments can be best understood, I suggest, through Scarry’s 
notions of objectification, as set out in The Body in Pain. This model in turn reveals 
the close relationship that obtains between the aesthetic analogues Mantel creates in 
her memoirs and modes of expressionism and surrealism at work in both literary and 
visual art. West’s memoirs not only add further substance to this argument, but 
extend it in ways that foreground illness’s capacity to derail, suspend, and disrupt the 
referentiality of language. As he writes in the overture to A Stroke of Genius, illness, 
and particularly his experience of aphasia, “inspired” him as a writer, by 
“animat[ing] [him] beyond the usual” (3). “A mind stretched to a new idea never 
returns to its original dimension,” he writes, and posits this as an explanation for the 
“sustained period of creativity” that followed in the aftermath of his TIA (40).  
 
The ethical implications of these experiments are significant. According to Alan 
Radley, creative acts of textual and visual representation are an important way of 
making sense of the illness experience and of rendering it meaningful, not just for 
the person with illness but to others. As such, these acts offer people with illness the 
opportunity to “render[] life’s conundrums somehow graspable” and to “re-creat[e]” 
their experience for others: a line of argument that echoes Woolf’s ideas about 
intersubjective engagement and the literary (Radley 36, 41). In contrast to what he 
sees as the limitations of “medical, scientific, or documentary” modes, these creative 
representations not only offer a means of articulating the more subjective facets of 
the illness experience in ways accessible to others, but also enable people with 
illness to achieve a sense of agency in the face of illness through “the deployment of 
an ethic of freedom” that manifests in aesthetic experimentation (Radley 38, 41, 36). 
With its emphasis on the mediatory role of aesthetics, Radley’s thesis brings to mind 
Woolf’s description in Mr Bennett of the literary as a “common meeting-place”: 
indeed, his suggestion that creative portrayals of illness should “usher” their viewers 
in closely echoes Woolf’s assertion that writers should ensure readers are able to 
reach this common meeting-place with ease  (Radley 185; Woolf Bennett 17).  
 
This notion of the literary—and of art more generally—as a privileged mode of 
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ethical engagement is problematized by the illness accounts of Mantel and West. In 
attesting to the challenges that illness poses to the referentiality of language, their 
memoirs draw into question the possibility of articulating illness with authenticity, 
and thus trouble the paradigm on which Radley’s argument depends. Rather, in the 
emphasis they place on the attempt to objectify the experience of illness, rather than 
the objects themselves, Mantel and West offer an alternative view of literature’s 
ability to facilitate intersubjective engagement, and thus to participate in the ethical. 
In this view, the literary offers as a basic term of recognition not a common aesthetic 
language for experience so much as an awareness of the labour involved in the 
attempt to achieve this language: an approach that has much in common with the 
ethical philosophies of Butler and Ricoeur.  
 
Acts of writing and reading subjective experience are central to J. M. Coetzee’s Age 
of Iron and Marlene van Niekerk’s Agaat, the novels on which my next chapter 
focuses. In these experimental fictions, Coetzee and Van Niekerk focus not on the 
challenges that illness poses to our thinking about the referentiality of language, but 
on the widespread tendency to read fictional representations of illness 
metaphorically – a tendency that is particularly pronounced in fictions that, like Age 
of Iron and Agaat, take as their settings moments of political, social, and cultural 
crisis. Like the other texts in this thesis, these novels deploy aesthetic strategies that 
problematize our assumptions about the ways in which illness signifies and the 
referentiality of fiction, and in this way draw into question the responsibilities that 
writers and readers have not only to texts but to each other.   
.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Via Dolorosa in the Southern Hemisphere:  
Illness, Fiction, and the Question of Place  
in Two South African Novels 
 
The blow catches him from the right, sharp and surprising and painful, like a 
bolt of electricity, lifting him up off the bicycle. Relax! he tells himself as he 
flies through the air (flies through the air with the greatest of ease!), and 
indeed he can feel his limbs go obediently slack. Like a cat he tells himself: 
roll, then spring to your feet, ready for what comes next. The unusual word 
limber or limbre is on the horizon too.  
    That is not quite as it turns out, however. Whether because his legs disobey 
or because he is for a moment stunned (he hears rather than feels the impact 
of his skull on the bitumen, distant, wooden, like a mallet-blow), he does not 
spring to his feet at all, but on the contrary slides metre after metre, on and 
on, until he is quite lulled by the sliding.  
      J. M. Coetzee (Slow Man 1) 
 
Thus opens Slow Man (2005), Coetzee’s eleventh novel and the first written after his 
relocation to Australia from South Africa in 2002. As a result of this catastrophic 
cycling accident, Paul Rayment—a childhood immigrant to Australia from France 
now in the twilight of middle age—loses his right leg, and is transformed from a 
healthy, physically intact and fully able human being into a hospital patient 
temporarily bedridden and permanently disabled by the amputation of his right leg. 
Slow Man charts Rayment’s progress—or, rather, his lack of progress—in the 
aftermath of the accident: his refusal of physiotherapy and rejection of prosthesis, 
and his awareness that throughout “he has not behaved well, has not risen to the 
occasion” (10, 15). Lying in bed, refusing to work up the momentum to take “just a 
few steps,” Rayment also resists the pressure to move on in narrative terms from 
crisis towards acceptance and restitution: a movement repeatedly emphasized in the 
advice of his doctor and nurses, as well as his friends (10). Instead, he circles back to 
the “the incident on Magill Road” in a compulsive rewriting of the novel’s opening 
paragraph, before returning home, where he is cared for on a part-time basis by a 
recent Croatian immigrant (14-15). After witnessing Rayment’s post-accident 
depression, the theft of a prize specimen in his collection of early Australian 
photographs, his erotic and romantic misadventures, and the invasion of his flat and 
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private life by one Elizabeth Costello—the titular character of Coetzee’s previous 
novel and a writer herself—, the novel’s final scenes are surprisingly sentimental, 
and offer the prospect, if not the guarantee, that Rayment might begin to move on 
with his life – a prospect symbolized by the customized recumbent tricycle he 
receives from his carer’s family as a gift of thanks for his advice and financial 
support.    
 
In her review of Slow Man for the British daily The Times, Sarah Emily Miano 
describes the novel as “another exemplary tale of suffering from one of the best 
writers of our time,” and commends Coetzee for “dar[ing] to articulate our 
incomprehensible existence”; a feat whose success depends, she suggests, at least in 
part on the novelist’s identification and exploration of the “differences [that] lie 
between narrative prospects and real ones” (Miano 2005). Here, Miano reproduces a 
metanarrative that in the early twenty-first century has come to hold increasing sway 
in both scholarly and popular readings of Coetzee’s oeuvre: a metanarrative in which 
this oeuvre is seen to have as its central concern the incomprehensibility of human 
existence, and the suffering that forms a central part of this existence. In this, Miano 
is joined by a host of reviewers and scholars, including Stephen Abell, who in a 2011 
article for the Times Literary Supplement describes Coetzee as “our best authority on 
suffering,” and Alice Hall, who in Disability and Modern Fiction (2012) places Slow 
Man within the author’s ongoing engagement with “questions of universal 
significance […] about care, bodily, linguistic and technological dependencies and 
the formation of narrative and identity”  (Abell 3; Hall 93).   
 
Strongly orientated towards an essentializing humanistic philosophical tradition that 
is Western in origin, this critical metanarrative is by no means new. As Attridge 
points out, its roots can be traced in early responses to Coetzee’s fiction (Coetzee 
33), and indeed may have proved instrumental in the exemption of his work from the 
apartheid government’s draconian censorship laws.93 Its ascendancy can also be seen 
to mirror the evolution of Coetzee’s fiction, which, with the exclusion of the semi-
autobiographical novel Summertime (2009), has in the early twenty-first century 
been marked by a turn away from the South African context to that of North 
                                            
93 Peter D. McDonald discusses the encounters of Coetzee’s fiction with government censors in The 
Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship and Its Cultural Consequences (2009).  
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America, Europe, and Australia in the novels Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man, 
and Diary of a Bad Year (2007), and, more recently, the unnamed utopian setting of 
The Childhood of Jesus (2013).  
 
Crucially, this critical metanarrative has to a large extent displaced that which 
dominated the response to Coetzee’s late twentieth-century fictions, beginning with 
Dusklands (1974), a work of two parts set in the United States of the 1960s and in 
eighteenth-century South Africa, and culminating in the dystopian post-apartheid 
novel Disgrace (1999). Taking its cue from Jameson’s proposition that “third-world 
texts […] necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory: 
the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled 
situation of the public third-world culture and society,” this earlier metanarrative 
consists in “allegorical readings” of a highly localized, historicist kind (Jameson 69; 
Attridge Coetzee 33). Based on “the widespread assumption that any responsible and 
principled South African writer, especially during the apartheid years, will have had 
as a primary concern the historical situation of the country and the suffering of the 
majority of its people,” Coetzee criticism in this vein thus tends to “translate 
apparently distant locales and periods into the South Africa of the time of writing, 
and to treat fictional characters as representatives of South African types or even 
particular individuals” (Attridge Coetzee 33). To this mode of historicist 
allegorization, even those of Coetzee’s novels that are explicitly located in the 
contemporary South African content have not been immune: as Attridge notes, Age 
of Iron has often been read “as an exemplification of the condition of South Africa 
during the township wars and States of Emergency of the mid-1980s” and Disgrace 
as “a schematic portrait of the country in the early years of democracy after the 
official end of apartheid” (Coetzee 33).   
 
However, for all the tension that exists between these two metanarratives, the 
difference between them is perhaps less profound than might at first appear. As 
Attridge points out both approach Coetzee’s fiction as fundamentally allegorical in 
nature (Coetzee 32-33). Whereas allegorical interpretations in the historicist mode 
read Coetzee’s fiction in relation to a specifically South African symbolic economy, 
then, those at work in the readings of Miano, Abell, and Hall—among many 
others—take as their frame of reference a supposedly universal notion of the human 
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condition, and consequently read individual characters as manifestations of this 
condition (Coetzee 32-33). Though in the context of apartheid South Africa these 
interpretive approaches might have appeared incompatible, then, at root they both 
speak to more essential debates about literature, and particularly about the writing 
and reading of fiction.  
 
In relation to these debates, tropes of illness, disability, and the suffering body 
occupy a particularly interesting position. As Sontag points out in her critique of 
metaphoric thinking, illness is invariably read as in allegoric and/or metaphoric 
terms, and subsequent studies—including Mitchell and Snyder’s Narrative 
Prosthesis (2000)—have only served to bolster this argument. This way of thinking 
is particularly pervasive in contexts such as South Africa, as Attridge has pointed 
out. And yet, for Coetzee, the suffering body is that which is beyond allegorization. 
Speaking in relation to Foe (1986), his reworking of Robinson Crusoe, he describes 
the suffering body as the “simple […] standard” that stands over his fiction, and “a 
counter to the endless trials of doubt” (“Interview” 248). The “power” of the “body 
in pain,” he urges, is undeniable and authoritative, and thus, he appears to suggest, 
cannot simply be collapsed into allegory (“Interview” 248).  Taking this problematic 
as my point of departure, in this chapter, I consider the contribution that two fictional 
accounts of illness that are broadly realist in style, and which take as their setting 
decisive moments and significant spaces in South Africa’s historical and cultural 
life, can make to thinking about literature’s relationship to the local context in which 
it comes into being, and the kinds of responsibilities this relationship demands of 
writers and readers.  
 
Structures of Ambiguity: Illness and Allegory in Age of Iron and Agaat  
Age of Iron takes as its setting suburban Cape Town in the mid to late eighties, or 
what David Attwell describes as “the worst years” of the States of Emergency 
imposed by the National Party government in the decade prior to the collapse of 
apartheid (Attwell Coetzee 120). A slim novel presented as an extended letter from 
one Mrs (Elizabeth) Curren—an ageing white woman and former classics teacher 
who lives alone in a deteriorating inner-city suburb—to her daughter, who lives in 
self-imposed exile in the United States, this text falls under the rubric of the 
epistolary novel, though, as Attridge reminds us, Mrs Curren’s narrative provides 
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“little in the way of realistic reinforcement that might enable us to imagine the words 
issuing from a pen onto a sheet of paper” (Attridge Coetzee 91). Early on, Mrs 
Curren relates the news that the cancer for which she has previously been treated has 
recurred, and is terminal, though in a moment of temporal confusion typical of her 
circuitous narrative style, the letter opens not with this terrible news, but with a 
description of an encounter with a vagrant who has set up camp next to her garage. 
Known only as Vercueil, this man becomes a central figure in the novel, eventually 
moving into Mrs Curren’s house and becoming a carer of sorts. The letter covers the 
development of their unusual relationship over the last weeks of Mrs Curren’s life, in 
a city racked by political violence and social unrest.  
 
In contrast to Age of Iron, Agaat is, at well over 600 pages, a fat breezeblock of a 
book. Van Niekerk’s monumental novel spans the second half of the twentieth 
century, but is primarily set in 1996, on a family farm in the Overberg region of the 
Western cape – one of only two provinces that failed to elect an African National 
Congress provincial government in the nation’s first democratic elections, and the 
only one to re-elect the National Party at this time. These events form the backdrop 
against which Van Niekerk narrates the final months of Milla de Wet’s life, during 
which she is bedridden and increasingly paralyzed by motor neurone disease. No 
longer able to speak or write, Milla is subjected to hours of what her nurse Agaat—a 
woman whose relationship to Milla is complicated by the informal adoption through 
which, as a child “cast-off” by her parents, she first entered the de Wet household—
calls “reading-aloud time” (9, 662). This “reading-aloud time” involves Agaat 
reciting from a small library of South African and European literary classics, out of 
date women’s magazines and farmer’s weeklies, academic texts, and, most crucially, 
Milla’s old diaries. Alongside this, Van Niekerk sets Milla’s attempt to account, both 
as a final testament and in the teeth of the self story with which Agaat confronts her, 
for her “life and times […], her place of origin, her purlieu on Grootmoedersdrift, 
her hereditary home” (21). The narrative that results is disordered, and weaves 
together the present, which Milla narrates in the first person; the past as 
retrospectively reconstructed by Milla, which is narrated in the second person; and 
the past as documented in her diaries, and as embellished by Agaat: a strand also 
narrated in the first person. This amorphous whole is bookended by two short 
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sections that detail the brief visit made by Milla’s son Jakkie to Grootmoedersdrift, 
in which he buries his mother and bequeaths the farm to Agaat. 
 
Like Age of Iron, Agaat’s political backdrop has shaped critical responses to the text, 
both within and without South Africa, in ways reminiscent of the kinds of historicist 
allegory Attridge traces in readings of Coetzee’s fiction. This is exemplified in Liesl 
Schillinger’s review of the novel for the New York Times. Here, Schillinger 
explicitly reads Agaat as national allegory, deciphering the relationship between 
Milla and Agaat as a symbolic embodiment of the country’s past. She writes: “it is 
apartheid itself that Agaat and Milla embody, two women, black and white, ink and 
paper, who together, over 50 years, inscribed upon each other a scroll of wrongs, 
betrayals and sacrifices that cannot be redressed, only reread.” Scholarly readings of 
the work display a similar tendency, using the novel as a testing ground for the 
transposition of theoretical concepts from exogenous contexts into a South African 
milieu.94 Perhaps even more so than Age of Iron, Agaat invites such readings – it is, 
after all, a novel that engages in detail and at length with South Africa’s literary 
tradition—particularly with the genre of the plaasroman, or farm novel—and with 
its peculiar socio-historical conditions. And yet, as Van Niekerk wryly notes in an 
interview with Hans Pienaar, readings of the novel that take this “frame of 
referentiality” as their starting point are often “plotting for more” than her writing 
can—or, she suggests, should—provide (Van Niekerk “So”).  
 
In one of the more interesting moments in this awkward interview, Pienaar likens 
Agaat to Coetzee’s Disgrace, asking Van Niekerk if “the former can be read as a 
response to the latter.” Though Van Niekerk acknowledges being “pierced to the 
quick” by Coetzee’s novel, she dismisses Pienaar’s suggestion, stating that though 
both novels are “about power” and “about land,” in Agaat she is “specifically 
interested in the intimate relationship between two people, the dynamics between 
them” (Van Niekerk “So”). With this statement, Van Niekerk stymies Pienaar’s 
attempt to discuss the intertextuality of her work. And yet, rather than distancing her 
work from Coetzee’s oeuvre entirely, her response instead suggests that, in linking 
                                            
94 Studies in this vein include the work of Loraine Prinsloo and Andries Visagie (2009); Rosemarie 
Buikema (2009); and Caren van Houwelingen (2012).  
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Agaat to Disgrace rather than to Foe, say, or to Age of Iron, Pienaar might simply 
have missed the wood for the trees.  
 
In its depiction of the final months of an ailing, ageing white woman on an isolated 
farm during a period of radical social and political tension, Van Niekerk’s Agaat can 
quite clearly be seen to resurrect the ghost of Mrs Curren, rather than restage the 
carnage of Disgrace. Indeed, the parallels between these two texts are profound, and 
build on the themes that link Age of Iron to Coetzee’s oeuvre more widely. Though 
Milla de Wet is dying not from cancer but from motor neurone disease, the 
debilitating effects of her illness combined with the absence of family—both women 
have only one child, and like Mrs Curren’s daughter Milla’s son Jakkie also lives in 
self-imposed exile in North America—leave her in a similar situation to Coetzee’s 
protagonist. Housebound and entirely dependent on others, Milla is cared for 
primarily by Agaat. While the resemblance between Milla and Mrs Curren is 
striking, that between Agaat and Vercueil is uncanny, and takes place on both a 
somatic and a semiotic level. Both bear names that are unstable and ambiguous. 
Agaat’s original moniker Asgat, or “ash-arse,” is modified by Milla into the 
Afrikaans endearment “aspatat,” or “baked-potato,” and then condensed into the 
initial “A.” before the local minister suggests “Agaat” – a name that carries with it 
the notion of intrinsic good from its root in the Greek agathos, but which also 
signifies the semi-precious stone known in English as agate (666, 470, 479, 487). In 
a similar vein, in Age of Iron Mrs Curren is mystified by Vercueil’s name, remarking 
“Vercueil, Verkuil, Verskuil […] I have never come across such a name before” 
(34). Though unrecognizable in any language, these permutations of Vercueil hint at 
meaning in their morphemic resemblance to various French and Afrikaans words—
“ver,” for example, means “worm” in the former and “far” in the latter, while in 
Afrikaans “skuil” and “ferskuil” mean both “to hide” and “to shelter”—and thus also 
gesture to a putative ancestry. Further, though the question of whether Vercueil is, 
like Agaat, coloured in origin is debatable, the two share an unusually specific 
physical marker in their disabled right hands. Vercueil’s is immobile, its “three 
fingers curled into the palm,” while Agaat’s “deformed arm” ends in a “hand bent 
down from the wrist, the fingers half squashed together, the thumb folded in so it 
looks like a shell” (10; 656).  
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The close resemblance between Vercueil and Agaat is not, however, an indulgent 
intertextual gesture on Van Niekerk’s part. It is instead, I argue, an important clue to 
the specific nature of the intervention that these novels stage in relation to the critical 
metanarratives that have come to dominate thinking about the ways in which 
fictional depictions of illness signify. In his discussion of the ways in which Coetzee 
both solicits and problematizes allegory in his fiction, Attridge uses Vercueil as his 
case in point. “Interpretations of Vercueil in Age of Iron that allegorize him as the 
angel of death,” he insists, must take account not only “of Mrs. Curren’s own 
tendency to do just that throughout the novel” but also of her “rejection in many 
places of this allegory” (34, 35, emphasis in orig.). Examples of these tendencies are 
plentiful, and Attridge cites them at length; what matters most however is their 
cumulative suggestion that “an allegorical reading of Vercueil’s part in the novel 
cannot be straightforward” (35). In light of this suggestion, I argue, Agaat’s close 
resemblance to Vercueil can be seen as a statement of affinity with the stance 
towards allegory that Coetzee takes in Age of Iron.   
 
The ambiguity of this stance is most pronounced in the interactions staged between 
bodies and landscapes in these novels, I argue, and ultimately unfolds in ways that 
pit the authority of history—an authority that, Coetzee insists, “lies simply in the 
consensus it commands”—against that of the suffering body, the “standard” that he 
erects over his fiction and which, he argues, acts as “a counter to the endless trials of 
doubt” (“Novel” 4; Doubling 248). In my readings of these interactions, I take as my 
lodestar Attwell’s discussion of the experience of place, and of South Africa in 
particular, in Coetzee’s oeuvre, as set out in articles such as “Coetzee’s 
Estrangements” (2008) and “J. M. Coetzee and the Idea of Africa” (2009). For 
Coetzee, Attwell writes, South Africa is “the unchosen but intimately known milieu” 
of writing (“Estrangements” 237, emphasis in orig.) — a connection that arguably 
holds true for many South African writers, including Van Niekerk. This tension, he 
argues, manifests itself in acts of “fictive displacement” and “imaginary relocation”, 
and also in the “tripartite architecture” that, for Attwell, “surfaces again and again in 
the novels” (“Estrangements” 233). This architecture consists of  
the subject (frequently a subject living unhappily in a body, often a body in 
pain, marked by contending social forces); history (as a field of contestations, 
"torsions of power" in Coetzee's phrase from the Jerusalem Prize acceptance 
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speech) […] and language (as a field of representations, cultural codes that 
precede the subject, themselves historical and forever slipping into 
obsolescence). (233) 
Mrs Curren and Milla de Wet are both subjects living unhappily in a body in pain 
and marked by contending social forces, engaged in a struggle to the death with 
history and with language. Crucially, however, it is illness—and not South Africa 
per se—that forms the unchosen but intimately known milieu of narration for these 
women. As part of the novel’s alleged epistolary structure, in Age of Iron Mrs 
Curren’s impulse to write is presented as a response to the news that her cancer is 
terminal, by leaving some form of last testament for her daughter in exile: her letter 
is a gift, an embrace, a mother’s attempt “to pass [herself] on beyond death” (5). 
Before all else, then, this is a narrative brought into being by illness, and not—at 
least not directly—by apartheid. Similarly, Milla’s desire to paint a convincing “self-
portrait” is provoked not by the political transition unfolding around her, but by 
Agaat’s reading aloud from her diaries and her inability to respond – a situation 
fundamentally dependent on Milla’s illness (21).  
 
In his reading of estrangement in Coetzee’s oeuvre, Attwell attends to the way in 
which he uses aesthetic defamiliarization to “serve a much more wide-ranging 
practice” that is at once “existential, political, ethical, as well as aesthetic” 
(“Estrangements” 238, 236). Attwell finds an example of this in Mrs Curren’s 
palimpsestic description of the “alley down the side of the garage” with which the 
novel opens (Age 3). This space is first a place where Mrs Curren’s daughter and her 
friends would “sometimes play”, then a “dead place, waste, without use”, before 
being occupied by a “a house of carton boxes and plastic sheeting and a man curled 
up inside” – the man being Vercueil, who she later invites into her home (Age 3). For 
Attwell, this scene constitutes “a renewal of perception of sorts, in which 
meaningfulness returns in an unexpected if unwelcome way” (“Estrangements” 242). 
Crucially, he attributes “the interruption causing the estrangement” to “the presence 
of death and separation - the news of the illness, the appearance of Vercueil, and the 
absence of the daughter” (242). It is against this “dark background of morbidity”—
and I would probably rephrase this as its “dark foreground of morbidity”—, he 
argues, that “Cape Town in the mid-1980s will be reassessed” (242). Crucially, for 
Attwell this reassessment enables  
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a defamiliarization of place so complete that a reexamination of social 
relationships […] can be explored de novo. It is not only the perception of 
objects that is renewed, in Shklovskian terms; it is also the country itself, in 
all the complex, incommensurate interconnections that are implied by native 
land and nation-state, pays and patrie, the intimacies of home and the 
detachments brought about by the exercise of power. (242) 
 
In his later article on the idea of Africa in Coetzee’s fiction, Attwell turns his 
attention to a process he calls “occultation”: a representative technique in which an 
object is “rendered potent and mysterious” (“Idea” 71). This forms part of a wider 
scheme of estrangement, which writers achieve through “appropriating places and 
their names to their own narratives and structures of meaning” (74). Crucially, 
however, occultation as a distinct representational mode involves “emptying signs 
that are not free of social content and filling them with something else” (74). 
According to Attwell, in Coetzee’s fiction “the occulted sign of Africa ensures that 
the eclipsed object continues to hold sway over the subject’s imagination, releasing 
an aesthetic charge and leaving an ethical disturbance” (71). In summary, then, in 
Attwell’s use of the two terms, estrangement signifies a multivalent process of 
aesthetic, existential, political, and ethical defamiliarization, while occultation refers 
specifically to a form of defamiliarization in which pre-existing signs, signs loaded 
with culturally-specific meaning, are recast within an alternative framework of 
reference. In the close readings of Age of Iron and Agaat that follow, I examine how 
illness acts as a driving force behind estrangement and occultation, to enact a kind of 
conceptual slippage and traffic that both solicits and resists allegory.  
 
Early on in Age of Iron, the novel’s terminally ill narrator Mrs Curren takes a trip up 
Cape Town’s Boyes Drive, an elevated road that hugs the slopes of Muizenberg 
Mountain above “the sweep of False Bay” (16). At the top, she stops to contemplate 
the view, taking in “A breaker, perfectly straight, hundreds of yards long, rolled 
inshore, a single crouched future on a surfboard gliding ahead of it” and “the 
mountains of Hottentots Holland” that stand out “clear and blue” across the bay. As 
she does so, she is overcome by what she describes as “a hunger of the eyes…such 
hunger that I am loth even to blink”. “These seas, these mountains”, she writes, “I 
want to burn them upon my sight so deeply that, no matter where I go, they will 
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always be before me. I am hungry with love of this world” (16). Here, the 
significance of the word “world” is threefold. Poised above the shoreline, not far 
from the continent’s southernmost tip, Mrs Curren stands on the threshold both of 
the natural landscape and of the nation-state — tropes central to the novel’s political 
and philosophical content.  And yet, the circumstances that have brought her 
narrative into being lend this scene an additional symbolism that combines the 
specificity of her location with the fundamentals of human experience. “This world” 
is not only the scrubby fynbos and strandveld of the Cape peninsula, with its quaint 
Victorian houses, Art Deco apartment blocks, and labyrinthian townships, but 
material world in general: a world in which bodies and landscapes interact in the 
production of knowledge and the creation of meaning.  
 
Our knowledge of Mrs Curren’s impending death is sufficient to sustain such a 
reading, and yet it is clear that neither Coetzee nor his author-protagonist are content 
to leave this as just one among many competing thematic strands. The centrality of 
illness to Mrs Curren’s experience of the False Bay vista is heavily underscored by 
the scene’s resemblance to an earlier paragraph:  
We sicken before we die so that we will be weaned from our body. The milk 
that nourished us grows thing and sour; turning away from the breast, we 
begin to be restless for a separate life. Yet this first life, this life on earth, on 
the body of earth — will there, can there ever be a better? Despite all the 
glooms and despairs and rages, I have not let go of my love of it. (11-12) 
Shared metaphors of hunger and desire link the two sections, as does a reoccurring 
imagery of the body – an imagery that is most pronounced in the analogy set up 
between Mrs Curren’s cancerous body and the body of earth on which she stands. 
The nipple to Africa’s drooping teat, in centuries past the Cape nourished the Dutch 
East India Company, channeling the riches of the region’s mines and the sticky wine 
of its vineyards to nurture Europe’s expanding empire. And yet at the time in which 
Age of Iron is set apartheid has ravaged the Mother City, leaving her more of a toxic, 
neglectful hag than a nurturing, milky-breasted matriarch. Moreover, the “glooms 
and despairs and rages” that Mrs Curren describes not only link her debilitating 
episodes of physical pain and chaotic psychological state to the riots and crackdowns 
of South Africa’s state of emergency, but also recall the volatile weather and 
deceptive landscape to which the epithets “Cape of Storms” and “False Bay” refer.  
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This complex chiastic structure brings the novel’s representation of the natural 
landscape and the nation-state into conversation with the experience of inhabiting an 
ageing, malignant white female body — a body that has been largely overlooked in 
feminist and other modes of literary and cultural criticism. This neglect is 
particularly pronounced in South Africa, where attention has tended to focus on 
other bodies. The mutilated bodies of young black men litter apartheid-era texts, 
from Elias Tekwane in Alex La Guma’s In the Fog of the Seasons’ End (1972) to 
Wally Mongane Serote’s To Every Birth Its Blood (1981), while post-apartheid 
fiction is particularly memorable for its depiction of the violated female body, of 
which Lucy in Disgrace, Lydia Ali in Achmat Dangor’s Bitter Fruit (2001), and 
Dulcie Olifant in Zoë Wicomb’s David’s Story (2000) are all salient examples. 
Likewise, though illness is an increasingly prominent trope in South African fiction, 
its representation is typically limited to HIV/AIDS - a condition associated, 
particularly in South Africa, with youth and desire, rather than ageing and isolation.  
 
Age of Iron engages at length with these emblematic bodies. The corpse of Mrs 
Curren’s domestic worker’s son, murdered during a Gugulethu riot, is a “massive, 
solid presence” in the text: a presence reinscribed in the body of his friend, John, 
who survives the riot only to be discovered in hiding on Mrs Curren’s property and 
executed there by the police (96, 142).  However, instead of obscuring the symbolic 
power of the ageing white female body, this engagement, I argue, serves primarily to 
intensify it. The contrast that Coetzee sets up between the resistance to meaning 
represented by Mrs Curren’s body and the susceptibility of Bheki’s and John’s 
bodies to socio-political interpretation is crucial to this intensification. This contrast 
is evident, for example, in the scene of John’s execution. Although the act takes 
place off-stage, John’s body is the nucleus around which the scene revolves. During 
this episode, Mrs Curren is repeatedly ignored, her body and voice occluded by the 
black-and-white pattern of political violence. The police pay no attention to her 
protests against the invasion of her home:  
‘Wait!’ I called, and ran, truly ran — I did not know I had it in me — to the 
kitchen door. ‘Wait!’ I called, slapping at the pane, fumbling with the bolts 
and chains — ‘Don’t do anything!’ 
   There was someone in a blue overcoat standing on the veranda with his 
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back to me. Thought he must have heard me, he did not turn. (138) 
She is soon removed from the scene, first into the kitchen and then from the house 
altogether. This displacement is coupled with an insistent covering of her ageing 
body. She emerges from the house with bare feet, wearing only a  “white 
nightdress”—a garment that makes her appear like “a body risen from the dead” 
(138-9). This is first covered by a “policemen’s overcoat” and then by a quilt, a 
covering that simultaneously reflects and refracts the image of John’s blanket-
covered body as it is wheeled down the driveway and into an ambulance (139, 141, 
143). On the one hand this sequence of displacement and disguise reinforces what 
Kathleen Woodward describes as the “invisibility of older women”, in which the 
ageing female body is both metaphorically and literally kept “out of sight” and thus 
“out of mind” (xiv, xii-xiii). On the other, however, the repetitive tug-of-war that 
takes place between Mrs Curren’s disruptive presence and the attempts of the police 
to contain it constructs the ageing female body as something that cannot be 
contained nor controlled. While Bheki and John can be shot on grounds of national 
security and the singularity of their living, breathing bodies compacted into political 
allegory, Mrs Curren presents a more complex challenge to the symbolic economy of 
South Africa in the apartheid era.  
 
Though the symbolic substance of Mrs Curren’s ageing, malignant body is 
continually eclipsed by the more readily readable bodies around her, I argue that, in 
doing so, its power to complicate the categories of being and systems of meaning 
associated with its context is intensified. The occulting of Mrs Curren’s body is 
evident from the novel’s opening scene, in which she presents herself as little more 
than an inanimate clotheshorse, upon which “the winter stockings, the blue coat, the 
skirt with whose hang there has always been something wrong, the grey hair cut by a 
strip of scalp” are draped in a two-dimensional semblance of a body (4). This 
description anticipates the series of ethereal self-portraits found in the latter half of 
the novel. She describes herself as “hollow […] a shell” (103), “[a] white moth, a 
ghost emerging from the mouth of the figure on the deathbed” (119), a ghostly “body 
risen from the dead” (138). “Were I to be opened up”, she writes, “they would find 
me hollows as a doll, a doll with a crab sitting inside licking its lips, dazed by the 
flood of light” (103). Reduced to a crab, the symbol of her cancer, Mrs Curren is 
continuously engaged in a process of emptying out, of occulting herself.  
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 And yet, in spite of this, the liminality and transience with which her ailing, ageing 
body is associated dominates the symbolic logic of the novel. The first, scene-setting 
paragraph, for example, is redolent of death and decay: the claustrophobic, tomb-like 
space of the alley a “dead place” full of rotting leaves. It is also, however, a record of 
a personal past very different from the letter’s present. This vacant, unused space 
acts as a reminder of her daughter’s growth into adulthood and her subsequent 
departure from South Africa, which in turn signals Mrs Curren’s loss of utility and 
social value as a mother and the denial of her symbolic value as a grandmother.95  
This is reinforced a few paragraphs later, when Mrs Curren observes Dr Syfret 
“withdrawing”, a sign of “his allegiance to the living, not the dying”, and also later 
in the novel, when we learn that she made her living as a classicist, by “giving voice 
to the dead” (4, 176).  
 
These idioms percolate through the paragraph that follows. A “derelict” living off 
donations, drink, and discarded food, Vercueil lacks social function and value (3). 
He smells of “urine” and “mouldy clothing”—waste and decay—and, lying in his 
“box” with “his legs stretched out like a marionette’s [and] his jaw agape”, he 
resembles nothing so much as a corpse awaiting burial (3). Though apparently 
occulted in this scene by Vercueil’s unusual appearance and olfactory overload that 
accompanies it, Mrs Curren’s body casts a long shadow of morbidity. This complex 
performance of occultation recurs throughout the novel. When Bheki is knocked off 
his bicycle by a police van, Mrs Curren’s description of her attempt to stem the flow 
of blood from his injuries is at first entirely focused on Bheki’s body. Her narrative 
is saturated in his blood, her hands obscured by it:  
Blood ran down the boy’s face in a steady, even sheet…. As long as I 
pinched tight I could hold in most of the flow. But when I relaxed blood 
poured again steadily. It was blood, nothing more, blood like yours and mine. 
                                            
95 Mrs Curren’s role as a grandmother is never directly mentioned in the novel, but is hinted at when 
she shows Vercueil a photograph of her daughter’s two sons. Significantly, she calls them “their 
children” rather than ‘my grandchildren’, and describes them without affection as “two little boys in 
caps and coats and boots and gloves standing to attention beside a snowman”, an image far removed 
from her own childhood photo, with its sunshine, “hollyhocks” and “bed of melons” (27-28, 101). 
The contrast between the two photos is made all the more profound by the fact that the latter was 
taken in Mrs Curren’s grandfather’s garden, a detail of family intimacy that emphasizes the distance 
separating her from her own grandchildren. 
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Yet never before had I seen anything so scarlet and so black. Perhaps it was 
an effect of the skin, youthful, supple, velvet dark, over which it ran; but 
even on my hands it seemed both darker and more glaring than blood ought 
to be. I stared at it, fascinated, afraid, drawn into a veritable stupor of staring. 
(58) 
However, the narrative soon returns to its narrator, and back to tropes of history, 
land, and maternity familiar to the reader from the scene on Boyes Drive. Bheki’s 
blood sets in motion a sequence of “unsuspected linkages, at once decentered and 
systemic” that leads us from a Cape Town street to “a Baikal Sea scarlet-black under 
a wintry blue Siberian sky” and then on to “a place apart, in a mud-walled dam in the 
Karoo with barbed wire around it and the sun blazing down, the blood of the 
Afrikaners and their tribute-bearers” (58-59). She then goes on to describe how  
For twenty years I have not bled. The sickness that now eats at me is dry, 
bloodless, slow and cold […]. To have fallen pregnant with these growths, 
these cold obscene swellings; to have carried and carried this brood beyond 
any natural term, unable to bear them, unable to sate their hunger: children 
inside me eating more every day […] Like insect-eggs laid in the body of a 
host, now grown to grubs and implacably eating their host away. (59) 
In this way, Coetzee’s novel fashions a semiotic logic in which conceptual 
boundaries exists primarily as sites for continuous slippage and traffic, in ways 
redolent of the bodies in performance discussed in chapter 3.   
 
Agaat’s various narrative strands are disordered and digressive, with little concern 
for conventional narrative principles such as causality, coherence, or consistency. 
Among the novel’s many unruly features can be found a potent defamiliarization of 
place similar to that Attwell identifies in Age of Iron. Like Milla’s diaries, which 
Jakkie describes as being extensively annotated “in [his mother’s] handwriting with 
dates, days and even months, years later than the original entry” (680), the 
Grootmoedersdrift homestead is a site of ongoing transformation — a transformation 
that becomes increasingly driven by Milla’s illness. Beginning with the transfer of 
Grootmoedersdrift from Milla’s parents to her husband Jak and culminating in the 
legalisation of Agaat’s “benevolent dictatorship,” land ownership is a key issue in 
the novel — an issue that lies close to the heart of South Africa’s apartheid and post-
apartheid history (Van Niekerk “So”). And yet land ownership is only one of many 
 139 
interrogations of space and belonging at work in Agaat. In a technique that recalls 
Woolf’s The Waves, the abstract, italicized prose poems that punctuate Milla’s 
narrative, for example, brings together agricultural rhythms and biogeochemical 
processes in a stream-of-consciousness narrative that forms an abstract counterpoint 
both to Milla’s diaries and to her final attempt to account for herself:    
they have not heard from me for so long they may well think I am dead it 
leaves me cold really I cannot deny I have let the world slip by my hand 
sometimes I still have the urge to call to scream to get up the need walks in 
waves but congeals an ocean of glassy gel noiseless salty white coast a 
dream but I am not sleeping am not dead am awake between me and me all 
hollows are silted shut a mountain without caves storeys without 
stairwell…images no longer offer solace my filling seed soil wind I am who I 
am impermeable no turn up or down or round possible the sight of a dead 
wall could relieve me but I am myself the wall am name am flour am history 
have occurred my damage is dense is black my tongue silts my mouth full of 
water oh my soul in me there is no room for you to mortify yourself (622) 
 
In addition to their role in Van Niekerk’s depiction of Milla as unreliable narrator, 
these sections work towards a defamiliarization of place similar to that found in Age 
of Iron. Raising complicated questions about the relationship between culture and 
nature, and particularly about what Michiel Heyns calls “human dealings with the 
soil” (132), they play with the “complex, incommensurate interconnections” that link 
“native land and nation-state, pays and patrie, the intimacies of home and the 
detachments brought about by the exercise of power. Central to this sense of an 
estrangement that is at once existential, political, ethical, and aesthetic is Van 
Niekerk’s use of a densely patterned figurative vocabulary that draws on 
cartography, needlework, scarification, and textuality – a vocabulary whose organic 
evolution simultaneously evokes the chaotic congestion of Milla’s motor neurons, 
the cadences of the landscape, and the unsuspected linkages and “retarded logic” that 
govern human emotion and interaction (Agaat 11).  
 
This element comes to the fore in a scene in which Agaat hangs an “embroidery 
experiment” on the wall next to Milla’s bed, in order to give her something to look 
at: Milla’s restlessness is, she feels, an attempt to communicate that “she wants to 
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see something” (217, 208-209). The embroidery is of a “great rainbow”, and, in its 
impenetrable evocation of the “rainbow nation” of post-apartheid South Africa, the 
embroidery is thus easily read as a gesture towards the wider context in which the 
novel takes place. Too easily, perhaps: though Agaat is “anaesthetised” by the 
creative labour involved in producing it, her intention is to estrange the familiar. 
Milla recalls her saying “Everybody thinks they know what a rainbow looks 
like…but when it’s from close by like this, they’ll wonder what they’re seeing” 
(217). Seen through Milla’s eyes, the embroidery achieves the intended effect: 
A straight inside section of the body of the rainbow. All over the cloth. The 
yellow of the spectrum runs off into creamy white, then pure white. The veld 
gradated so subtly that my eye reels, that I seek for a stay inside of me, for 
the blue-green of the Waenhuiskrans horizon, for yellow-green shoots of self-
sown oats, water-green pineapple drink, lime peel, sunflowers, orange 
cannas, a dust-dimmed sun over stubble field, a harvest moon blood-red, a 
watermelon’s flesh. And Geissorhiza radians, Babiana purpurea, amongst 
dark bracken the seven other purples of September. Swift effulgences, pleats 
of light.  
   But here is neither place nor time. It’s an embroidery of nothing and 
nowhere. What Agaat must have imagined to lie behind the tender despair of 
defenceless creatures, behind the firefly, the evening star, the poppy, the 
blond lad in his corduroy pants. Everything that slipped out of her grasp, 
Jakkie’s whole childhood, replaced with this embroidered emptiness. […] 
What am I supposed to do with it all? (218-219)  
At once abstract and layered with meaning, the embroidery prompts interpretation 
only to undermine it, evoking everything and nothing at the same time. Furthermore, 
Milla’s restlessness, her desire to “see something” is, as the reader knows, a desire to 
contemplate once more the map of Grootmoedersdrift - a desire that becomes a 
driving force in the novel. Agaat’s attempt to sate this desire with the rainbow 
embroidery thus establishes a connection between the homestead and the nation-
state, but one that stymies attempts to interpret the farm and its community as the 
rainbow nation in miniature.  
 
Van Niekerk’s intricate entangling of the natural landscape, the family farm, and the 
nation-state is further complicated by the figure of the ailing, ageing female body. 
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Like Mrs Curren, Milla’s descriptions of her body invite a reading of occultation. 
Her somatic self-portraits are similarly two-dimensional, ethereal: she is “a little 
bundle of bones and feathers” (215). In the mirror, she sees “a shadow of myself, my 
sloping shoulders, my face on which my features appear vague, as if an artist had 
rubbed his sleeve over a preparatory study, or flattened the modelling clay with his 
palm” (21). Unlike Age of Iron, however, in Agaat there are few bodies with which 
to occult Milla. Aside from Agaat, most inhabitants of the homestead are reduced to 
sounds— the bakkie coming back from town, “the laughter of the farm boys down 
by the drift”, the banging of screen doors (61, 65). Those that do visit are fleeting: 
the doctor Leroux’s fumbling consultations, for example. Consequently, there are 
few opportunities for Milla’s body to be occulted by the bodies of others. She is 
instead occulted by Grootmoedersdrift, represented both through the landscape and 
through the symbolic repetition of this landscape in a series of maps: “the old map of 
conveyance,” “the old transfer-duty map,” “the surveyor’s map,” “the topographical 
map,” “the big soil composition map,” “the whole of South Africa, and a world map, 
Jakkie’s school maps” (156-157). 
 
Through Agaat’s ministrations Milla is quite literally emptied out, of phlegm and 
piss and shit; through her own descriptions she is refilled with organic matter of a 
different kind. She is like a “rag doll,” “filled with sawdust. Or lupine seeds. Or 
clean white river sand” (15). Embarking on her final “self-portrait”, she tries “to find 
handholds inside [her]self”, landing on “Rye grass, klaaslouw bush, wattle branches 
to anchor myself against the precipice. Diehard species. I feel around inside me. 
There’s still vegetation, there’s water, there’s soil” (16). As in Age of Iron, here the 
relationship between the ailing, ageing white female body and the natural 
landscape—a relationship implicit in Milla’s slouch towards death and thus toward 
burial—is paramount. The trope of the handhold, moreover, anticipates Milla’s 
response to the rainbow embroidery—in which she seeks “for a stay inside of me”—
a connection that brings ideas of belonging and nationhood into conversation with 
this symbolic nexus of flesh and farmland.  
 
This conversation reaches its apogee in chapter 5, when Milla imagines herself 
becoming one with the map of Grootmoedersdrift: 
They must unroll it in the dust and place stones on its corners so that it 
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doesn’t roll shut […].They must remove the brace so that my neck can bend. 
    They must take my head in their hands so that it doesn’t become too 
heavy, and lift it up and lower it as the rod points on the map and the hand 
points over my world, so that I can see the map of Grootmoedersdrift and its 
boundlessness […]. 
    Between the land and the map I must look, up and down, far and near until 
I’ve had enough, until I’m satiated with what I have occupied here. 
   And then they must roll it up in a tube and put on my neckbrace again like 
the mouth of a quiver. And I will close my eyes and prepare myself so that 
they can unscrew my head and allow the map to slip into my lacunae. (104-
105) 
The extended soliloquy leading up to this fantasy draws on tropes of burial and the 
becoming-earth that follows. The passage is full of containers—“bottle”, “crate”, 
“basket”, “cage”, “basin”,  “jars and tubes”, “sacks”, “the caverns of the shed”, a 
“coop”—while Milla describes herself as “a clod in a field, a shallow contour” (101-
104). Again, as in the embroidery scene, the impossibility of interpretation is key. 
Milla asks: “What must I make of it? What is the message?” (101).  
 
Like Mrs Curren, Milla is engaged in an ongoing process of emptying out and 
refilling, replacing her vital organs with a selection of natural and manmade objects 
that link her to the land and to the nation-state — tropes that, in the context of post-
apartheid South Africa, are particularly burdensome. And yet, rather than allowing 
these symbols to dominate the symbolic logic of the novel and thus reinforce Milla’s 
allegorical role as a beneficiary of apartheid, this process serves instead to intensify 
the singularity of her situation and to extend her influence within the novel. Just as 
Van Niekerk resists Pienaar’s attempts to read Agaat as a novel about farming 
methods and the politics of land ownership, then, Milla resists attempts to be read as 
trope, preferring instead to remain a site of structured ambiguity.   
 
Conclusions 
In “The Novel Today,” a lecture given in Cape Town in 1987—and thus shortly after 
he had begun work on Age of Iron—Coetzee takes to task the kinds of historicist 
thinking that underpins allegorical readings of South African realist fiction. Herein, 
he focuses on “the powerful tendency […] to subsume the novel under history, to 
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read novels as […] imaginative investigations of real historical forces and real 
historical circumstances” (2). “Storytelling,” he insists, “is not a way of making 
messages more […] ‘effective’,” but represents rather “an other way of thinking” 
about “the underlying patterns of force at work in our public and private life” (4, 2). 
Novels, he therefore argues, have the right not only to operate, but to be recognized 
as operating, “in terms of [their] own procedures,” and thus to “issue in [their] own 
conclusions” (3).  
 
To my mind, the argument that Coetzee puts forward in “The Novel Today” is 
driven by many of the same concerns that animate Woolf’s thinking about literature 
at the time of writing On Being Ill. Like Woolf, Coetzee acknowledges the power of 
the literary to obviate the traps that are set for it, arguing that “in laying down rules 
that stories may not transgress, and enforcing these rules, [censors] fail to recognise 
that the offensiveness of stories lies not in their transgressing particular rules but in 
their faculty of making and changing their own rules” (3). Nevertheless, like Woolf, 
Coetzee admits to being deeply troubled by the prevalence of modes of reading that 
take as their primary motivation a deciphering of the relationship that obtains 
between a work of fiction and the “time and place” in which it is written, particularly 
when the work of fiction concerned explicitly engages with “the historical present” 
(2). For Coetzee, then, these modes of reading enact a form of interpretive violence 
through the restrictions they place on what such fictions might mean.    
 
In light of the argument Coetzee sets out in “The Novel Today,” his simultaneous 
solicitation and problematization of allegory in Age of Iron can be seen as a means 
not only of resisting interpretive violence, but of drawing his reader’s attention to 
limitations of the interpretive habits they bring to certain kinds of fictional 
representations: an agenda that resonates in powerful ways both with Woolf’s 
critique of illness’s absence from literature’s “prime themes” and with her notion of 
rash reading as an interpretive approach cognisant of, but not limited to, the tropes 
and trends of traditional literary criticism. In this sense, the construction of a novel 
that not only engages with the historical present, but which unfolds as an account of 
illness, can be seen as a means of rendering this issues particularly acute. In a similar 
vein, Van Niekerk describes how in her writing she seeks “to complicate matters 
[…] in such a densely patterned way that the text will not stop eliciting questions and 
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that it will refuse to provide any definite answers to questions such as [those its 
readers] might ask” – a statement of intent that aligns her thinking with that set out 
by Coetzee several decades earlier (Van Niekerk “So”). The manifestation of this 
thinking in Coetzee’s and Van Niekerk’s fictional accounts of illness, I argue, 
cultivates in their readers what Sarah Nuttall has called a “spliced reading”: a 
reading in which “apartheid as signifier and symptom hovers, is drawn in, re-fused, 
modified, as potent after-effect, now in combination with new formations of self and 
meaning” (86, 106-107). “Together,” Nuttall writes, these readings “make for an 
entanglement, as point of difficulty and release” (107). In Age of Iron and Agaat 
allegory acts as this point of difficulty and release, and in this way encourages 
readers to explore not only he ways in which fiction engages with the historical 
present, but also the nature of their responsibility to these fictions.     
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Conclusion  
 
I began this thesis with the aim of undercutting a stance of resistance in both the 
medical humanities and literary studies to recognizing illness accounts as works of 
literature, in Attridge’s sense of the term as texts whose aesthetic dimensions—their 
deployment of narrative form, imagery, metaphor, generic convention, and so on—
generate structures of meaning distinct from those set out in its more literal content: 
the events it narrates, the characters it contains, and so on. As I demonstrate in 
chapter 1, this stance is predicated on a set of deep-seated assumptions about writing 
and reading illness. First amongst these is a failure to countenance the possibility 
that an individual might, in attempting to account for illness, undertake any kind of 
reflective, interpretive, or representational work, and that this work might have 
meaning and value. From this perspective, the stylistic idiosyncrasies of illness 
accounts can offer its interpreters insight into the cultural context in which the illness 
experience and its narration take place, as well as the subconscious desires and fears 
of its narrator, but no more.  In opposition to this, the second assumption takes shape 
as an insistence that fictional representations of illness are always underwritten by 
forms of authorial intention that take as their object either metaphor or the 
development of the work’s plot and/or characters. Perhaps most problematic, 
however, is the third of these assumptions, which uses this all-or-nothing view of 
authorial intentional to dictate the terms on which illness accounts can be read, and 
thus betrays the profoundly conservative bent of much research in the field.  
 
To someone trained in a post-deconstructive tradition of literary scholarship—a 
tradition oriented towards the currents of contradiction, ambiguity, and interplay that 
percolate below the surface of the text—the complicity of literary studies in this 
conservatism is not only surprising, but seems to go almost entirely against the grain 
of the discipline. Animated by the need to address this conflict, my readings of late 
twentieth- and early twenty-first-century autoethnography, literary memoir, and 
experimental fiction in this thesis have therefore sought to uncover the aesthetic 
complexity of the contemporary illness account. Crucially, these readings not only 
attest to the ways in which the aesthetic dimensions of a text intensify the bare facts 
it narrates, but also demonstrate the ways in which these aesthetic dimensions create 
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a content of their own that adds both to the scope of the account and to the 
experience of reading it.   
 
In my analyses of illness accounts by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Jackie Stacey, Mary 
Felstiner, Ann Oakley, Hilary Mantel, Paul West, J. M. Coetzee, and Marlene van 
Niekerk I show how these authors encounter a series of fault lines at the interface of 
experience and expression, including the overdetermination of the textual body and 
of narrative voice by competing cultural discourses of gender and illness; the 
referentiality of figurative language; and the relationship between story and setting: 
fault lines that are largely unaccounted for in the critical metanarratives that underpin 
current thinking about illness accounts in both the medical humanities and literary 
studies. In tracing their explorations of these fault lines, my analyses also illuminate 
how, for these authors, the attempt to account for illness raises wider questions about 
the textual representation of the embodied self; and about the responsibilities that 
writers and readers assume in relation to these representations. In this way, I 
demonstrate how both the accounts themselves and the interpretive practices I have 
brought to bear on them can act as an important and necessary check on the critical 
metanarratives that continue to underwrite illness account research, as well as a point 
of departure from which to consider thinking about literature and its participation in 
the ethical.   
 
My emphasis in this thesis on the critical vistas that such analyses open up is not, 
however, tied to a call to dispense with its predecessors altogether. Nor is meant to 
suggest that the kinds of analyses I undertake should always be performed. Indeed, it 
would not be right to put forward a critique of this sort without reflecting on the 
limitations of the alternatives I propose. Chief amongst these limitations is the risk of 
being seen to champion the literary over other forms, by framing the aesthetically 
sophisticated accounts of illness considered in this thesis as both more meaningful 
and more valuable than those that take a more straightforward approach to 
representation. Illness accounts of all types are, and will continue to be, valuable 
sources in a range of different research and pedagogical projects, and in many 
instances it is most appropriate to read these accounts in non-literary ways. In both 
of these instances the methodologies of the medical humanities are indispensable 
tools.  
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Rather, my objective with these readings is to show both the magnitude and the 
relevance of what is missed when the habits and conventions with which scholars 
approach illness accounts fail to look for and engage with the characteristics of the 
literary. Consequently, though the explicit aesthetic sophistication of the accounts I 
consider here offers the best illustration of the argument I wanted to set out in this 
thesis, in drawing this argument to a close I am centrally concerned with the need to 
show how the kinds of interpretive approaches I practice in its pages can be applied 
to illness accounts that are not self-evidently “literary,” and how these readings 
might further contribute to our understanding of the relationship between illness, 
literature, and ethics. Given that the vast majority of illness accounts published in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries do not display the complex, self-
reflexive aesthetic strategies that characterize the texts on which this thesis focuses, 
the credibility of any claims I might make to have contributed to the development of 
scholarly practice in the field of illness account research depend on a convincing 
demonstration of the ways in which my findings might be extended beyond these 
parameters. And yet, this project demands that I provide such a demonstration for 
other reasons too, for it was with the epitome of the non-literary—the celebrity 
illness memoir—that it in fact began.  
  
In its earliest incarnation, the research on which this thesis is based focused on the 
representation of suffering in Coetzee’s fiction, and it was in my search for an 
archetypal illness narrative against which to compare Coetzee’s explorations of 
illness and disability in Age of Iron and Slow Man that I first came to read Lance 
Armstrong’s 2001 cancer memoir It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life, 
a work co-written with the award-winning sports journalist Sally Jenkins.96 
Published shortly after the first of Armstrong’s seven consecutive Tour de France 
victories, the memoir embodied the popular not just in style, but in the sheer extent 
of its readership, reaching number one on the New York Times Bestseller List in 
2001 and winning the William Hill Sports Book of the Year Award in 2000. As a 
cycling fan, I was familiar with the general outline of Armstrong’s story: of his 
diagnosis, at the age of just twenty-five, with stage three testicular cancer, including 
                                            
96  For the purposes of this conclusion, I will refer only to Armstrong as the author, though I will 
discuss the implications of this co-authorship in greater detail where relevant.   
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metastatic growths in his brain, lungs, and abdomen; his return from radical 
treatment to dominate professional cycling; and his establishment of the Lance 
Armstrong Foundation, a nonprofit organization that offered support to people with 
cancer. I thus hoped to find in this account a textbook example of either a restitution 
narrative or, ideally, an automythology: an expectation that reviews of the memoir 
on websites such as Amazon and Goodreads appeared to corroborate. I didn’t find 
quite what I was looking for, but what I did find was fascinating, for a range of 
reasons. In the pages that follow, I offer a brief articulation of Armstrong’s account 
and its pivotal role in my research, as a means both of drawing together the major 
conceptual and analytical interventions that I have sought to make with this thesis, 
and of sketching out the implications of these interventions for scholarship in the 
field of illness accounts more widely.  
  
It’s Not About the Bike is first and foremost an illness account: its narrative centres 
on Armstrong’s diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. In keeping with the various 
“media accounts, autobiographies, biographies, and Lance Armstrong Foundation 
materials” that circulated in the aftermath of his recovery, the memoir frames cancer 
as a major catalyst in Armstrong’s development as an athlete, activist, and public 
figure: a framing so pervasive that, Monica J. Casper and Lisa Jean Moore note, “the 
story of Lance Armstrong, über-cyclist, cannot be told outside of the story of Lance 
Armstrong, testicular cancer survivor” (159). The now-defunct Lance Armstrong 
Foundation website added a moral dimension to this superheroic narrative, through 
statements such as the following: 
  Cancer left him scarred physically and emotionally, but he now maintains it 
was “…the best thing that ever happened to me,” [sic] This new focus allowed 
him to think beyond cycling and focus on his debt to the cancer community. 
He formed the Lance Armstrong Foundation within months of his diagnosis to 
help others with their cancer struggles.97 
 
The resulting reinvention of Armstrong as champion, philanthropist, and icon of 
survival—his elevation from Armstrong to LiveStrong™, from survivor to 
superhero—effectively transformed what might have been a straightforward story of 
                                            
97  The Lance Armstrong Foundation website was taken down at some point in 2013: these quotations 
were taken from the website in May of that year. 
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recovery into the stuff of myth, and rendered its protagonist a living, breathing 
testament to the parable that “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.” As such, it 
took shape not as a restitution narrative but as what Frank calls an “automythology.” 
In this narrative type, the author “tells self-consciously of being transformed” by 
illness, and usually implies “that [they have] been given something by the 
experience…some insight that must be passed on to others” (118). That the 
automythology is, Frank argues, the story that most people who experience illness, 
as well as their friends and family, want not only to hear, but to assimilate and 
reproduce, might explain at least in part the overwhelming popularity of It’s Not 
About the Bike among readers (77).  
 
In relation to narrative decodings of the sort that Frank’s typology of illness 
storylines represents, content is everything, and the specificities of form are rarely 
taken into account. A ready example of this type of decoding can be found in Casper 
and Moore’s study of the Lance Armstrong “legend” in Missing Bodies (2009), their 
sociological analysis of bodies both actual and symbolic in contemporary American 
culture (159). For Casper and Moore, the Lance Armstrong legend was both made 
possible by, and is emblematic of, a moment of profound crisis in American culture, 
and as such offers a valuable framework within which to investigate the intersections 
of “masculinity, illness, sports, philanthropy, and the redemption of American 
national identity in wartime” (159). In this approach, It’s Not About the Bike 
constitutes just one of many venues in which these intersections can be traced: a 
work that testifies to the complexity of the Lance Armstrong legend, but only in its 
capacity to document the ways in which this legend is embedded in wider cultural 
discourses. In relation to this legend, Casper and Moore’s reading of It’s Not About 
the Bike—a reading that also draws on the memoir’s sequel, Every Second Counts 
(2003)—focuses on the text’s archival qualities, and particularly its cataloguing of a 
series of events that, they argue, are symptomatic of Armstong’s “quest” to reassert  
“his lost masculinity”: events such as his “successful efforts […] to produce children 
through in-vitro fertilization” and his devotion “to hard bodily work, pain, and 
suffering through sport, the annihilation of his opponents in the Tour, and a series of 
risky practices including diving headfirst off a 50-foot bluff into Dead Man’s Hole 
[…] just to remind himself that he’s still alive”  (165).  
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Though both compelling and informative, in Casper and Moore’s analysis of the 
Lance Armstrong Legend It’s Not About the Bike is thus construed as just one source 
amongst a set of data that, though heterogeneous in form, are largely homogeneous 
in content, and which can thus be mined for information in similar ways. In this 
regard, their work falls into step with the kinds of approaches that Waddington and 
Willis target in their critique of illness account research. In relation to my own 
analysis of this research, moreover, their reading exemplifies the tendency amongst 
both medical humanities scholars and those in literary studies to restrict their 
thinking about the stylistic idiosyncrasies in ways that limit their significance to an 
unmediated reflection of the cultural context in which the illness experience and its 
narration take place, the subconscious desires and fears of its narrator, or both.  
 
At first glance, Ted M. Butryn and Matthew A. Masucci’s article “It’s Not About the 
Book: A Cyborg Counternarrative of Lance Armstrong” appears to offer a radical 
counterexample to the work of Casper and Moore. Herein, Butryn and Masucci not 
only restrict their gaze to the text, but also draw on a theoretical paradigm—cyborg 
theory—that is well-established in, if not central to, the humanities. Moreover, 
though they share a background in sports studies, from a methodological perspective 
both their acknowledgement of the “agency and authority” implicit in Armstrong’s 
acts of self-representation, and their particular focus on the role that metaphor plays 
in these accounts, set up for an analysis informed by a relatively sophisticated 
engagement with the principles and practices of the humanities (127). Butryn and 
Masucci’s reading traces in It’s Not About the Bike a “cyborgian” counternarrative 
(125). Particularly compelling is their account of the “simultaneous juxtaposition and 
convergence of identity and technology” at work in Armstrong’s telling of his illness 
experience: a simultaneous juxtaposition and convergence that yields moments of 
slippage palpable at the level of metaphor (125). And yet, this account never quite 
delivers on its promise of close reading, but instead unfolds as an over-theorized and 
under-read analysis of the ways in which “Armstrong’s articulation of multiple, 
competing identifications is consistent with a postmodern notion of fractured, 
incomplete identity” (124).  
 
The process through which It’s Not About the Bike was written means that questions 
of authorial intentionality are particularly fraught, though the public release of the 
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US Anti-Doping Agency investigation findings in 2012 reveal that Armstrong’s 
contribution to this process certainly involved deliberate acts of elision and 
fictionalization. Moreover, the collaborative nature of its production also places 
severe restrictions on the kinds of claims that can be made about the aesthetic 
strategies the memoir contains. Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, it is 
possible, I believe, to approach this account as one would a more self-evidently 
literary text, and to take seriously therefore the ethical implications of the aesthetic 
strategies that such an approach uncovers.   
 
As demonstrated in the work of Casper and Moore, the automythological narrative of 
Armstrong’s spectacular recovery and reinvention was, for over a decade, the glue 
that held the vast range of visual and verbal representations of the Lance Armstrong 
legend together. It’s Not About the Bike is no exception to this rule: references to this 
narrative trajectory not only recur again and again in its pages, but are present from 
the very outset of the account. On page 4, for example, we are informed that:    
The truth is that cancer was the best thing that ever happened to me. I don’t 
know why I got the illness, but it did wonders for me, and I wouldn’t want to 
walk away from it. Why would I want to change, even for a day, the most 
important and shaping event in my life? (4) 
As “the most important and shaping event” in Armstrong’s life, illness acts as a kind 
of pivot point on which the narrative turns, a notion reiterated in statements such 
““There are two Lance Armstrongs, pre-cancer, and post,” and his descriptions of 
cancer as “a route to a second life, an inner life, a better life” (4, 157).  
 
And yet, at the same time, two elements of It’s Not About the Bike appear to trouble 
the preeminence of the automythology in Armstrong’s illness account.  The first of 
these is by far the more prominent, and centres on Armstrong’s summary and 
outright rejection both of the Lance Armstrong legend and of the automythology 
form upon which this legend is based, complete with ironic capitals and italics:  
I’m sure you’d like to hear about how Lance Armstrong became a Great 
American and an Inspiration To Us All, how he won the Tour de France, the 
2,290-mile road race that’s considered the single most grueling sporting 
event on the face of the earth. You want to hear about faith and mystery, and 
my miraculous comeback, and how I joined towering figures like Greg 
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LeMond and Miguel Indurain in the record book. You want to hear about my 
lyrical climb through the Alps and my heroic conquering of the Pyrenees, and 
how it felt. … 
    …I’m asking you now, at the outset, to put aside your ideas about heroes 
and miracles, because I’m not storybook material. This is not Disneyland, or 
Hollywood. (3) 
The contradiction between this statement and the traces of automythology in It’s Not 
About the Bike is emphatic, but short-lived, and primarily functions as a stamp of 
authenticity that ultimately reinscribes, rather than undermines, this narrative trope. 
 
The second version of the relationship between Armstrong’s account and the 
automythology narrative is less prominently signalled, but more pervasive and more 
problematic. It focuses not on rejection but on integration, and achieves this through 
an extension of the automythology form beyond his cancer story, to encompass his 
life story as a whole. From this angle, it is adversity in general, rather than cancer in 
particular, that shapes this life story, creating an undulating narrative in which the 
arc of his diagnosis, treatment, and recovery lies alongside the series of obstacles 
that Armstrong encounters and overcomes on his journey to success: obstacles that 
range from being the child of a single, teenage mother to the death of his friend and 
teammate Fabio Casartelli in the 1995 Tour de France to chemotherapy-induced 
infertility. This extension is initiated in chapter 2, in which Armstrong begins his 
account of his childhood and teenage years with the statement that “Your past forms 
you” (17). It reaches its apotheosis, however, during a pivotal moment in his 
comeback—his first post-cancer attempt at Beech Mountain, “a crucial stage in [his] 
two Tour du Pont victories” in 1995 and 1996—when he recalls that  
As I rode upward, I reflected on my life, back to all points, my childhood, my 
early races, my illness, and how it changed me. …As I continued upward, I 
saw my life as a whole. I saw the pattern and the privilege of it, and the 
purpose of it, too. It was simply this: I was meant for a long, hard climb. 
(201-202).  
Even the account’s title—which I initially took to signal a privileging of cancer’s 
significance to Armstrong over that of cycling—speaks to this subtext, as we see in 
the following extract: 
 153 
I had learned what it means to ride the Tour de France. It’s not about the 
bike. It’s a metaphor for life, not only the longest race in the world but also 
the most exalting and heartbreaking and potentially tragic. It poses every 
conceivable element to the rider, and more: cold, heat, mountains, plains, 
ruts, flat tires, high winds, unspeakably bad luck, unthinkable beauty, 
yawning senselessness, and above all a great, deep self-questioning. During 
our lives we’re faced with so many different elements as well, we experience 
so many setbacks, and fight such a hand-to-hand battle with failure, head 
down in the rain, just trying to stay upright and to have a little hope. The 
Tour is not just a bike race, not at all. It is a test. It tests you physically, it 
tests you mentally, and it even tests you morally. (71, my emphasis)   
 
Armstrong’s mother acts as a focal point for his extension of the automythology in 
It’s Not About the Bike. In the opening to chapter 2, he writes  
My mother was 17 when she had me, and from day one everyone told her we 
wouldn’t amount to anything, but she believed differently, and she raised me 
with an unbending rule: “Make every obstacle an opportunity.” (17)  
Along with similar phrases like “you can’t quit,” this phrase is repeated in various 
iterations at several points in the text, and always in quotation marks or italics, with 
the result that his mother ultimately becomes one of the text’s most prominent voices 
(38, 29, 52). This is further consolidated when, towards the end of the book, 
Armstrong tells of his mother’s response to his 1999 Tour de France victory: 
The press swarmed around her…and someone asked her if she thought my 
victory was against the odds. 
   “Lance’s whole life has been against all odds,” my mother told him. (261-
262)   
She is also present at the climax of the account’s first section, a suspense-filled 
passage in which the reader knows that Armstrong’s cancer diagnosis is just around 
the corner though his narrative persona remains blissfully unaware, and which, in 
another version of events, might have formed the end of a childhood memoir. 
Having just won the 1993 World Championship in Oslo, he writes: “It seemed like 
the end of something for my mother and me, the finish line. […] Maybe it was the 
end of the long, hard climb of childhood” (65). In this way, the point of origin for the 
Lance Armstrong legend is identified not in his illness experience, but far earlier, in 
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his childhood, with the result that the automythology form comes to envelop his life 
story as a whole, rather than his cancer story in isolation. The triumph against 
adversity narrative for which his mother stands thus becomes a prophetic structuring 
device into which one might expect Armstrong’s cancer experience to neatly fit.  
 
This retrospective deployment of the automythology as a prophetic structure device 
is not, in itself, particularly surprising, but rather takes shape as a simple inversion of 
what Frank identifies as one of the key functions of the memoir form: namely, “the 
incorporation […] of illness into the writer’s life” (120). What is surprising, 
however, is the conflict that arises between Armstrong’s incorporation of the illness 
experience into his life story and his privileging of the illness experience elsewhere 
in It’s Not About the Bike. This tension is indicated at key moments in the text: for 
example, when Armstrong’s coach calls his agent after the Beech Mountain 
breakthrough to say “Get ready. He’s coming back a different guy. The guy we used 
to know” (203). It is also reflected in the organisation of the text, and particularly the 
inclusion of a photographic paranarrative roughly midway through.  
 
Though chapter 1 recounts Armstrong’s first symptoms and initial diagnosis, and in 
this way places the experience at the forefront of the reader’s mind, the rest of the 
text is then organised chronologically, bookending his illness with dramatic accounts 
of events that defined his childhood and return to cycling. The photographic 
paranarrative departs from this front-loaded structure and instead reinforces the 
sense of chronology that characterizes the bulk of the memoir, sandwiching images 
of Armstrong during his treatment between childhood photos and racing shots 
familiar from the pages of international newspapers and websites. The emphatic 
foregrounding of cancer performed by chapter 1 is thus absent in this visual 
storyline. As a narrative that is almost, but not quite, identical to that within which it 
is embedded, this photographic section thus appears to the reader as both a challenge 
to and a performance of narrativity. 
  
The continual contortion of the automythology narrative in It’s Not About the Bike is 
just one of the ways in which Armstrong’s memoir draws attention to its aesthetic 
dimension, and distinguishes itself from the realm of documentary. However, though 
this contortion gnaws away at the foundations of the automythology, it is not, in 
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itself, sufficient to destabilise it entirely. This destabilisation is instead achieved by 
the text’s volatile approach to figurative language, an approach that is experienced as 
a curious, and at times uncomfortable, oscillation between continuity and change, 
sameness and difference. Through an alternate rejection and reinscription of 
metaphor, simile, analogy, and so on, the text gives rise to a series of performances 
similar to those described in earlier chapters.  
 
As one might expect, Armstrong’s use of figurative language centres around cycling 
- even his account’s title, as I pointed out earlier, proceeds from an extended 
metaphor in which cycling is portrayed as an analogy for life. Predictably, cycling—
and sport more generally— also provides Armstrong with a battery of imagery with 
which to describe his illness experience. He describes his state of mind before the 
first operation as being “as if I was getting ready for a big competition”, and later 
writes that “The more I thought about it, the more cancer began to seem like a race to 
me” (78, 89). The tumours in his lungs are “like white golf balls”, and encouraging 
blood results “a slam-dunk” (77, 146).  Armstrong finds “an odd commonality in the 
language of cancer and the language of cycling”: his dropping tumour markers are 
“my motivator, my yellow jersey”, and he begins “to think of my recovery like a 
time trial in the Tour” (92, 146). He recounts “wanting to tear the legs off cancer, the 
way I tore the legs off other riders on a hill” (146). Even the titanium staples holding 
his head together after neurosurgery are familiar: titanium, “an alloy used in some 
lighter-weight bikes” (126). Even his friends and doctors use cycling metaphors. 
Rick Parker refers to cancer as “a speed bump”, and in response to Armstrong’s 
questioning of his credentials, neurosurgeon Scott Shapiro responds “as good as you 
are at cycling…I’m a lot better at brain surgery” (74, 111).  
 
Against this, however, can be found a peculiar disavowal of figurative language. In a 
similar way to Armstrong’s treatment of the automythology form, this disavowal 
doesn’t take place in isolation, but as part of a rapid oscillation between two modes: 
the figurative, and the literal. This is particularly pronounced in the opening section 
of the text. Early on in chapter 1, for example, he describes how, as a cyclist, he’s 
been hit by “so many vehicles…so many times…in so many countries, I’ve lost 
count,” while also signalling his toughness by talking about how he would “wave a 
fist at the disappearing taillights”, and “take out [his] own stitches” (2). He then goes 
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on to draw an analogy between this experience and his illness. “Cancer was like 
that,” he writes: “It was like being run off the road by a truck, and I’ve got the scars 
to prove it” (2). Shortly after this passage comes the statement we encountered 
above, in which he both summarises and rejects the Lance Armstrong legend, 
emphatically stating that “I’m not storybook material” (3). To illustrate this, he 
provides an example:   
I’ve read that I flew up the hills and mountains of France. But you don’t fly 
up a hill. You struggle slowly and painfully up a hill, and maybe, if you work 
very hard, you get to the top ahead of everybody else. 
    Cancer is like that, too. (3) 
As you can see, here Armstrong does a very strange thing, in literary terms. He 
shifts, almost without skipping a beat, from an outright rejection of figurative 
language to a reinscription of it, with the simile “Cancer is like that, too”.  
 
This paradoxical shifting back and forth between the literal and the figurative is a 
recurrent feature of Armstrong’s account – a feature that not only reflects his 
conflicted relationship with the illness automythology and the Lance Armstrong 
legend more broadly, but also, and perhaps inadvertently, taps into the ambiguities 
Sontag and others have identified in the relationship between illness—and 
particularly cancer—and metaphor. Part of this stems, no doubt, from the temporal 
conflict inherent in an account that seeks to balance a retrospective awareness of the 
narrative arc of his illness—an awareness that most, if not all, of Armstrong’s 
readers bring to the text—with an attempt to authentically recreate this experience as 
it played out in real time. Likewise, the tensions that characterize Armstrong’s use of 
the automythology narrative as structuring device can easily be interpreted as 
evidence of illness’s disruptive effects. And yet, at the same time, I argue, these 
elements of Armstrong’s account—elements that only come into focus through the 
practice of close reading and textual analysis—instill in the reader a sense of 
multiplicity and contradiction that far exceeds the moments of uncertainty described 
in what would conventionally be thought of as the account’s content. This sense of 
multiplicity and contradiction, moreover, prohibits the reader from a simple 
decoding of Armstrong’s account, and instead encourages an engagement with the 
text characterized by ambiguity and open-endedness.      
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In this brief analysis of Armstrong’s memoir, therefore, I combine my own readings 
with those of other critics so as to give a sense of the complex and conflicting 
interpretations that It’s Not About the Bike invites. In doing so, I show how 
Armstrong’s memoir sustains multiple decodings, and in this way can be aligned 
with several of the key critical metanarratives that underpin current thinking about 
illness accounts in both literary studies and the medical humanities. Alongside this 
anatomization, however, I also identify elements in this account that are not only 
literary in the sense of aesthetic complexity, but which, by means of this literariness, 
thoroughly problematize the decodings alluded to above in ways not dissimilar to 
those identified in my readings of more self-evidently “literary” illness accounts. As 
such, in this compact reading of It’s Not About the Bike and its responses, I have 
sought both to draw together the main conceptual and analytical interventions of my 
research, and to demonstrate how these interventions might productively be extended 
well beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Though admittedly an unlikely example with which to illustrate the potential of 
reading illness accounts for the literary, Armstrong’s memoir is a testament not only 
the ease with which illness accounts—and particularly popular and/or non-fiction 
illness accounts—are seen to be outside the purview of the literary, but also to the 
way in which a more creative—or “rash”—approach to reading illness accounts in 
general can open up new interpretive possibilities and, in doing so, contribute to our 
thinking about the literary and its participation in the ethical. Given that the vast 
majority of the illness accounts that have poured forth in recent decades are not 
explicitly “literary,” the development of the increasingly sophisticated and inclusive 
humanities approach to illness account research that Waddington and Willis call for, 
and the integration of this perspective into the mainstream medical humanities, is 
particularly pressing. And yet, my readings in this thesis not only expose the 
limitations of existing literary studies approaches to illness accounts, but also 
demonstrate the capacity of illness accounts themselves to act as both an important 
and necessary check on the critical metanarratives that are brought to bear on them, 
and a forum within which new interpretive modes can be explored. As a final coda, 
then, I want to emphasize the importance of what Woolf calls rashness to the future 
of illness account research: to ways of reading that look beyond the need to make 
sense of illness accounts so as to let “other tastes assert themselves.” 
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